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ABSTRACT 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Applied Science. 
Teachers Talking About Their Epics 
Near Misses in Outdoor Education 
by Catherine M. Haddock 
This study examines incidents with high potential for serious harm (HIPO incidents) which 
occurred in Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre programmes. Through the use of 
qualitative techniques, the research explores definitions and meanings of key terms (accident, 
incident and epic); examines accounts of eleven HIPO incidents; considers effects the events had 
on those involved; identifies possible causes of the incidents and structures these into recognised 
models of analysis; investigates what people did about an event afterwards; and determines 
suitable procedures for reporting and analysis which would benefit a school's risk management 
plan. 
The results of the research affirm that HIPO incidents are meaningful events for teachers and 
instructors that experience them and that they have significance for safety and preventive 
purposes. Consistent with industrial research, incidents were shown to have multiple causes 
over a number of stages and most could be traced back to factors which management had 
control over. For example, a shortage of skilled and experienced outdoor staff was found to 
contribute to many incidents in the study. 
Additionally, HIPO incidents were processed both formally and informally after an event. 
Helpful procedures included formal debriefs, talking to family and friends, self ~eflection and 
recording it. Schools would do well to provide a no-blame forum for events to be discussed and 
appropriate remedial action planned at the conclusion of each outdoor education camp. 
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This thesis contends that due to the current focus on adventure activities in outdoor education, 
economic pressures and an analogous increase in professionalism and safety standards in the 
outdoor industry, outdoor education in New Zealand schools is in a process of transition. 
Elements of this have important implications for the management paradox between safety and 
risk. Schools need to re-evaluate their current resource allocation toward outdoor education 
programmes to ensure that staff have adequate experience for their responsibilities and 
programmes meet current industry standards. 
Key words 
Incident, high potential incident (HIPO), epic, accident, contributing causes, outdoor 
education, adventure education, risk, risk management, safety, Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor 
Education Centre, schools, accident prevention, incident analysis, outdoor leadership, 
leader competence, teacher, outdoor instructor. 
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction 
1.1 From professional interest to risk management research 
This study arose from my experience as a specialist outdoor educator working in a school-
based outdoor education centre where occasional 'near miss' incidents were a part of my 
outdoor lifestyle and work. I wished to learn more about these memorable and often turgid 
experiences. My interest was two-fold. To explore meaningls for those who experienced 
them, thereby discovering what place these events occupied in the outdoors culture of 
New Zealand. I also wished to examine the anatomy of a near miss, deconstructing it to 
see if analysis could indicate how to avoid similar events. 
A leading topic in outdoor leadership training and debate over the past decade was risk 
management in the outdoors. Where outdoor leaders had responsibility for others, there 
lay great responsibility, both for the leader and the organisation in which they worked or 
volunteered. Although adventure tourism had taken off in New Zealand in the 1990's, 
schools still provided the majority of this country's outdoor education experiences. Several 
deaths during outdoor programmes here and overseas gained high profile coverage in the 
media and outrage from the community in recent years. Parents who sent their children on 
school camps were almost completely trusting, yet the level of care provided did not 
always match the level of trust held by parents, in my view. 
1.1.1 Development of the research idea 
As an outdoor education programme manager, I was constantly surprised by the number 
of incidents that occurred, yet fascinated by the lack of recognition they received. The 
culture was one of 'We all got back safely' and 'We've been lucky, we've never had a 
serious accident'. Some incidents from previous trips were re-told as epic adventures, yet I 
was aware that some were potentially serious. Story telling may be part of the educative 
process, with listeners learning something of how to avoid similar incidents and/or a 
platform for the teller to gain hero-status. 
:~:~~~!:;~::~:~:~:~ 
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Due to the Health and Safety in Employment (HSE) Act (1992) and other statutes, 
accountability for those in the outdoor recreation profession had never been higher. This 
added to the 1990's thrust toward increasing standards and professionalism in outdoor 
leadership. The HSE Act required that a register be kept of 'Every accident that harmed 
(or, as the case may be, might have harmed) , (p.17) employees or other people in the 
workplace, with systems in place for their investigation and analysis. It was therefore 
important to evaluate methods for incident reporting and analysis in outdoor education, 
providing further rationale for the focus of the study. 
In the late 1980's I was involved in developing the Risk Management Training and 
Assessment Scheme, a Department of Education initiative to provide Education Outside 
the Classroom (EOTC) teachers with training courses in risk management. This led to my 
being contracted by the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council to write a manual to 
complement the courses (Hadd()ck, 1993a) which heightened my awareness of safety and 
risk management issues. 
So during my employment as Resident Teacher at Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education 
Centre from 1991 to 1997, I overhauled safety procedures. This process was both 
demanding and enlightening. There were few templates and little time and resources 
allocated by my employers to accomplish necessary tasks. I suspect most schools were in a 
similar situation, perhaps worse off, as many staff would have had little or no formal 
training in safety management. To aid the process and as part of a postgraduate 
qualification, I carried out several research projects which provided baseline data and 
information to develop safety management systems and procedures at the Lodge, and led 
to the current study. 
The first project was to set up incident and accident reporting procedures, to provide a 
database from which to plan our safety strategy and comply with the HSE Act. In 
analysing the results, I found where the majority of incidents were happening, in what 
locations, activities, and with which groups. Types of injuries were revealed as were 
common causes of events. Also, many of the factors contributing to incidents indicated a 
lack of judgement on the part of the leader of the activity. This was also found to be a 
.• _,<--" 
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leading cause of accidents in outdoor adventure programmes (Meyer, 1979) as sound 
judgement based on experience was critical to safety in the outdoors (see section 3.6). 
Consequently, in the second project I surveyed staff who came to Rotoiti Lodge to assist 
with camps, to evaluate their outdoor and leadership experience (Haddock, 1994). 
Compared with the national benchmarks set for voluntary bush craft instructors, teachers 
who assisted on camps at the Lodge did not always have adequate logged experience for 
leading tramps, which was an inherent risk in the programme. Of particular concern were 
winter tramps and those that ventured above the bushline. 
Several incidents in the hoard of information I collected each year struck me as significant. 
The incidents evoked feelings of "that was lucky ... whew! we got away with that", but did 
not stand out from the page. I sensed that these incidents were critical to safety. Studying 
a large number of incidents over" time gave a breadth of analysis that helped improve 
programme safety in certain areas. But I suspected studying a smaller number of significant 
events may give a depth of analysis not achievable in the broader study, revealing different 
insights to improve safety. The literature agreed (see section 1.3), providing impetus for 
the current study. 
My initial research questions related to my inter-twined interests in researching 'near 
misses' outlined earlier. How did teachers and instructors interpret these events? Did they 
see them as significant and potentially dangerous? What did they do about them 
afterwards, if anything? Why were they integrated into the folklore as epic adventures 
when often those involved were traumatised or shaken by the experience? How did one 
distinguish these events from adventures or an insignificant incident? Was this possible? 
Could a near miss be analysed to determine causes and preventive strategies? As my 
research proposal crystallised, a more formal set of research aims and objectives were 
developed (see section 1.6). 
1.2 Definitions of terms 
Terms used in this study are now defined. Section 1.2.1 includes commonly accepted 
nominal definitions based on the work of recognised experts in the fields of adventure 
.'. -..... -: .. -~.:. --- ,- '-. 
'~'>.';'.' .. '.'.'.'~:.'. 
<:.:.:..:.~::':.:~::.;:::::~~.: 
, . - . .. - .. ~ .. , .. ~ ~ 
4 
education and safety management. Section 1.2.2 contains operational definitions for the 
purposes of this paper. 
1.2.1 Nominal definitions 
An accident is an undesired event which results in personal injury, property damage or 
loss (Bird and Germain, 1992; Kauffman, 1989). 
An incident is an undesired event which, under slightly different circumstances, could 
have resulted in personal injury, property damage or loss. This study is concerned with 
incidents with high potential for serious or major loss (HIPO incidents) (Bird and 
Germain, 1992; Johnson, 1980). 
Risk is the potential to lose something of value. The loss may be physical, mental, social or 
financial. The presence of risk creates uncertainty (Miles and Priest, 1990; Priest and 
Baillie, 1987). 
There are three possible values for risk according to Priest and Baillie (1987). Absolute 
risk was the uppermost limit of risk inherent in a situation, with no safety controls present. 
Real risk was the amount of risk present, once adjusted by safety controls. Perceived risk 
was an individual's assessment of the real risk present. This differed from person to person 
and may not be related to the real or absolute risk. 
Safety means freedom from danger or risks (Allen, 1990) through the control of accidental 
loss (Bird and Germain, 1992). 
Risk management refers to those collective procedures utilised to keep risks and losses 
within an acceptable range (Priest and Dixon, 1990). 
Outdoor education is a broad term used to describe education which primarily takes 
place in the natural environment (McRae, 1992; Priest, 1990). 
.;. - ~'", ~-.:~~ .... "-.;--.... ~ 
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Education outside the classroom (EOTC) is a term used extensively by New Zealand schools 
in the same broad sense as outdoor education above (Abbott, 1990). 
An adventure is an experience where the outcome is uncertain because key information is 
missing, vague or unknown (Ewert, 1989a; Priest and Baillie, 1987). 
Adventure education is based on activities which create challenge and excitement by 
deliberately exposing participants to elements of risk (Ewert, 1989a; Hayllar, 1992; Miles 
and Priest, 1990). 
Processing in the context of this study refers to actions undertaken as a result of an 
incident. Actions may range from report writing and formal debriefing with colleagues and 
others, to informal discussion of the event by talking to peers or diary writing (Nadler and 
Luckner, 1992; Knapp, 1990). 
1.2.2 Operational definitions 
Resident Teacher: A specialist outdoor educator employed by the Lake Rotoiti Outdoor 
Education Trust to manage Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre programmes and 
instruct and lead groups in technical outdoor activities such as abseiling, high ropes 
elements, canoeing, caving, tramping and snow craft. 
Liaison Teacher: A position of responsibility designated to a teacher within each 
constituent school, involving the co-ordination of all camps at Rotoiti Lodge and liaison 
with Lodge resident teachers to negotiate and provide a suitable programme. 
Teacher: A qualified teacher who accompanies a school group to the Lodge, leads less 
technical activities and assists with other activities. This person is not necessarily an 
experienced outdoors person. 
Outdoor Educator: A qualified teacher who accompanies a school group to the Lodge 
and leads or co-leads outdoor activities. This person is an experienced and often qualified 
outdoor professional. 
_. ~ ,.' ., .. 
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Instructor: An experienced and often qualified outdoor professional, employed by the 
Lodge or school to assist in the leading and co-leading of outdoor activities. 
Assistant: A person who voluntarily accompanies a school group to the Lodge and assists 
qualified teachers or instructors with supervising activities andlor helps in the kitchen. This 
person is not necessarily an experienced outdoors person and could be a parent, tertiary 
student on placement or other volunteer. 
1.3 Accident and incident research 
There is a vast literature on the study of industrial accidents and incidents (Bird and 
Germain, 1992; Dwyer, 1991; Johnson, 1980; Kates, Hohenemser and Kasperson, 1985). 
Some authors saw the usefulness of this research for outdoor safety (Davidson, 1992; 
Haddock, 1993a; Kauffman, 1989; Meyer, 1979) .. 
1.3.1 Industrial research 
Bird and Germain's (1992) accident ratio study l (see Figure 1.1 below) suggested that 
accidents which resulted in serious injury were just the tip of an iceberg. This analysis of 
industrial events found that for each serious injury or fatality there were ten minor injuries, 
thirty cases of property damage and six hundred incidents with no visible injury or damage 
(a 1: 10:30:600 ratio). They concluded that since there were so many more incidents than 
accidents, organisations would be unwise to concentrate only on the few, serious accidents 
as much could be learned from incidents. 
Authors (Bird and Germain, 1992; Johnson, 1980; Q'Shell and Bird, 1969) pondered, do 
minor incidents predict major accidents? They reported Heinrich (pioneer in industrial 
safety c1959) drew attention to the high ratio of minor to major events, urging attention be 
given to the numerous incidents. But Johnson (1980) argued that the principle was 
misapplied if aU incidents were lumped together. He reported that as early as 1940, a 
National Safety Council (USA) study in the electric utility industry pointed out that minor 
injuries (bumps, bruises, minor cuts, and dust in the eyes) did not focus on causes of 
1 This study analysed nearly two million events reported by 300 companies involving two million employees who worked three 
billion person hours (Bird and Germain, 1992). 
.~ ," • ~,-'I . '.-.'.' . 
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electric shock fatalities. Thus many minor injuries were unrelated to major accidents. 
Johnson concluded the minor to major event relationship had preventive values primarily 
within a specific type of event. Others agreed (Bird and Germain, 1992; Johnson, 1980; 
O'Shell and Bird, 1969) that 'near misses' with high potential for serious harm, were 
predictive of serious accidents in ways that typical first-aid cases were not. Thus, 'HIPO' 
incidents should be investigated as thoroughly as accidents (Bird and Germain, 1992). 
Figure 1.1 
• Serious or major 
injury 
• Minor injury 
• Property damage 
accidents 
• Incidents with no 
visible injury or 
dama~e (near miss) 
Accident ratio study (Bird and Germain, 1992, p. 21). 
Hale (1989) advocated that outdoor programme leaders should also take note of these 
events. He described four important indices of close calls, those involved:express relief, 
often through exaggeration and humour; often do not identify it as a true accident and do 
not report it formally; therefore no analysis is made; no analysis means no intervention to 
stop or alter the close-call circumstance, tending to promote a recurrence, often with 
escalating seriousness. Hale suggested information learned from a close-call should be 
documented, analysed and networked among peers in that and other programmes. 
HIPO incidents were shown to be related to accidents in that they had similar causes (Bird 
and Germain, 1992; Hale, 1989; Johnson, 1980; Kates, Hohenemser and Kasperson, 
1985; Kauffman, 1989). Yet incidents went grossly under reported (Dwyer, 1991; Hale, 
1989; O'Shell and Bird, 1969) and were even 'shrouded by a veil of silence' (Dwyer, 
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1991, p.6). HIPO incidents differed from accidents in that no injury or damage resulted. 
But the type and degree of loss were a matter of chance, depending partly on fortuitous 
circumstances and partly on the actions taken to minimise the loss (Bird and Germain, 
1992). Consequently, the effect could range from insignificant to catastrophic, from a 
scratch or dent to multiple fatalities or loss of plant (equipment or buildings). 
1.3.2 Determining significant events 
Delineating high potential 'near-miss' incidents from minor accidents and incidents with no 
relationship to major accidents, posed a challenge. Johnson (1980) highlighted the 
importance of 'the professional scan of minor injury reports and property damage reports 
... to bring to light cases of potentially great significance. ' (p. 371). This relied on the 
input of someone with expertise in safety and the particular industry. 
Seriousness 
Q) 
u 
s:: o 1 2 3 
Q) 
S u 0 u 0 1 2 3 
0 
I.j.... 
0 
1 .~ 1 2 3 4 
~ 
~ 2 ..0 2 3 4 5 
8 
p.... 
3 3 4 5 6 
Risk Factors 
Figure 1.2 Risk assessment model. (Albrighton, 1993, p.18). 
DESCRIPTORS FOR MODEL 
Probability Ranking Points: 
o 
1 
2 
3 
Very unlikely 
Slight possibility 
Medium possibility 
Highly possible 
Seriousness: 
o 
1 
2 
3 
Of no consequence 
Marginal 
Quite serious 
Catastrophic 
Probability Points + Seriousness Points = Risk Factor 
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Several tools have been developed to assist the professional in this endeavour. Albrighton's 
(1993) risk assessment model (Figure 1.2 above) is one such tool. It ranks the probability 
and seriousness of events in order to produce a risk factor. Thus the significance of an 
individual event is estimated. 
Albrighton (1993) recommended that incidents with a risk factor ofthree or more should 
generate further investigation, analysis and corrective action. Incidents with a risk factor of 
three or more were the focus of this study. Albrighton's model was used to attain scores. 
1.3.3 Accident and incident analysis 
Accidents and (by implication) 'lllPO' incidents were generally never the result of a single 
cause. They were the result of a mixture of events and factors which built up over time and 
combined under just the right circumstances to cause an accident or 'lllPO' incident (Bird 
and Germain, 1992; Raffan, 1984). Since multiple causes took time to evolve, it followed 
that there were multiple opportunities to predict accidents by identifying the antecedental 
causes and intervening to prevent the accident. 
Researchers identified stages of accident causation, signalling possible intervention points. 
Bird and Germain (1992) identified immediate, basic and lack of control causes, showing 
most accidents could be traced back to lack of management control factors. Similarly, 
Kates et al (1985) structured accidents into a causal sequence. Additionally, they identified 
'pathways' for intervention between each stage, concluding that the earlier the intervention 
occurred, the greater were the preventive benefits. Although the trend in accident analysis 
was to reduce and simplify events into a linear sequence, researchers (Bird and Germain, 
1992; Johnson, 1980; Kates et aI, 1985) acknowledged that accidents were complex 
events and more tree or web like than linear. Fault tree analysis is a recognised technique 
which shows this type of structure (Johnson, 1980). 
Other authors (Helms, 1984; Kauffman, 1989; Raffan, 1984) saw the importance of 
recognising the 'lemons' or 'accident chain' before an accident occurred in the outdoors. 
Lemons were causal factors which, if left unchecked, could lead to an accident (Raffan, 
1984). An accident chain was a series of events which, when viewed in retrospect, led to 
.-., • : • .'"':.~ ,,~-<., -~.' 
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an accident (Kauffman, 1989). These authors highlighted the significance of the HIPO 
incident in affording an opportunity to analyse an incident without a death or serious injury 
necessitating the process. 
Philip chalk (1995) highlighted the hindsight bias, 'our tendency, in looking back, to 
overestimate our ability to foresee actual consequences' (p.143). So while retrospective 
analysis of contributing factors to events may be useful for preventive purposes, leaders 
and researchers may overestimate people's ability to pre-empt accidents by spotting such 
factors during normal operation. 
1. 4 Contributing causes 
The literature highlighted common and significant causes of accidents and incidents in the 
outdoors. Helms (1984) reported two studies that found that accepting increased levels of 
risk contributed to most accidents. He concluded that risk shift, get-home-itis and 
familiarisation with the situation were the three largest contributing factors to accidents. 
Risk shift was the phenomenon where groups made riskier decisions than the individuals 
that comprise them (Freedman, Carl smith and Sears, 1970 cited in Allen, 1980). Get 
home-itis was trying to adhere to a schedule or forgetting everything else once the end was 
in sight. Familiarisation with the situation was when experienced people who knew the 
territory, had a reduced perception of the actual risks present. 
Table 1.1 Principal causes of major accidents in adventure programmes 
(Meyer, 1979, p. 11). 
Loose rock 
Inadequate area 
Unexpected water/ 
im 
cedure 
Unsafe speed 
Inadequate water/ 
nutrient intake 
Unexpected or new 
situation 
Desire to please others 
Misperception 
Fatigue/ distraction 
t-. 
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Meyer (1979) found that the majority of accidents in adventure programmes were the 
result of a combination of any of the following: an unobserved or underestimated unsafe 
condition, an unsafe act on the part of a student or an error of judgement on the part of 
staff. These factors are illustrated in Table 1.1 above. 
Haddock (1996a) identified wild card factors in some HIPO incidents. These factors were 
characterised by their unpredictable nature and usually inhered in the colleagues or 
students a leader was working with. For example, behaviour which took them by surprise 
and put them in a reactive mode, often without all the information. 
1. 5 Approaches to accident and incident research 
Industrial and outdoor studies alike mainly concentrated on quantitatively analysing the 
number and types of events which occur and determining possible contributing factors 
(Bird and Germain, 1992; Haddock, 1993b; Federated Mountain Clubs of New Zealand, 
cited in Johnston, 1989; Meyer, 1979; Peart, 1991). Most studies of accidents in outdoor 
programmes relied on using pre-existing data. Such studies provided useful information, 
but researchers reported limitations of the approach, given the varied quality and 
availability of data (Meyer, 1979; Peart, 1991). 
Bird and Germain (1992) contended that accident statistics were not in themselves a 
reliable indicator of the degree of risk in an organisation. They maintained that just because 
an organisation had a favourable frequency rate today, did not mean it could not have a 
disaster tomorrow. Some industrial researchers (Dwyer, 1991; O'Shell and Bird, 1969) 
incorporated qualitative methodology into their approaches. Dwyer (1991) studied the 
social context surrounding industrial accidents and incidents using a case study approach 
to assist in the analysis of the complexity of accident causation. He, along with Bird and 
Germain (1992), found incident records to be incomplete in the workplaces they studied, 
and accidents and incidents to be grossly under-reported and in some cases misreported. 
Dwyer argued that a case study approach overcame many disadvantages of relying solely 
on available secondary data. Where data were missing he could access further information 
through interviews and observation. He could also ascertain the extent of misreporting and 
under-reporting. 
.. -.--~;.,-->.,> .... -.,:, 
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In summary, the research showed the following. Studies investigating accident causation in 
industrial and outdoor settings focused on available records of accidents where losses had 
occurred. Although recognised as important for preventive purposes, research on near 
misses was invisible in the literature, probably due to a lack of information. Researchers 
indicated that qualitative techniques may overcome problems of relying on absent or 
inadequate secondary data. Consequently I chose qualitative techniques for this research, 
to elicit information about HIPO incidents in the social context of outdoor education. I 
used interviews, focus groups and pre-existing incident records to gather data, which are 
explained fully in Chapter Two. The study had the following aims and objectives. 
1. 6 Research aim and objectives 
The literature reviewed suggested that the investigation of incidents with high potential for 
serious loss had significance for safety and preventive measures. The aim of this research 
was to investigate high potential "inCidents which occurred in Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor 
Education Centre programmes and the actions that resulted. In doing so, I aimed to 
ascertain meanings of events for those involved and elucidate suitable mechanisms for their 
reporting and analysis. To achieve these aims, the research had the following objectives: 
a) To elicit at least ten first hand accounts of high potential incidents that teachers and 
instructors have experienced whilst leading or co-leading groups of students. 
b) To describe meanings of HIP 0 incidents for respondents including definitions 
meaningful to them, effects events had on those involved, and determining the 
significance of events for them. 
c) To describe possible causes of each incident as identified by respondents and 
contained in incident records, to ascertain patterns common to several incidents 
and to structure these using recognised models of analysis. 
d) To investigate how (or it) HIPO incidents were processed by describing what 
people said and did about it, if anything, afterwards. 
.,,.=.::,,.:,~,~< :'-' 
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To elucidate procedures for incident reporting and analysis (formal and informal) 
and determine which would be beneficial to a school's risk management plan. 
1. 7 The significance and implications of the research 
This research will increase understanding of incidents that have occurred in outdoor 
education programmes at Rotoiti Lodge and provide insights into reporting and analysis 
procedures for outdoor education. The research may be useful for outdoor education 
policy-makers and administrators, particularly the Lake Rotoiti Outdoor Education Trust 
Board and Boards of Trustees ofRotoiti Lodge's constituent schools, who have ultimate 
responsibility for student safety. It may assist Resident Teachers, instructors and school 
teachers working in the programmes by improving understanding offactors which 
contribute to high potential incidents, indicate suitable procedures for analysing them, and 
offer guidance for improving programme safety. 
The results of this study will add to the body of research into outdoor education accidents 
and incidents. The research is particularly relevant in the context of the New Zealand 
Health and Safety in Employment Act (1992), whereby the reporting of significant 
accidents and near accidents to the authorities is mandatory. The research will assist 
schools to comply with the Act by identifying suitable procedures for incident analysis in 
outdoor education. The study will also indicate directions for future research into safety in 
school outdoor programmes. Finally, the increasing interest and demand for public 
accountability in respect of safety in adventure programmes makes this research timely. 
1. 8 Limitations of the research 
This is an in-depth contextual study of high potential incidents which have occurred at 
Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre, so it therefore has limitations. If the respondent 
group is found to be different from teachers and instructors who assist with outdoor 
education programmes elsewhere in the country or if the setting differs significantly from 
elsewhere in the country, then the results of this study may not be widely generalisable. 
This can be tested in future studies. The study was also limited by dependence on 
respondent co-operation, honesty and memory issues. 
"', .: .:,.:.<~;.",~; 
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1.9 Thesis structure 
In Chapter One I explained the development of the research idea, defined terms and 
concepts associated with the research, examined accident and incident causation and 
research, approaches taken to study incidents and accidents and outlined the research aim 
and objectives. I also explained the significance, implications and limitations of the 
research. In Chapter Two I describe the theoretical perspective, setting and my research 
methods. I discuss ethical considerations and explain data analysis procedures. In Chapter 
Three I define outdoor education, examine the history of outdoor education in New 
Zealand and place Rotoiti Lodge within this context. I also discuss outdoor leadership 
competence and its relationship to safety in outdoor education. Finally, I explore attempts 
to determine society's acceptance and tolerance of risk. These topics establish the context 
for the substantive chapters that follow. In Chapter Four I compare accepted definitions of 
recognised experts, with respondents' own definitions of an accident, incident and epic. 
Subsequently I revise accepted definitions of accident and incident in the New Zealand 
outdoor education context. I also define an outdoor epic, as previously none existed. From 
this work, I distil meanings of HIP 0 incidents for teachers and instructors of outdoor 
education. In Chapter Five, I examine the effects of HIP 0 incidents on those involved. In 
Chapter Six I introduce Albrighton's (1993) risk assessment model for determining the 
significance of an event and present and discuss results of its use in the study. In Chapter 
Seven I examine how HIPO incidents were processed formally and informally and which 
processes and settings were conducive or non conducive to constructive reflection on an 
event. I also examine the extent to which knowledge gained from an event was transferred 
to prevent similar events in the future. In Chapter Eight, I analyse contributing factors to 
HIPO incidents. Finally, in Chapter Nine I draw together the argument and conclude that 
HIPO incidents are indeed meaningful events for teachers and instructors who experience 
them whilst leading groups of students in the outdoors. They have significance for 
improving safety in outdoor education and therefore schools would do well to encourage 
and provide a 'no blame' forum for the events to be discussed and appropriate action 
planned at the conclusion of each outdoor education camp or activity. 
': , ~ _-I ;,;. ••• ' :'._.;,_~ 
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CHAPTER TWO Methods 
2.1 Introduction and theoretical perspective 
Previous research focused on accidents rather than incidents. Accident research was 
mainly quantitative in approach, providing a broad analysis of accident type, causes and 
frequency, rather than the meanings associated with the experience. I wanted to take an in-
depth look at incidents with high potential for harm, for which few official records existed 
and little research had been done, rendering them less visible in the literature than 
accidents. Hence the adoption of qualitative research because: 
... qualitative research is often the most 'adequate' and 'efficient' method for 
obtaining the type of information required andfor contending with the difficulties 
of an empirical research situation (Glaser and Strauss, 1970, p.289). 
Primarily, I wanted to know the meanings 9fthe HIPO incident experience for those 
involved and how the event was dealt with afterwards. A symbolic interactionist approach 
was most appropriate to elicit this information as it concentrates on studying human 
action: 
The action consists of the multitudinous activities that the individuals perform in 
their life as they encounter one another and as they deal with the succession of 
situations confronting them (Blumer, 1969, p. 6). 
Significantly, the approach also recognises that, 
people act toward things on the basis of the meaning that these things have for 
them [so). .. if the scholar wishes to understand the action of people it is necessary 
for him (sic) to see their objects as they see them (Blumer, 1969, p. 51). 
This theoretical perspective had profound methodological implications according to 
Blumer (1969). First it required the researcher to be positioned in the relevant setting. 
Second, to find objects of central concern, a set of relevant observations were needed. 
Blumer argued these were rarely produced by questionnaires, scales, surveys or other 
methods using pre-determined variables. Rather, descriptive accounts were required from 
actors, of how they saw the objects, how they acted toward them in a variety of situations 
and how they referred to objects when talking with members of their group. Blumer 
addressed problems and solutions with the approach. How could the testimony of 
individual informants and the interpretation of the researcher be relied upon? 
'~;.'.': 'w';'.', ""_,;,,,' 
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the depiction of key objects that emerge ... should be subject to probing and 
critical collective discussion by a group of well-informed participants in the given 
world. This latter procedure is a 'must' to guard against the admitted deficiencies 
of individual accounts ... [additionally] scholars ... are prone to assume that 
other people see the given objects as they ... [so] need to guard against this 
proneness and give high priority to deliberate testing of their images (Blumer, 
1969, p.52). 
I took an interactionist approach in this study, choosing in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions as primary means of gathering data. I used focus group discussions to 
counter the deficiencies of individual interviews and researcher bias identified above, 
providing triangulation of methods and giving rigour to the research. Methods are 
discussed in detail in section 2.8. 
2.2 Validity and reliability issues 
Memory deteriorates with time elapsed (Cohen, 1989), but no guidance for how much 
time elapse resulted in deterioration was fo'und in the literature. So, after discussion with 
Moore (Pers. Comm., 1995), a time limit was settled on to reduce threat to the validity of 
data which depends on memory. Incidents had to occur between two months and two and 
a half years before the interview to allow reflection and action to occur following an event 
(research objectives c and d), while ensuring the experience was still within recall. 
Memories of certain episodes in one's life are known as episodic memories (Cohen, 1989; 
Philip chalk, 1995). The psychological literature on memory suggested that many factors 
affected the relative recall of episodic memories and their reliability. The longer ago an 
event occurred the more intervening factors were involved (Cohen, 1989). So this research 
did not assume that memories recalled were entirely accurate. 
Using memories to determine 'what actually happened' poses several problems. A body of 
work on eye witness testimony, relevant to courtroom situations, suggested that memory 
can be recalled in a way that depends as much on the questions as on the details of the 
event (Philip chalk, 1995). So three within-method triangulation techniques were used to 
strengthen data validity (Denzin, 1989; Moore, Pers. Com., 1995), especially in respect to 
research objective c (to determine possible causes of events for preventive purposes). 
Lodge incident reports written at the time of the incident were consulted to provide a 
c_' .• 
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check on accuracy and possibly add detail. Also, where possible, I interviewed two people 
together who were involved in the same incident, providing collaboration. This was 
achieved for two interviews, involving three incidents. Each person had their own 
perspective on events, providing a fuller picture of the incident. Finally, respondents were 
sent copies of their transcripts to add or correct information not recalled or mis-recalled 
during the interview. In all cases, no significant alterations or additions were made on the 
returned transcripts. 
There is a large literature on factors involved in distortion and reconstruction of episodic 
memories. Schemata and scripts for example, are known to distort memories (Philipchalk, 
1995). These are mental structures concerning what we expect to happen in certain events 
or how we expect certain objects to appear, for example, respondents may have a script 
for what happens on a tramp. Specific factors related to respondents' motivations, 
emotions and self image also distort memories and are especially relevant to this study. 
Emotions such as guilt and motivations such as the desire not to appear incompetent may 
have affected the way that memories were reconstructed and reported. The well 
researched attributional or self serving bias, 'our tendency to take credit for positive 
behaviours or outcomes, but to blame external causes for negative ones' (Baron and 
Byrne, 1987, p. 59; also supported by Brehm and Kassin, 1993) can also be responsible for 
memory reconstruction. Sports people for example will often attribute blame for negative 
events (like losing) to external factors such as the weather or the referee and take credit for 
positive events (like winning) by attributing internal factors such as their skill and heroic efforts. 
There is also the possibility that some may simply lie. Strategies outlined above were used 
to caution against these problems also, but some could not be fully cautioned against. 
Having outlined the accuracy problems associated with using memories as data, there were 
also advantages. Recent work has extolled the value of memory work in unfolding 
meaning from people's experiences (Crawford et ai, 1992). This was a particular strength 
in addressing objective b in this research. 
In addition, HIPO incidents were atypical occurrences and therefore 'most memorable 
experiences' (MMEs) for respondents (Cohen, 1989; Woike, 1995). 
. - ,.' , ~ 
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Affective MMEs are deemed important ... and somewhat rare experiences for the 
majority ... Research suggests that emotional intensity combined with personal 
significance often gives rise to personal memories that are highly available for 
recall and comparatively resistant to forgetting (Woike, 1995, p.1088-9). 
Cohen (1989) outlined a study where students were asked to describe three of their 
clearest memories. 'The most commonly reported events concerned injuries or accidents, 
sports, and encounters with the opposite sex ... '(p.124). Elements which heightened 
impact and therefore improved retention were highly affective events involving intense 
feelings and emotions. Additionally, such events were retold often, cementing them in a 
person's memory even more. Subject matter for this research, HIPO incidents, would 
therefore have a high chance of retention in respondents' memories. 
To determine which HIPO incidents were included in the study, respondents were asked to 
rate incidents using Albrighton's (1993) risk assessment model. As an external control on 
incidents included in: the study and to control for the inaccuracy associated with self-
reporting, I recruited an external consultant to also rate incidents. An outdoor educator 
with extensive experience working with school groups at the Lodge, this person was sent 
the incident account sections of interviews after the data collection phase. If one or both 
parties rated the incident a three or more, it was included in the study. Risk assessment 
scores are discussed in Chapter Six. 
2.3 The research setting 
Field work for this research took place at Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre 
(hereafter known as Rotoiti Lodge or the Lodge). It opened in February 1968, the result ofa 
local initiative, substantial voluntary work and community funding. It is situated in Nelson 
Lakes National Park in the upper South Island of New Zealand. At the time of the research 
(1995-7) Rotoiti Lodge was a school outdoor education centre, reflecting a unique 
partnership between the Department of Conservation and the Lake Rotoiti Outdoor 
Education Trust (hereafter known as the Trust). 
The Department of Conservation owned and maintained the buildings (a large hall, 
kitchen, bunkrooms comprising 70 beds, a classroom, storage and gear sheds) and gave 
priority of use to thirteen Nelson and Marlborough secondary schools. The schools are best 
, . '. --
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described as six larger town schools (consisting of two single-sex girls' schools, one single sex 
boys' school and three co-educational schools); two smaller town co-educational schools; three 
rural co-educational area schools; a special school for girls and the correspondence school (co-
educational, catering for pre-school to seventh form students who are unable to attend a regular 
school for various reasons). 
The Trust devolved management of its affairs to an Executive Committee, comprised of 
the managing principal (constituent school principals take two year turns in this role), 
Trust accountant and two resident teachers. The Trust employed a warden who was 
responsible for maintenance and administrative tasks and two resident teachers (specialist 
outdoor educators) to develop, manage and instruct programmes to ensure education and 
conservation objectives were met. The Trust also owned and was responsible for the 
maintenance of, a considerable amount of outdoor gear, equipment and a minibus. 
Programmes varied seasonally and according to group level. Although a regional centre, 
Rotoiti Lodge enjoyed a high national profile reflecting the breadth of the region's outdoor 
programmes (The Trust, 1992). These included environmental education programmes at sixth 
form level, and outdoor pursuits and adventure education programmes at third, fourth and sixth 
form levels. This study focused mainly on the latter. Rotoiti Lodge's current mission 
statement states it is: 
An educational resource for schools which: 
responds to the needs and requirements of each school 
provides safe, stimulating experiences for pupils, as a medium for curriculum 
enrichment, enhancing self confidence and self esteem and developing 
communication, co-operation andgroup skills. (Haddock and Campbell, 1995, 
p. i) 
Approximately 2,000 students per year attend Lodge programmes. Groups of 40 to 60 students 
are in residence for five days (70 programme hours), for 37 weeks annually. This involves 
2,500 programme hours or 140,000 participant hours per year (Haddock, 1994). An estimated 
110-120 teachers attended camps at the Lodge annually with four accompanying each group. 
Following are demographic and other characteristics of staff who attended camps at the Lodge 
in 1994 (Haddock, 1994). Teachers were mainly a mature group; the modal age range was 40-
45 years, with 67 per cent aged between 31 and 45 years. Although drawn from six 
>~.:,;, :-~<-:-:.; -: .:.;. 
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coeducational, two girls' and one boys' school, 58 per cent of teachers who assisted with 
camps were male. Of the 92 study respondents, 82 attended camps in the period 1988-1994, of 
which 75 per cent attended three or more times. Staff reported a breadth of experience 
participating in activities related to Lodge activities (walking, tramping, camping, skiing, 
mountaineering), although they reported less leadership experience in these activities. 
Compared with national benchmarks for volunteer bush craft instructors, staff reported limited 
logged days over the previous two years and experience leading in winter conditions. For 
example, 55 staff reported they currently led the Bushline Tramp (a two day tramp above the 
bushline). Only four of these staff reported having the skills and experience necessary to lead 
tramps in winter conditions, yet all could potentially end up leading in such conditions. This fell 
below current nationally accepted outdoor industry standards for leading such a trip. The study 
(Haddock, 1994) concluded that outdoor and leadership experience of staff leading tramps, 
particularly above the bushline or in snow conditions was generally lacking. This was 
considered a potential risk to stud~nts and staff alike. 
This situation developed incrementally due to changes in the types of activities provided at the 
Lodge over the decades. These activities reflected popular trends in outdoor education over 
time. Whereas geography and biology fieldwork exercises and tramps were the main activities 
offered at Rotoiti Lodge in the 1960' sand 1970's, a trend toward more adventure activities 
such as canoeing, abseiling, caving and ropes courses was evident in the 1980's and 1990's 
(Crouch, Pers. Comm., 1996). These incremental changes were not accompanied by changes to 
staffing arrangements at the Lodge. Resident teachers led tramps in the early years while school 
staff assisted or led field work activities based around the Lodge. In later years resident teachers 
were used to lead adventure activities and some tramps, necessitating school staff to lead some 
tramps and low risk Lodge based activities such as orienteering or botany walks. By the 1990's, 
two specialist outdoor education staff were employed when four groups required experienced 
leaders each week. This necessitated reliance on school staff to lead activities for the other two 
groups, often without adequate experience or training. I surmise that over time, this situation 
became tradition and accepted practice. 
." - -- 0','" , -
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2.4 The remoteness of the setting 
Rotoiti Lodge activities were located in or near Nelson Lakes National Park, except Huia caves 
which was in neighbouring Kahurangi National Park. Booth and Peebles (1995, p. 40) 
reviewed the spatial differences in use of National Parks. They found that front country 
referred to visitors' centres, short walks, road ends and amenity areas such as day shelters and 
picnic spots. Back country was accessible via the hut and track network and wilderness 
contained no facilities at all. The latter two were accessible by foot (or helicopter in an 
emergency) only. 
Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre used front and back country and wilderness areas, all 
remote in a sense. For example, if an accident happened near the Lodge, the nearest medical 
help was an hours drive to Wakefield Medical Centre or one and a half hours drive to Nelson 
Hospital. Backcountry hutsandcalnpsites were from one and a half to three hours walk from 
the Lodge or road end. While front country huts (Lakehead and Coldwater) were three hours 
walk or 30 minutes motor boat ride from the Lodge. 
2.5 Why Rotoiti Lodge? 
Rotoiti Lodge was chosen as a study site because I was working as a resident teacher at 
the Lodge during the data collection period and had done for three years, an excellent 
position to do the research given my position and experience. Second, most prospective 
respondents knew me and an element of trust existed, so recruiting respondents was 
relatively easy. However, finding time to interview and hold focus group discussions was 
most difficult indeed. The very nature of a school camp is total commitment, with staff 
working long hours and constantly on duty. Aspects such as the changing weather and 
associated programme changes, student behaviour and staff fatigue acted to compound 
the hectic pace and atmosphere of camp as it went along. 
Third, procedures were in place to record and discuss accidents and incidents and staff 
were used to this. Incident records relevant to the study were also available for 
examination. Fourth, boundaries were more identifiable as schools had similar outdoor 
education programmes at the time of the research, reducing variability in the study and 
t·· 
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enhancing the possibility of generalisation of the findings. Finally, Lodge programmes were 
at the forefront of national EOTe curriculum and professional developments, so Rotoiti Lodge 
was a model for other centres to follow (The Trust, 1992). Thus research based at Rotoiti 
Lodge would most likely gain national attention in the field. 
2.6 Description of sample 
Qualitative inquiry focuses on a limited number of purposefully selected cases. Key criteria 
lead to selecting 'information rich cases ... from which one can learn a great deal about 
issues of central importance to .. , the research, thus the term purposeful sampling' 
(patton, 1990, p. 169). A purposive sample was used for this study, selected from 
Resident Teachers employed at the Lodge; outdoor educators and instructors employed by 
the Lodge or schools; teachers and assistants who assisted with camps at the Lodge; all 
during the data collection period (October 1995 - August 1997). Respondents also needed 
to be willing participants in the study. 
Interviewees had experienced a high potential incident whilst leading or co-leading a group 
of students during an outdoor activity at Rotoiti Lodge. Eleven respondents took part in 
ten individual or paired interviews. They included five teachers, three outdoor educators, 
one resident teacher, one instructor and one assistant (social worker employed by school). 
See Table 2.1 for their brief biographical details. 
For convenience, focus group respondents were groups of staff who assisted with a camp 
together at Rotoiti Lodge during the data collection period. Nineteen respondents took 
part in five focus group discussions. They included ten teachers, seven outdoor educators 
and two instructors. One outdoor educator was also a liaison teacher and two outdoor 
educators were also assistants (postgraduate students on placement). Three focus groups 
involved three staff, one involved four and one involved six. See Table 2.2 for their brief 
biographical details. 
2. 7 Pilot study 
A pilot study was conducted at the research setting. Its purpose was to develop, check and 
refine research procedures and instruments to be used for the primary data collection. Six 
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interviews and one focus group discussion were held. On completion of pilot work, the 
interview schedule and risk assessment model were revised (see Appendices II and III). 
Three incidents in pilot interviews were rated a three or more on the risk assessment 
matrix. So once revisions were made, the three respondents were asked the additional 
questions and to re-rate their incidents using the revised model, and their interviews were 
included in the primary data. 
2.B Methods 
The research questions required detailed descriptive information about high potential 
incidents respondents had experienced whilst leading students at the Lodge. Qualitative 
methods were considered most suited for eliciting this information. So, in-depth semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions were chosen to collect data. Other 
sources were used to provide background to the study. These included incident and 
accident records kept at Rotoiti Lodge, my personal experience, literary sources, 
observations and discussions with colleagues. 
2.8.1 The interviews 
In-depth, semi-structured, audio-taped interviews were used to gain data to address 
research objectives a-e. Their purpose was to gain retrospective case study data pertaining 
to HIPO incidents. Respondents were asked to define terms associated with the study; 
discuss a high potential incident they had experienced whilst leading or co-leading students 
at the Lodge; describe the actions they had taken since the event; and rate the incident 
using a risk assessment model. 
All interviews were semi-structured with an 'emergent design', meaning that as something 
was learned from an interview, that knowledge was built into later parts of the interview or 
the next interview (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A schedule of questions guided interviews to 
elicit information which specifically addressed research objectives a-e. The schedule was 
modified from a previous study on a similar topic (Haddock, 1995/6a), and the pilot study. 
It is included in Appendix III. 
. --.,-,,-:--; 
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Interviews lasted between 35 and 90 minutes, with an average of 55 minutes. Times and 
places were arranged to suit respondents. They were held at the Lodge, my house which is 
one kilometre from the Lodge, or at the respondent's school or home. All interviews were 
face to face except one which was conducted over the telephone. 
2.8.2 The focus groups 
In-depth, semi-structured, audio-taped focus group discussions were used to address 
research objectives band e. The discussions differed from the in-depth interviews, taking 
place with a minimum of input from me as the interviewer. Topics included defining key 
concepts relevant to the study; what they did about events afterwards, if anything; a risk 
assessment case-study; (see Appendix III for the full schedule). I initiated topics and 
facilitated discussion, whilst allowing the group to formulate and develop their ideas, 
challenge one another's assertions and explore complex issues themselves. This reduced 
the chances of me inadvertently influencing those involved (Morgan, 1988). 
Six focus group discussions were held. Five were included in the study as one was not 
taped due to operator error. Times and places for meetings were negotiated by myself and 
staff. Three were held at the Lodge in the classroom or resident teacher's office, one at a 
school and one by conference telephone call. It was much harder to arrange for staff to be 
involved in the focus group discussions than interviews. Given the nature and demands of 
camps, it was difficult to withdraw all staff from their responsibilities. To enable them to 
be released for a sufficient length of time, a structured activity was run by a Resident 
Teacher or Department of Conservation officer or a teacher, parents or other assistants 
supervised students. Focus group discussions lasted from 45 to 90 minutes. 
2.8.3 The respondents 
To recruit respondents, I sent a letter to staff through their Liaison Teachers outlining my 
research and informing them I would ask for volunteers to participate in the study if they 
came to the Lodge in the data collection period. I outlined the research to principals and 
Liaison Teachers at the AGM of the Trust, wrote to Trustees formally asking permission 
to undertake the research and wrote a brief article explaining the purpose and details of the 
research in the Lodge newsletter to all schools. 
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2.8.3.1 Interview respondents 
I used three methods to recruit interviewees. One involved me explaining my project at the 
first staff briefing and asking if anyone was interested in being involved. I recruited four 
respondents in this way. Second, if a teacher was assisting on a camp whom I knew had 
experienced an incident in the last two and a half years, I asked them individually if they 
were interested in being involved in my project. I gained three interviews in this way, 
including one pair interview. All those asked agreed to be involved. 
Finally, if an incident occurred during the data collection period, I either asked those 
involved if they were prepared to be interviewed at a later date or made a mental note and 
telephoned them several months later. I gained three interviews this way, including one 
pair interview focusing on two separate incidents which occurred on the same camp they 
had attended. All those asked, agreed to be involved. In total, ten interviews were held 
with eleven respondents, five females and six males, from five different schools. Brief 
biographical details are included in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 Interview respondents 
Agatha F 36 Instructor Leader Orange 
Tommy M 44 Teacher Assistant Violet 
Miriam F 31 Teacher Assistant Violet 
Renal M 38 Outdoor educator Leader / TIC3 Orange 
Bruce M 47 Instructor Co-leader Grey 
Fred M 46 Teacher Leader/TIC Blue 
Bill M 55 Teacher Assistant Blue 
Garth M 31 Instructor Co-leader Red 
Gintime F 34 Assistant (social worker) Co-leader White 
Phoebe F 53 Teacher Leader Blue 
Spur M 36 Outdoor educator Leader / TIC Orange 
Jane-Lee F 34 Outdoor educator Leader / TIC 
Of the ten interviews, eight were individual and two were pair interviews. Two individual 
interviewees were actually the same person (Spur and Renal), interviewed on different 
occasions about different incidents. 
2 Colours denote school group respondent was working with 
3 TIC = Teacher in charge of camp 
1,~ •• ; \: :-:, 
26 
2.8.3.2 Focus group respondents 
Respondents for focus group discussions were the group of three to four school staff who 
attended a particular camp together during the data collection period. Originally, three 
focus groups were planned but five were held in order to achieve a gender balance, 
diversity of schools and range of experience, to reflect groups which typically came to the 
Lodge. Discussions may have been affected by staff who were tired or distracted by their 
other responsibilities, time pressures and a staff member leaving for a period of time. 
In summary, nineteen staff from six schools participated in five focus group discussions. Of 
the nineteen, ten were men and nine were women; ten were curriculum teachers and nine 
were experienced outdoor educators or instructors. Their brief biographical details are 
displayed in Table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2 Focus group respondents 
M Teacher 1 Blue 
F Teacher 1 Blue 
Ben M Teacher 1 Blue 
George M Outdoor educator 2 Gold 
Charlie M Instructor 2 Gold 
Nonn M Outdoor educator & Assistant 2 Assisting at Lodge 
Ralph M Outdoor educator & Assistant 2 Assisting at Lodge 
Baz M Instructor 2 Gold 
Jackie F Teacher 2 Gold 
Eric M Outdoor Educator 3 Turquiose 
Frank M Teacher 3 Black 
Lou M Outdoor Educator 3 Purple 
Jade F Teacher 4 Green 
Leila F Teacher 4 Green 
Ripena F Teacher 4 Green 
Jane F Outdoor educator & Liaison Teacher 5 Green 
Juanita F Outdoor educator 5 Green 
Janice F Teacher 5 Green 
Ezmerelda F Teacher 5 Green 
2.9 Ethical considerations. 
Overt Research. I was explicit about this research throughout the process. All those 
involved in the research setting (resident teachers, liaison teachers, school staff, 
instructors, assistants) were informed of the research prior to their possible involvement. 
All prospective participants were invited to discuss queries directly with me. 
j .. 
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Confidentiality. As respondents could make themselves vulnerable due to the nature of 
the information they disclosed in the research, the following efforts were made to protect 
their confidentiality. At the time of data collection, informed consent forms (Appendix IV) 
were signed by respondents covering their agreement to participate and assuring right of 
withdrawal and confidentiality. Pseudonyms were used for respondent and school names. 
If respondents felt they were compromising the confidentiality ofother(s) by talking about 
an incident with me, they were offered the opportunity to consult with them before or after 
being interviewed. They could also alter or delete associated information from the 
transcript when sent to them. None chose to do this. 
Dual Roles. Combining the roles and responsibilities of teacher and researcher raised 
further ethical questions. As a professional outdoor educator and programme manager, I 
had the primary responsibilities of ensuring safety and high quality experiences for 
students. If a conflict arose between the two roles, then my primary responsibilities took 
precedence. The time period for data collection allowed for this. 
2.10 Data analysis 
I returned from the field with a large amount of qualitative data. I analysed data 
thematically based on emergent or constructed categories. Coding manually, I 
systematically analysed data related to each theme creating units which allowed precise 
description of relevant content characteristics (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Glaser and Strauss (1970) described qualitative research as a means for deriving 
substantive or grounded theory, not simply a means for determining preliminary categories 
for ensuing quantitative research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) concurred with this. I have 
used it to develop definitions and theory in this thesis. 
In writing up, I let respondents speak for themselves to illustrate points relevant to the 
research. To assist the reader, I took out speech mannerisms and returned colloquialisms 
to standard English. I also abbreviated some quotes to reduce the total volume, indicating 
this with dots ( ... ). In doing so I have ensured that the full sense of the quote was retained. 
, ..•.. ,"."'";;.'" ··.·.-0·· 
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2.11 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I discussed my theoretical perspective for the research. I chose a symbolic 
interactionist approach as it was suited to obtaining the detailed descriptive data needed to 
address the research objectives. This approach had methodological implications, requiring 
the researcher to be positioned in the setting in order to see issues from the respondents' 
perspective. Qualitative methods were best suited to achieve this, so I chose in-depth 
interviews and focus group discussions to gather primary data. Lodge incident records 
were consulted for background information along with relevant literature, my own 
experience and discussions with colleagues. 
I acknowledged problems and advantages associated with using episodal memories as 
data. These related to how the data was to be treated. If accuracy was important, as with 
research objective c (determining possible causes of events), then many variables could 
distort memory according to the literature. These included time passing, emotional and 
motivational influences on respondents and the possibility of someone lying. I used several 
measures to mitigate these affects, including limiting the time passed since the event, 
consulting incident records made at the time, interviewing two people involved in the same 
event together to provide collaboration, and sending respondents transcripts of their 
interviews later so they could add or correct information on the transcript. An advantage 
to the research was that 'most memorable experiences', such as HIPO incidents, were 
highly available for recall. Memory work was also valuable in finding meanings of events 
for those who experienced them. 
I described the sample as teachers, outdoor educators, instructors and assistants who had 
attended camps at Rotoiti during the data collection period. Interviewees were staff who 
had experienced a HIPO incident whilst leading a group of students at the Lodge. Their 
data was used to address research questions a to e. Focus group participants were a group 
of staff who attended a camp together during the data collection period. Their data was 
used to address research questions b, d and e. 
I conducted a pilot study for the research which assisted in refining data collection 
procedures and instruments, namely timing issues, the interview schedule and risk 
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assessment tool. Ethical considerations included giving my primary responsibilities as 
outdoor educator and manager precedence over those as researcher. Respondents' 
confidentiality was protected by using pseudonyms for their names and schools. 
Rotoiti Lodge was chosen as the setting because I worked there full time which gave me 
access and knowledge beneficial to the research. Boundaries were more identifiable as 
schools had similar outdoor education programmes at the time of the research. This 
reduced variability in the study, enhancing the possibility of generalisation of the findings. I 
described the research setting in detail, describing the management, schools and 
programme, highlighting the remoteness of the area and giving context to the research. To 
place the research setting into a larger picture, the context of outdoor education is 
described next in Chapter Three. 
i' 
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CHAPTER THREE The context of outdoor education 
3.1 Introduction 
Because of New Zealand's small size and its amazingly diverse natural terrain, 
there is a wide variety of accessible opportunities for outdoor recreation. As a 
result of its geography and decentralisation, New Zealanders feel closer to the 
outdoors ... and generally either the coast or the mountains, or both, are within 
easy reach. 
Inevitably, too, outdoor education feels much more a part of education. More 
Headmasters (sic) believe in it, more teachers are keen to run trips, and there are 
fewer problems in getting school children to bring along a sleeping bag and the 
other outdoor gear that is needed to run a trip or camp with a minimum of fuss ... 
(Abbott, 1990, p.307). 
3.2 Defining outdoor education 
While 'the outdoors has always played a part in New Zealand education' (Abbott, 1990, 
p.307), common usage and the literature alike, show a number of terms are used to describe 
learning which takes place in the out-of-doors. Terms such as outdoor education, education 
outside the classroom, environmental education, adventure education, and outdoor pursuits 
are used extensively in this field, sometimes interchangeably, but differences exist in the 
approaches and goals of each. While there is no standard agreement of definition for most of 
these terms and understandings of them are not consistent, the following definitions have been 
selected to best describe different aspects ofRotoiti Lodge's programme. I acknowledge that 
teachers' definitions may differ from these. Finally, a basic rationale for the use of risk in 
outdoor education is also touched on. 
Rotoiti Lodge is an outdoor education centre. As defined in section 1.2.1., outdoor education 
and education outside the classroom (BOTC) are broad terms describing education which 
primarily takes place in the natural environment. Schools bring pupils to Rotoiti Lodge as part 
of their EOTC curriculum which is in their charters. Priest (1990) explained that historically, 
two branches of outdoor education had been identified, environmental education and adventure 
education. 
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Environmental education had two main concerns, "the ecosystemic relationships refer to the 
interdependence of living organisms in an ecological microclimate ... [and the J ekistic 
relationships refer to the key interactions between human society and the natural resources of 
an environment" (p. 113). Both concerns are investigated in Rotoiti Lodge sixth fonn biology 
and geography programmes. 
Adventure education was education based on activities which deliberately exposed . 
participants to elements of risk (section 1.2.1. defines these) which could be physical, emotional 
or material (Ewert, 1989a). While real risk was common to the recreational outcome of 
outdoor adventure pursuits, activities which had a high degree of perceived risk, were more 
often used in educational adventure activities (Mortlock, 1983). This is the case at Rotoiti 
Lodge which uses natural and constructed environments to achieve this. 
Outdoor pursuits are activities involving moving across natural land and/or water 
environments by non mechanised means (Ford and Blanchard, 1985; Priest, 1990). For example 
tramping, canoeing and caving are outdoor pursuits commonly used in Rotoiti programmes. 
"The point at which the outdoor pursuit becomes an 'adventure activity' is moot and 
determined by the participant" (Ford and Blanchard, 1985, p. 5). For example, in a group at 
Rotoiti, there may be students who find their canoe-tramp journey to the head of the lake an 
adventure while others find it a journey involving two outdoor pursuits. 
Why risk in the first place? A vast literature exists on this topic, however Snider (1964) 
offered one of the simplest explanations. He asserted that risks may be further classified as 
speculative or pure. Speculative risks held forth the promise of gain or the chance ofloss. 
Pure risks were taken with the prospect of only loss or no loss. I contend that adventure 
education embraces the concept of speculative risk to achieve educational goals as there 
would be little point or justification for utilising pure risk. With its promise of gains in 
many areas (confidence, self esteem, skills, teamwork etc) risk and hence adventure can be 
a powerful educational tool. However diligent risk management by competent leaders is 
required to minimise the possibility ofloss. This theme is expanded fully in section 3.4. 
.. - ~ , 
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3.3 Outdoor education in New Zealand 
Detailed infonnation on the history of outdoor education in New Zealand remains scant at 
present, although Abbott (1990) and Lynch (1998) stated references to the use of the outdoors 
in an educational context were noted in documents over a century old. The School of Physical 
Education in Otago was responsible for a more recent push in the 1940s and 50s due to the 
influence of Professor P.A. Smithells, who believed that outdoor education could "more 
effectively achieve more educational goals than any other subject" (Abbott, 1990, p. 308). 
Over the following four decades outdoor education became established at all educational levels, 
from pre-school to tertiary. 
In the 1960s and 70s a number of residential centres sprang up to cater for high school outdoor 
education needs, many employing resident teachers (Abbott, 1990). One such centre was 
Rotoiti Lodge. This trend was a recognition of the importance of supporting school 
programmes with experienced outdoor staff and purpose built facilities. The building of centres 
involved co-operative efforts by local schools and communities. Gradually the Department of 
Education capitalised on these developments, contributing assistance with policies, salaries for 
resident teachers and funding for equipment purchase and building maintenance. Different 
centres developed different emphases in outdoor education programmes offered. 
Teachers of outdoor education in New Zealand had traditionally volunteered for the job if they 
had an interest in the area and some experience. Du Feu, (1981) reported: 
'up to the present training in outdoor education has been piecemeal with no adequate 
training programmes for teachers. Most of the teachers taking part in DE 
programmes have drifted into it either with a mountaineering, army, university field 
trip or tramping background, and an overwhelming belief in the benefits to be gained 
from the programmes' (p. 23). 
Abbot (1976a) identified that competence was essential for teachers leading outdoor trips. In 
1978 he reported on various outdoor training opportunities available to teachers and the 
promising development of a national outdoor training scheme designed to streamline and 
sequence training. By 1980, an Outdoor Training Advisory Board (OTAB) representing all 
major outdoor interest groups had been set up. It produced the 'Outdoor Training Guide' 
(1980) which outlined professional standards for leadership in a range of outdoor activities and 
""'.', . -
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printed an outdoor logbook. This was like a diary for outdoor leaders to record their training 
and experience in, for vocational and professional development purposes. The scheme never 
got off the ground due to much opposition and disagreement on the form it should take. This 
debate also raged in the United States (Sakofs, in Davidson, 1988). In 1986 the New Zealand 
Council for Recreation and Sport reported 'outdoor leader training has been spasmodic, 
unstructured and directionless' (Davidson, 1988, p. 5). 
A new direction for outdoor leader training in New Zealand was set in the late 1980's with the 
development of several training and assessment schemes. These set standards in skills, 
experience and instruction for outdoor leaders. The New Zealand Outdoor Instructors' 
Association (NZOIA) was formed in 1987 to provide training and assessment for professional 
instructors; the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council (NZMSC) introduced a training and 
assessment scheme for its voluntary instructors at a similar time; and the Department of 
Education introduced the Risk Management Training and Assessment Scheme (RMT A) aimed 
at teachers ofEOTC (Dickinson, 1992). Education Outdoors New Zealand (EONZ, 
representing interests ofEOTC teachers) has joined a more recent collaborative effort to 
establish a joint qualifications scheme. During negotiations, a need was identified for a low level 
baseline qualification suitable for teachers who take students for camp based activities, and 
subsequently, 'Outdoor l' was developed. The basket of qualifications in outdoor disciplines 
(eg: bush, alpine, kayak, abseil) can be taken up by teachers, volunteers and professional 
instructors alike. In addition, Colleges of Education offered pre-service and in-service training 
courses in outdoor education and a wide range of skills courses were offered by the Outdoor 
Pursuits Centre and the like (Boyes, 1992). 
Despite the comprehensive training opportunities available in outdoor leadership by the 1990's, 
few teachers took these up. For example, a 1994 survey (Haddock) showed that less than 20 
per cent of teachers who assisted on Rotoiti camps (n=92) had undertaken any sort of outdoor 
leadership related training in the previous five years. Seventy per cent had undertaken first aid 
training however. In subsequent years since the survey, I believe little has changed, the reasons 
for which I have not attempted to explain in this thesis. However time availability and costs 
probably come into it. Also, few schools require staff to hold such qualifications in order to lead 
outdoor activities, nor do they actively encourage and support staifto do so. While some 
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schools hire outdoor instructors to support their programmes, in most cases teachers still 
volunteer for the job due to interest, experience or pressure to staff the camps. 
3.4 Leadership and safety in outdoor education 
The teacher or instructor, as outdoor leader, was a key actor in the incidents in this study. It 
was therefore important to examine the outdoor leadership literature. The role, competencies 
and responsibilities of outdoor leaders were examined to identify the issues surrounding 
classroom teachers and instructors as leaders of outdoor education activities. Although the 
outdoor leadership literature was extensive, little focused on teachers as outdoor leaders, yet 
schools were the main providers of outdoor education in New Zealand (Knol, Pers. Comm., 
1997). This may be due to literature being mainly North American, where most outdoor 
education is taken by specialists and not classroom teachers. Moreover, effective outdoor 
leadership was shown to be inextricably linked with safety. 
Safety is a complex issue in outdoor education. ' ... the dilemma of safety versus risk is the 
critical ... issue in ... adventure education. ' (Mobley, 1981, p. 38). While risk is a 
fundamental ingredient of adventure experiences, safety during the experience is expected 
by participants, particularly in school programmes. Experienced outdoor leaders could 
manipulate an adventure experience to give the appearance but not the essence of risk by using 
activities with high perceived and low real risk. This involved accurate judgement and the 
sound base of knowledge and skill ofa competent outdoor leader (priest and Baillie, 1987). For 
the administrator or manager it also posed challenges, theirs was the responsibility of ensuring a 
balance between the two. 'The paradox ... is also a goal for organisations to build up their 
support systems for staff working in the field ... [it] has been a progressive force' (James, 
1980, p. 21). I fear that the force has not been as progressive for the New Zealand teacher 
as it has for the professional and voluntary instructor. 
3.4.1 Leader competence 
Outdoor leaders were morally and ethically bound to manage risks so few accidents occurred 
and those that did were minor (Blanchard and Ford, 1895). They were also legally bound to 
ensure that no harm came to employees and others in the workplace (Health and Safety in 
Employment Act, 1992). Outdoor leadership competence was a key means of fulfilling these 
-,.",-' 
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responsibilities according to the literature. The following is an examination of the specific 
knowledge, skills and attributes required by a competent outdoor leader. 
Ford and Blanchard (1985) suggested some basic qualities to look for when selecting leaders: 
enthusiasm, ability (practical in the activity), experience, judgement, appreciation of the 
outdoors and enjoyment of the outdoors. Not in priority order, these were similar to qualities 
identified by New Zealand writers (Abbott, 1976a, 1976b and 1978; Banks, 1990; Outdoor 
Training Advisory Board, 1980; Rawson, 1995; Ringer, 1987; Trist, 1977). 
Ringer (1987) identified the importance of outdoor leaders developing people skills in addition 
to the technical skills traditionally associated with leader competence in the outdoors. He 
described people skills as: the ability to start groups off on a good note, facilitating group 
dynamics effectively, assertiveness, skills in listening, conflict resolution and negotiation, 
working with violent behaviours, anger management, basic counselling, self awareness, stress 
management and decision-making skills. Others concurred with Ringer (Ford & Blanchard, 
1985; Phipps & Swiderski, 1990). An international survey of outdoor leadership preparation 
(priest, 1987) found that New Zealand outdoor educators considered outdoor leaders were best 
prepared for their role by reducing 'hard' (technical skills) and emphasising 'soft' (people) skills 
in their place. He investigated what it took to be considered an effective outdoor leader in five 
countries, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States. A list of 
fourteen components of effective outdoor leadership resulted: 
Table 3.1 Components of effective outdoor leadership (priest, 1987, p. 34). 
Technical activity skills 
Safety skills 
Organisational skills 
Environmental skills 
Instructional skills 
Group management skills 
Problem skills 
Motivational philosophy and interest 
Physical fitness 
Healthy self concept & ego 
Awareness and empathy for others 
Personable traits & behaviour 
Flexible leadership style 
o-ptnpt,t based on 
Different writers emphasised different qualities. Many (Cain & McAvoy, 1990; Hunt, 1984; 
Miles & Priest, 1990; Phipps & Swiderski, 1990; Raiola, 1990) highlighted instructor 
judgement and deciSion-making skills as critical to safety and effective leadership. Hunt 
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declared that although rules had their place in outdoor programmes, a reliance on them was no 
substitute for judgement based on experience. Priest and Dixon (1990) asserted that; 
Judgement is the fulcrum on which balances the competence of staff members. Staff 
can be the most technically competent, safe, and environmentally careful people in the 
world, but without judgement they will not be able to take care of themselves, others or 
the outdoors (p. 5). 
Cain and McAvoy (1990) saw leadership and the judgement and decision-making process as 
synonymous, believing outdoor and leadership experience could only be accumulated over a 
period of time in a practical manner in 'real' settings. As such, appropriate experience was seen 
as an important foundation of effective outdoor leadership and sound risk management. Other 
authors agreed (Abbott, 1976b; Haddock, 1993a; Miles & Priest, 1990; Outdoor Training 
Advisory Board, 1980). The National Field Officer of the New Zealand Mountain Safety 
Council, stressed the importance of experience for teachers also: 
The teacher must first be thoroughly competent in the skills of the activity mId Widely 
experienced, with a deep understandingfrom personal experience of the sort of 
problems and difficulties that can occur at the most unexpected moment. The sort of 
competence that is needed is learned only through long experience, and I believe there 
is a real danger in the quick course, whether 'in sen'ice' or any other! ... Responsible 
and reasonable precaution within the activity is the clue to good leadership; and if 
there is one virtue above all others in bush and mountain recreation, it is experience 
(Trist, 1977, p. 3). 
Education authorities in New Zealand also recognised the importance of experience with regard 
to leader competence, acknowledging that certificates, forms and regulations could not replace 
the wisdom from leadership experience in the outdoors (The Department of Education, 1985; 
Rawson, 1995) and went further to state that, 
Principals mllst ensure that a SUfficient pool of experienced stafJis built up, and 
maintained where necessary by the training of others. If staff changes significantly 
reduce this pool, the Education Outside the Classroom programme may have to be 
curtailed (Department of Education, 1985, p. 4). 
Priest and Dixon (1990) tempered this view in isolation, with a warning that: 
gaining greater experience might help an outdoor leader to gain sound judgement, but 
simple possession of experience in no way assured good judgement. All experience 
must be processed or reflected upon, tested and affirmed (p. 5). 
Others concurred with this view (Teschner and Wolter, 1990, p. 88; Williamson and Mobley, 
1984, p. 5). To this end, this study investigated how (or if) teachers processed their experiences 
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of incidents in outdoor education (research objectives d and e), to illuminate effective means of 
improving leader judgement through constructive reflection. 
Several authors (Davidson, 1992; McConnell, 1989, cited in Haddock, 1993a; Martin and 
Priest, 1985) upheld the view that competent leaders should have a greater level of skill and 
experience than was required for the activity, to maintain a safety margin to cope under stress. 
Raiola (1990) labelled this 'unconscious competence' whereby the leader was able to operate at 
a high level of skill and ability without conscious effort. 
In summary, the literature agreed that outdoor leaders assuming responsibility for others, 
should be thoroughly competent for the job. Competence was indicated by technical activity 
skills, people skills relevant to working with the particular group, sound judgement during the 
activity in an often changing environment and circumstances, which in tum was based on an 
appropriate amount of accumulated experience. The qualification schemes developed in New 
Zealand by the NZMSC, NZOIA and EONZ reflect the development and attainment of 
attributes identified in the above discussion. 
3.5 How much risk is acceptable? 
Authors have attempted to assess the degree of risk associated with human activities and from 
this derive a measure of acceptable risk which was practical and defensible. Accident statistics 
provided a database from which to work. Some authors (Davis, 1980; Ewert, 1989b; Meier, 
1985; Meyer, 1979; Priest & Baillie, 1987) used comparisons of such statistics to determine 
acceptable levels of risk. Conclusions appear inconsistent with one another and do not take 
account of the concept of societal risk tolerance. 
Meyer (1979) gathered useful facts by informally surveying well established, full-time adventure 
programmes. He estimated a fatality rate of about .5 per million hours of exposure, as 
compared with an accidental death rate in the U.S. of. 1 per million human hours (all causes, at 
work and away). He concluded that the risk offatal accidents in adventure programmes could 
be five times of that in evelyday activity. Dis-aggregated data also suggested adventure 
programmes were safer than comparable time in an automobile, which he estimated to be 
about.7 fatalities per million hours of exposure. 
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Meyer (1979) also examined injury rates of various activities. Using the National Safety 
Council criteria for reportable injury4, he found the injury rate in adventure programmes was 
about 40 injuries per million hours of exposure. Meyer concluded that there were real and 
significant risks associated with adventure programmes. The injury rate was on a par with 
hazardous occupations such as mining, but had less risk than motor vehicle travel or college 
football where the injury rate was more than 60 injuries per million hours of exposure. No 
indication was made of the severity of injuries. 
Ewert (1989b) compared studies of outdoor adventure programmes' injury and fatality rates 
(Table 3.2 below). He concluded that recent studies affinned earlier evidence that adventure 
programmes were no more risky than common every-day activities such as automobile riding. 
Table 3.2 [Adventure Programme] Studies Indicating Rates of Injuries / Fatalities Per 
Million Participant Hours (Unshaded portion oftable: Ewert, 1989b, p. 90). 
Study Year Injury Rate Per Million Fatality Rate Per Million 
Hours Hours 
Meyer 1979 40.00 .50 
Higgins 1981 37.50 o 
1982 5.13 o 
Ewert & Johnson 1983 34.00 .42 
Hale 1987 20.25 o 
The shaded portion of Table 3.2 shows results of two more studies (Gentile et ai, 1994; Paton, 
1994 ) 6 . While the latter two show similar fatality rates to earlier studies, they indicate 
4 Where the i~ured person is unable to perfonn regular duties for one or more days after being injured. 
5 Based on data generated from ropes courses only. 
6 I converted the fatality and injury rates of these studies to the same scales used in the table. 
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significantly higher injury rates. Two reasons could account for this. First, the wilderness-based 
programmes concerned (Outward Bound USA and the National Outdoor Leadership School 
USA) range in length from four days to three months with an average of three to four weeks. 
Researchers identified that injuries such as strains and sprains were more likely to affect lost 
days during periods of wilderness travel as participants were dependent on their mobility to 
participate. On shorter centre-based courses, participants were still able to participate in other 
activities such as kayaking if they strained an ankle. Hence, lost days were mitigated. Second, 
unlike the earlier studies, the latter two were conducted by trained researchers in association 
with experienced programme staff, involving standardised reporting procedures which all staff 
were trained to use. Together with a culture of increased awareness and higher standards of 
risk management in the 1990's, a more scientific approach probably accounted for the capture 
of many injuries which previously went unreported. 
Baillie (1986, cited in Priest and ,Baillie, 1987) pondered how much risk was acceptable 
for outdoor educators to expose participants to. He proposed the model of 'Normal Life 
Risk', based on comparing accident data from everyday life activities with those of 
outdoor adventure-based programmes. Baillie concluded that 'adventure experiences are 
no more risky than every day living' (cited in Priest and Baillie, 1987, p. 22). Priest and 
Baillie (1987) considered the sources on which this view was based to be brief and dated, 
and called for more work in this area. 
Baillie (1986, cited in Priest and Baillie, 1987) and Meyer (1979) both attempted to assess 
the risk associated with adventure activities, using normal life risk as a benchmark, in order 
to justify the risk to society. However, the two authors defined and interpreted key terms 
differently. Whereas Meyer equated 'normal life risk' with injury and death rates of all 
activities combined (adventure activities rating five times this amount). Baillie equated 
'normal life risk' with injury and death rates of automobile driving and college football 
only, which had slightly higher injury and death rates than adventure programmes. Thus 
'normal life risk' as an acceptable level of risk in outdoor education remains moot, 
confusing and misleading. 
Meier (1985) in considering Meyer's (1979) results, noted that adventure programmes 
may not be as dangerous as many envisaged. He stated risks were probably no greater than 
~.- . - -,' . - -' ',-. -.-'-' 
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those in recreational activities such as softball and basketball. He suggested 'risk 
recreation' was a misnomer ifused for all adventure programmes, but admitted there were 
objective dangers that must be recognised and minimised. 
In summary, authors (Baillie, 1986, cited in Priest and Baillie, 1987; Ewert, 1989b; Meyer, 
1979; Priest and Baillie, 1987) variously claimed that it was unrealistic to eliminate 
fatalities and serious disabling injury from adventure-based programmes. It appeared both 
practical and ethically defensible however, to reduce fatality and disabling injury rates to 
the level associated with common every-day activities such as automobile riding or college 
football. This goal seems logical, but the issue is more complex than it first appears. 
3.6 How much risk is tolerable? 
Kasperson and Kasperson (1983, cited in Kates, Hohenemser and Kasperson, 1985) viewed 
the acceptability of risk as an unfortunate term, which implied a degree of consent that rarely 
accompanied impositions of risk. Tolerability of risk was a term which better captured most 
risk situations to them. Ewert (1989b) identified that the public's perception of risk may 
differ from actual injury rates, yet both issues were of concern in a risk management plan. 
So both issues should be of concern in outdoor education. 
Society's tolerance of risk was linked to values, not accident statistics (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982). This cultural relativist perspective, they acknowledged, had a major 
problem however: 'how can we know whether the dangers are actually increasing or 
whether we are more afraid? • (p. 188). 
Risk perceptions appear to be dynamic. Ewert (1989b) identified that public perception of 
outdoor recreation had changed over time for a number of activities. As a recreational 
activity became more accessible and accepted as a more 'normal' leisure pursuit, the 
perception of risk and danger changed. Ewert observed how some activities, for example 
rock climbing, were considered risky, while activities that were more commonplace such 
as skiing, were seen as less risky. Ironically, it was the latter type which attracted more 
litigation in the United States. This illustrates how society lacks tolerance for accidents in 
activities where the perception of risk is low, and adds weight to the cultural relativists' 
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argument. Or, it could be explained by the deep pocket approach to litigation in the us. In 
the case of skiing and rock climbing, the more money the resource managers have, the 
more likelihood there is of suing. 
Shrader-Frechette (1991) dismissed the cultural-relativist's work and position for failing to 
be 'rational' or 'objective'. Lowrence (1980) observed that one of the major 
accomplishments of this century had been refinement of the notion of 'scientific 
objectivity', but noted that the concept was still not widely understood. He argued, as did 
others in the philosophy of science, that objective scientific 'truth' was knowledge that 
was subjectively endorsed by the scientific community. He made the point that estimates of 
risk, whether made by scientists or lay people, could not evade including 'subjective' 
human opinion. In that case, it may be impossible to determine an acceptable level of risk. 
Or, it may only be possible within temporal, cultural, social or contextual constraints. 
Lowrence (1980) stated that we should not be surprised when scientists disagreed or when 
the public perceived a risk differently from experts. Schrader-Frechette (1991) also 
believed that laypersons were often more rational in their evaluation of societal risks than 
either experts or governments recognised: 
Some persons claim that only technical experts are capable of making rational 
judgements about risk acceptability, whereas others assert that only potential 
victims, usually laypeople, are in a position to be truly rational about the 
evaluation of possible hazards (p. 7). 
Trish Consedine's comments, after her daughter's death on an Outward Bound course, 
illustrates this discrepancy: 
I think Outward Bound is a violent culture and I think their response to Suzanne's 
death underpins this. So we are not satisfied with cosmetic changes, minor reforms of 
bits and pieces of the programme. We think the whole organisation should be closed 
and have a radical rethink of what it's on about. (Brett, 1994, p. 49). 
Kates et al. (1985) summarised a National Research Council (1982) report, identifying three 
forces that have altered peoples perceptions of risk: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The intensified reporting of risks in the media, which sometimes justified and 
sometimes not, magnifies people's concerns; 
the loss of faith in institutions ostensibly created to deal with risk; and 
the growth of a complex, highly technological society that is interdependent in 
its junctioning and that reduces the perception of individuals that they can 
control the events. (p. 3) [numbers added]. 
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The first two forces especially had helped shape peoples' perceptions of risk in the outdoors. 
Society's response to several outdoor accidents in New Zealand in recent years attests to this. 
For example the Ruapehu tragedy, where six soldiers died ofhypothennia during an Anny 
Adventurous Training Unit course on Mount Ruapehu ("What Did It Teach Us?" 1991); 
Suzanne Consedine's death from a fall during an Outward Bound course (Brett, 1994); and the 
Cave Creek accident, where 14 people died when a Department of Conservation viewing 
platform collapsed near the Paparoa National Park (Oakley, 1995). All three of these accidents 
involved well known institutions and received major media and public attention along with calls 
for public accountability. Consequently, the accidents were followed by internal or external 
inquiries (by police, Occupational Safety and Health Service and/or a Commission ofInquiry). 
Media reports reflected that the events shook the public's faith in the institutions involved. The 
public would expect schools and outdoor education centres to provide a high standard of care 
for students also. 
Meanwhile, deaths ofrecreationists who have gone into the hills of their own accord have 
received media attention but no public outcry. Society appears to accept and tolerate these 
accidents. Schulze (1980) offered an explanation for this. He noted that the public readily 
accepts individuals killing themselves in their own cars, but views public airline safety in a 
totally different manner. He identified an ethical split between public and private safety. u ... ie. 
knowingly imposing a risk on oneself is 'right' while imposing a risk on someone else is 
wrong' "(p. 218). 
There are risks faced by people in everyday life which society allows them to assume 
voluntarily. But this is not the case where involuntary risk is involved, especially if the risk is 
imposed in an institutional framework (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Outdoor education 
centres and schools therefore, have a strong moral obligation to ensure facilities and 
programmes meet high standards of public safety. Moreover, society is likely to be harsh on 
failures to meet such standards as summed up by Trish Consedine earlier. 
3. 7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has established the context of outdoor education. First, I defined outdoor 
education and distinguished different elements of it, which relate to the study. Second, I 
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traced outdoor education history in New Zealand, including the availability of outdoor 
education training and how teachers became outdoor leaders. Despite a range of outdoor 
leadership training and qualifications being available for voluntary and professional 
instructors and teachers alike by the 1990s, few teachers chose to take these up. Third, the 
responsibilities of outdoor leaders were discussed and competence issues examined. I 
stressed how these factors were inextricably linked to safety in outdoor education. Finally, 
society's acceptance and tolerance of risk were considered. I explored the social context in 
which a risk event occurred and responses to· it shaped, thus improving understanding of 
its wider social meaning and further justifying the research. Although fatality and injury 
rates for outdoor activities were generally lower than those for common activities such as 
car riding and football, the literature did not agree on an acceptable level of risk that 
teachers and instructors could expose students to. What was clear, was society had set 
high standards of care in respect to outdoor leaders and institutions with responsibility for 
student safety. Exposure to invohmtary risks, especially within an institutional framework, 
was judged harshly by society. Risk acceptability therefore was dynamic but could be 
determined by monitoring the public 'mood'. So societal risk tolerance needed to be 
considered together with accident rates, as both were important in a risk management plan. 
The context has now been set for remainder of the thesis. Research objective b was to 
describe the meanings of HIP 0 incidents for the respondents involved including: 
definitions of terms meaningful to respondents; effects the event had on those involved and 
determining the significance of an event. A three pronged approach was taken to address 
the parts to the objective and has resulted in the three substantive chapters that follow. 
Chapter Four explores meanings of the key terms accident, incident and epic and settles on 
definitions which were meaningful to respondents. Chapter Five examines the effects of 
HIPO incidents on those involved, further assisting in the quest for meanings of these 
events. Chapter Six evaluates a tool used in this research, designed to determine the 
significance of an event. 
.-- - -.'-"':;'-
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 Introduction 
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Towards definitions and meanings -
Accidents Incidents and Epics 
Like adventure, misadventure is a state of mind Unlike adventure, the immediate 
reactions are essentially negative rather than positive. At one extreme the result is 
death or serious injury. At the other extreme are feelings of relief that one has 
escaped any serious consequencesfrom a situation that was unduly stressful and 
more demanding than one had conceived at the onset of their journey. The 
enjoyment, satisfaction and euphoria that can arise from adventurous experiences 
are replaced by negative feelings of 'Thank goodness that's over', or, 'God that 
was lucky'. (Mortlock, 1983, p.41). 
This study is about incidents with high potential for serious harm in outdoor education, 
and the meanings they have for those involved. I concentrated on the concepts associated 
with this type of event: accident, incident and epic, the reasons for which are explained 
next. Accident has a close association with a HIPO incident, as only outcomes differ. 
Incident is a generic term that HIPO's are a subset of Epic is a term I had heard and used 
to describe an outdoor trip where a serious near miss occurred. First I reviewed the 
literature for definitions of these key concepts. Then I asked interview and focus group 
respondents to define the concepts in their own terms to get closer to meanings for them 
(research objective b). Comparing these helped me settle on definitions which were 
meaningful to respondents. 
In reading the results presented in this chapter, I ask the reader consider the following: 
Content analysis has typically been viewed as a quantitative technique ... 
'Arguments against such a strictly quantitative interpretation ... can be made, 
including these: (1) the frequency of assertion is not necessarily related to the 
importance of that assertion ... , (2) more meaningful inferences can occasionally 
be drawnfrom qualitative than quantitative methods; and (3) emphasis on 
quantification of symbols and precision often comes at the cost of problem 
significance. '(Guba and Lincoln, 1981, p. 242 cited in Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 
338). 
I request readers to examine the data holistically, not merely numerically as significance 
and importance do not reside in the numbers alone, especially with such a small sample. I 
have indicated numbers of respondents and used frequency graphs as an efficient way of 
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summarising large amounts of grouped and related data, so as Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
assert, the numbers are not an end in themselves. 
4.2 Accident 
Two industrial researchers defined an accident as: ' ... an undesired event that results in 
harm to people, damage to property or loss to process' (Bird and Germain, 1992, p.18), 
Further, they outlined three parts to the definition: 
1 
2 
3 
Doesn't limit human results to injury. Harm to people includes injury and 
illness, as well as adverse mental, neurological or systemic effects ... 
Does not confuse 'injury' with 'accident '. They are not the same. Injuries 
and illnesses result from accidents. But not all accidents result in injuries 
or illnesses. This distinction is critical ... The occurrence of an accident 
itself is controllable. The severity of an injury that results from an accident 
is often a matter of chance. It depends on many factors, such as dexterity, 
reflexes ... 
If the event results in property damage or process loss alone, and no 
injury; it is still an accident., Often, of course, accidents result in harm to 
people, property and process. (Bird & Germain, 1992, p. 18). 
While Priest, an outdoor education researcher defined it as follows: 
The accident is an unexpected occurrence that results in a loss (illness, injury or 
fatality) ... (Priest, 1990, p. 116). 
Respondents agreed that an accident involved a harm, loss or damage situation. 
They also agreed that accidents involved physical injury to a person or people, with four 
(Gintime, Bruce, Norm, George) identifying that medical treatment would be required. 
Phoebe, Fred and Juanita noted that it could be life threatening. Six respondents (Garth, 
Bruce, Agatha, Ripena, Lou and Charlie) mentioned that an accident could also involve 
damage or loss of equipment or property, including the environment. Bruce defined an 
accident thus: 
Well, I normally think of it in terms of people, but it could be plant or equipment. 
I guess something where there's some physical damage occurred that required 
repair. So in the case of a vehicle or a piece of equipment ... something that 
required mechanical fixing, or in the case of a person they required medical 
treatment by a first aider or doctor. 
In addition, 12 said that an accident could involve mental, emotional or psychological 
damage or injury. Juanita's response was typical: 
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Something going wrong and having certain effects on people ... physically and 
emotionally ... Uor example J fear and loss of confidence. 
Many (12) saw accidents as unplanned or unforeseeable events which were undesired or 
unexpected. Gintime, Janice & Ben stated that accidents were unavoidable, while Sue & 
Ezmerelda contemplated whether accidents were avoidable occurrences. For some it was 
'where something goes wrong' (Jane-Lee, Juanita, Ripena, Ben). Others put people firmly 
into the equation, specifying that accidents were caused, when somethingls were 
'overlooked by those participating' (Garth, Miriam). 
Phoebe, Baz and Jackie saw it as involving an interruption to a smooth flowing process. 
However Norm challenged Jackie and Baz on this (in FG2\ stating that if this was the 
case, a change in the weather would be classed as an accident as would a fright from 
seeing a snake. Elements identified by the respondents in defining accidents in an outdoor 
education context, largely agreed with the literature examined. 
4.2.1 Discussion 
Bird and Germain's definition was comprehensive and specific, covering many of the 
elements identified by respondents. The first sentence of Priest's definition concurred with 
Bird and Germain's and respondents' definitions. However there were two differences 
between the respondents' and experts' definitions. 
First, a deal of scepticism was expressed by one focus group about whether loss to process 
on its own would constitute an accident in an outdoor context. Loss to process is lost time 
and subsequent activity interruption. Norm (FG2) challenged whether changing plans due 
to the weather (a common occurrence in the outdoor setting) and therefore losing time on 
an expedition (a loss to process) should be classed as an accident. I contend that the 
interruption to process on its own could not constitute an accident in an outdoors setting. 
Rather, it is one possible outcome of an accident. For example, ifRotoiti's fleet of six 
canoes were not secured onto the trailer and three came off and were damaged in transit, 
this accident would involve damage to canoes and loss to process. Loss to process would 
occur until the damaged canoes were repaired. With only three boats operational, groups 
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would get less canoeing time as only half the students could canoe at once, or they would 
have to do another activity instead. Staff time would also be lost when arranging repairs to 
the damaged boats. 
Second, notably missing from respondents' definitions was any mention ofi11ness which 
contrasts with both experts' definitions but i11ness definitely featured in their stories. Death 
was left out of Bird and Germain's and respondents' definitions, but is undoubtedly a 
possible outcome of an accident as identified by Priest (1990). 
Finally, I acknowledge that accidents (and incidents) often result in positive elements such 
as learning and sharpened judgement, confirming that like risk, accidents can also have a 
positive side. However, experts and respondents left these elements out of their definitions. 
Respondents included positive outcomes in their stories though. 
4.2.2 Revised definition: 
I propose a revised definition of an accident, specifically for the outdoor education setting. 
It is based on experts' definitions, deleting elements deemed specific to the industrial 
setting while incorporating elements identified by respondents and Priest (1990). Bold text 
indicates where revisions have been made. 
ACCIDENT - an undesired event that results in ... harm to people, damage to 
property and loss to process. 
There are three parts to the definition: 
1 
2 
3 
Doesn't limit human results to injll1y. Harm to people includes injury, 
illness and death as well as adverse psychological amI/or emotional 
effects. 
Does not confuse 'injury' with 'accident '. They are not the same. Injuries, 
illness and death result from accidents. But not all accidents result in 
injuries, illness or death. This distinction is critical . ... The severity of an 
injury that results from an accident is often a matter of chance. It depends 
on many factors, such as reactions based on skills, dexterity and 
judgement. 
If the event results in property damage ami process loss, and no injury, it 
is still an accident. Process loss alone does not constitute an accident. 
Often, of course, accidents result in harm to people, property and process. 
(Based on Bird & Germain, 1992, p. 18). 
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4.3 Incident 
Term usage in industrial research was consistent. Authors agreed with Bird and Germain, 
(1992) who had the following to say about incidents: 
Another term frequently used in safety and health is the word INCIDENT. As 
related to safety, occupational health and fire, the incident is usually referred to 
as the "near accident" or "near miss." ... the incident is similar to an accident, 
but without injury or damage ... incidents are enormously important to safety. An 
incident with high potentialfor harm· (HIPO) should be investigated as thoroughly 
as an accident . ... This definition of incident includes accidents, near-accidents, 
security breaches, production or quality losses or near-losses, etc. Both of the 
following definitions will be used The context will make clear which one is 
intended 
INCIDENT 
• an undesired event which, under slightly different circumstances, could have 
resulted in harm to people, damage to property or loss to process . 
• an undesired event which could or does result in a loss. (Bird and Germain, 
1992, pp. 19-20). 
Term usage in outdoor research varied. Priest (1990) defined incidents as follows: 
Incidents or close calls are the unforeseen happenings that do not develop into 
emergencies. Through effective leadership, the accident is prevented or the 
consequences are reduced Incidents can be thought of as minor accidents where 
the losses are acceptable (cuts, scrapes, bruises, etc.). Acceptability is a personal 
matter. Acceptable losses to one person may not be to another. Death is 
acceptable to some Himalayan climbers, while a bump on the head may not be to 
a child's mother (p. 116). 
The National Safety Network (USA) did not distinguish between an accident and a near 
accident: 'An accident is a dangerous, unplanned occurrence resulting in an injury, a 
close-call or property damage' (National Safety Network, cited in Hale, 1989, p. 11). 
Limited research has been undertaken, especially using primary data, on accidents and 
incidents which occur in outdoor programmes. The following is an examination ofthe 
terms used in two studies and the types of events recorded. 
Gentile et al (1992), notably, did not use the term accident in their study of the 
epidemiology of wilderness injury and illness. The term incident was used, although no 
1--~;., - ','.'_ , 
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definition was offered. They used the following criteria to determine whether an event was 
recorded in the National Outdoor Leadership School injury/illness statistics: 
Incidents were entered prospectively in the data base if they prevented the 
individual from participating in normal course activities for J 2 hours or longer. 
Incidents were categorised as injuries, illnesses, or non-medical events. Non-
medical events included behavioural and motivational problems and personal or 
family difficulties unrelated to course activities (p. 854). 
Being an epidemiological study, Gentile et al (1992), did not attempt to record lost or 
damaged equipment and did not capture 'near miss' events. 
Paton (1992) reported on 'Health, safety and risk in Outward Bound'. This study used the 
following criteria for reporting results: 
Safety 'incidents' are classified into one of the following categories: injury, 
illness, 'near miss', behavioural, and other .... An incident which results in a 
student or staff member being absent from a course for the day following the 
incident is classified as a- 'lost day ', ... Total incident rates ... include incidents 
which did not result in a student being absent from a course for 24h (p. 30). 
Like Gentile et aI, Paton made no attempt to record lost or damaged equipment events. 
However, this study did include 'near miss' incidents which were defined thus: 
A 'near miss' is a situation which is potentially dangerous, but which ends without 
injury. Examples would be a rockfall close to a climber, an encounter with a 
hostile local person, or a suicide threat by a psychologically disturbed student. 
Little research has been done on near miss or HIPO incidents, despite Hale (1989) warning 
outdoor programme leaders to ignore them at their peril. Generally, outdoor studies 
consulted ignored them (Gentile et ai, 1994; Kizer, 1994; Knutson, 1994; Meyer, 1979; 
Paton, 1994; Peart, 1991). Most examined injury and illness incidence, with near miss 
events remaining invisible apart from Paton (1994) and Knutson (1994). Definitions of 
accident and incident overlapped in the outdoor literature consulted and therefore 
remained confusing. 
Although HIPO's were not always recorded in studies, they were certainly known and 
talked about in the field and often recognised as significant (Hale, 1989). Hale encouraged 
programme leaders to record, analyse, act on and network any recommendations resulting 
from close calls. He also described systems to carry out the above within the programme 
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and nationally through the North American National Safety Network. This research is 
therefore important in defining these significant events, making them more visible and 
clearly understood. 
Respondents agreed that an incident either led to an accident or somehow stopped short 
of becoming an accident. Charlie's comment was typical: 
An unplanned, potentially hazardous occurrence, that could have led to an 
accident. But it hasn't got the severity of an accident, and it doesn't usually 
involve physical harm or harm to property or equipment. 
Jane-Lee described an incident as 'a close call' and Gintime a 'near miss'. Other language 
echoed similar sentiments: 
Where when it was over I thought whew! (laugh) (Jane-Lee). 
Anything where you catch your breath, and go haah, ooh! (Eric). 
Bill, Renal and Charlie stated that incidents 'happen more frequently' (Bill) than accidents. 
In terms of magnitude of the events, respondents held opposing views. Ezmerelda typified 
the majority view: 
... incident has a sense also a slight nuance of smallness. 
While Baz embodied another: 
... [incidents} can be either small or very large, like all encompassing ... accidents 
would be a subset o/incidents. 
This contrasting view seems deviant at first, however, I think Baz is trying to express that 
a major incident such as a near miss is not a small affair, in fact it may include a number of 
minor incidents and accidents over its duration. Jane-Lee explained it thus: 
... you can have major incidents where you think, gosh, that person could have 
died ... which is more important than a minor accident where somebody does hurt 
their knee ... 
These ideas came up in a previous study (Haddock, 1995) when Bill said: 
An accident's a lower class o/problem, an accident can be easily managed and 
an incident ... can require quite careful people management as well ... an incident 
could be more serious because it could lead to people getting out of control. 
Bill rated the incident he told me about as 'one of the scariest situations I've ever seen 
develop' so it was not surprising that his definitions conveyed this. 
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Causation was pondered by some respondents (Janice, Garth, Jane, Ezmerelda) and this 
concept was tied in with the ability to take precautions against an event occurring, as aptly 
summed up by Baz: 
... most incidents can be attributed to some cause that we could have taken 
precaution against but there must be some percentage and it would be interesting 
to see what, that couldn't be foreseen. A tree falling over in the bush or 
something ... 
Bruce agreed with Bird and Germain (1992) in surmising that with an incident, 
.,. often it's a case of luck that it doesn't go that way [to an accident}. 
Miriam and Janice agreed that an incident was 'something that you can return to your 
former state, and carry on your activity' (Miriam). Janice noted that it may affect your 
planning or your schedule. 
Agatha put her finger on a curious phenomenon, where some people may not be aware of 
an incident while others were acutely aware: 
.. , some people may not even be aware that it was an incident. Like when a group 
split up, they just trotsy along and get home and may not even think about it. But 
it's an incident that could have led to a number of scenarios. 
I asked Agatha what sort of people may not be aware of incidents: 
.. .1 think ... there's still lemons amongst experienced people, and there's still 
lemons with me ... for whatever reason. Probably because we're human. 
While Agatha was unable to identify any characteristics of those who were more or less 
aware of an incident, FG3 managed to tease some of the issues out during their discussion. 
They identified that the context contributed to whether an event was seen as an incident or 
not; as did the prior knowledge held by different people in a situation. Lou, Eric and Frank 
discussed the issues thus: 
L - ... do you consider somebody getting a blister being an accident? 
E - ... when you go for a run, and you develop a blister on your foot, it's just part 
of going for a run sometimes, you're breaking in a new pair of shoes, it's not 
really an incident. But ... a blister that develops on the second day of an eight day 
tramp, through dirty socks, and was slowly beginning to become infected perhaps 
is developing towards an incident. So exactly the same thing, in two different 
situations ... 
L - Would the blister be the incident leading to an accident? 
E - Yeah, or was it the context that causes the incident? 
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F - ... I don't think it can be classed as an accident because it can be stopped 
L - But in some ways it's almost foreseen, if you don't do something about it 
you're going to have problems. 
E -But it'sforeseen to us because we have prior knowledge, butfor someone that 
doesn't have that prior knowledge, then ... it's become an incident ... 
4.3.1 Discussion 
Notably missing from respondents' definitions was any mention of illness, contrasting with 
experts' definitions. Medical emergency does not feature in experts' or respondents' 
definitions either, although these may be classed as illness. However, illness and medical 
emergencies featured in four stories of HIP 0 incidents in this study. 
• teacher suffers from kidney stone (Renal) 
• student suffers prolonged breathing difficulties following an asthma attack in caves 
(Tommy / Miriam) 
• vomiting/diarrhoea bug affects 50 students and staff on camp (Jane-Lee) 
• boy has vomiting illness at hut (Phoebe) 
I endeavour to speculate why illness featured in industrial and not respondents' definitions 
next. In an industrial setting, illness can be an outcome of working in a particular 
environment, for example asbestosis or cirrhosis. Illness therefore becomes a health and 
safety issue in the workplace, especially if induced by that environment. Whereas in an 
outdoor setting, particularly in a school camp situation of relatively short duration (five 
days at Rotoiti), illness is much more likely to be brought to the setting. The remoteness of 
the setting then exacerbates the illness or medical problem, as occurred in the above 
incidents. So an integral part of the incident is the context (remoteness) as well as the 
illness or medical emergency. Perhaps respondents did not think of this in their definitions, 
but it certainly came through in their stories. 
Priest's (1990) definition made no accommodation for luck as a determinant of the 
outcome of an accident / incident. Nor did he acknowledge that the leadership may not 
have the necessary prior knowledge to prevent an incident / accident from occurring 
(Agatha, Eric). Third, Priest's definition failed to acknowledge that an incident could be a 
serious affair requiring similar action to that following a serious accident, therefore 
ignoring the concept (and importance) of the HIPO incident. Rather, Priest treated 
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incidents as minor affairs of an 'acceptable' nature. This was incongruent with Bird and 
Germain's, the National Safety Network's definitions and themes which came through in 
data for this research and did nothing to alleviate the confusion and overlap between 
accident and incident in the outdoor literature. Therefore, the shortcomings of Priest's 
definition render it less useful for the outdoor education setting. 
Bird and Germain's (1992) definition accommodated the conflicting definitions in the data, 
specifically, that incidents could be small or very large (the National Safety Network cited 
in Hale, 1989 agreed with this as well). Their approach highlighted the importance of the 
HIPO incident, which respondents also recognised. Their definition therefore suits the 
outdoor education context. 
4.4 Epic 
The previous two seCtions on accidents and incidents compared respondents' definitions to 
well developed theories and concepts in the literature, to check their relevance to the 
outdoor education setting. An epic had no such theoretical or conceptual base in the 
literature so respondents' ideas form the basis of a definition for a previously little 
researched concept. This section therefore includes more detailed analysis and theory 
building and relates the concept of an epic to the research. 
Epics form part of the folklore and culture of the outdoor recreationist and outdoor 
professional alike (Charlie). Epics have several meanings (according to respondents), one 
of which is a 'near miss' experience in the outdoors, hence the importance of including an 
examination of this social construct in my study. In the absence of mention of the concept 
in the research literature, a dictionary was consulted to assist in its definition. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
a long poem narrating the adventures or deeds of one or more heroic or 
legendary figures, e.g. the Iliad, Paradise Lost. 
an imaginative work of any form, embodying a nation's conception of its 
past history. 
a book or film based on an epic narrative or heroic in type or scale. 
a subject fit for recital in an epic. (Allen, 1991, p. 393). 
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These ideas suggest links with outdoor recreation in the sense that an epic is a story of the 
heroic adventures and deeds of people which are embodied in the culture of those people. 
These ideas are congruent with Charlie's thoughts above. 
In an exploratory study for this research (Haddock, 1995), the following elements 
common to outdoor epics were found. Epics endured over a long period of time (female 
respondents); they involved situations of feeling out of control (male respondents); they 
were experiences where lots of things went wrong so people were put in a reactive mode; 
they could involve a number of accidents and / or incidents; and their seriousness could 
range from minor to major. As a result of these findings, Haddock (1995) developed a 
framework to assist in the understanding of accidents, incidents and epics. The epic 
spectrum (Figure 4.1) portrayed the relative seriousness of types of events. It was used to 
plot specific events and highlighted how the same event could be perceived differently by 
different people (for example, students often perceived a HIPO incident as an adventure 
while leaders perceived it as a near catastrophe (Haddock, 1995). 
Annoying experiences / 
changes of plans 
epic adventure major catastrophe or 
near catastrophe 
O-----------------------------Seriousness of event-----------------------------------------~ 
Figure 4.1 Epic spectrum. 
Data from the current research was useful in further understanding epics in relation to 
HIPO incidents. Notably, not all respondents knew what an epic was. Of the 29 
respondents involved in the study, only 16 knew the meaning ofthe term epic in an 
outdoor situation. A further six had an understanding of the term in a literary or poetry 
context. Significantly, those who knew what epics were, were experienced outdoors 
people who recreated and/or worked in the outdoors regularly. For them, epics were part 
of their 'outdoors' culture. Those who did not know what epics were, had limited outdoor 
experience apart from their involvement in school camps, indicating the term was exclusive 
to the outdoors culture. It was not exclusive to New Zealand however. Respondents from 
. '., . -~ .'. 
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England, South Africa and Australia reported it was used and understood among outdoor 
people in their countries. Americans also used the term (Panicucci, Pers. Comm., 1998). 
So the following data were collected from thos(: 16 respondents who knew about epics in 
an outdoor context. 
Respondents described 18 different elements of an epic. Some elements were intertwined 
but all contributed to the meaning/s of an epic to them. Many mentioned that an epic had 
two or more meanings. The elements derived from the data, are displayed in Figure 4.2 
below. Together they provide a framework for defining an epic later in the chapter. 
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Figure 4.2 The elements of an epic 
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The following discussion of each element, puts them into the context they were talked 
about. Elements are highlighted to emphasise and relate them more easily to Figure 4.2. 
Most respondents agreed that an epic was 'something that goes on/or quite a long time ' 
(Fred). Eric pondered: 
I don 't know whether time just seems to slow down or whether it 's just they seem 
to take longer until you're starting to run short on reserves of energy ... 
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Ralph and Eric spoke of calling on reserves generated within the body. Garth said: 
... [the situation] usually triggers a couple of drugs, endorphin and adrenaline ... 
[which] causes your reaction. The reaction, based on experience, is what saves the 
situation. 
This is consistent with Bird and Germain's definition of an accident (section 4.2), where 
they contended results often depended on factors such as dexterity and reflexes. Most 
agreed that an epic was 
... a situation where the limits have been ... stretched, as far as you can go ... 
without having an accident (laughs) (George). 
Most stressed that an epic was something which you 'came through somehow or another' 
(Jane-Lee) and survived. Frank described it as 'a near death experience '. Garth and Baz 
called it a 'near miss' situation and others expressed similar sentiments. Some described it 
as the sort of experience you reflected back on with relief (Eric) and thought 'shit that was 
lucky' (Garth, Frank) or 'you got away with it' (Charlie, Norm, George). This was an 
indice of a close call according to Hale (1989) and Mortlock (1983). 
Respondents agreed ' ... you need a chain of situations happening as well for it to become 
an epic' (George). To them, 'itwasn't one thing, it was a number of things that [went] on' 
(Fred), 'maybe escalating' (Norm). Several qualified these 'things' as incidents, accidents 
or things which went wrong. Four saw themselves as active in the process of resolving 
incidents during an epic. Miriam said: 
... that person isn't safe ... or out of my own responsibility until a whole course of 
action takes place, and anything that could go wrong in that or things that have to 
keep on being done ... feed into ... the epic. 
Many respondents saw an epic as having more than one meaning. While nine saw the 
adventurous side of it some also recognised those with less experience may not. 
'" epic adventures, that would mean heaps of fun and long duration or maximum 
adrenaline buzz. That wou ld be for myse if really (Jane-Lee). 
In contrast, 
.. . an epic involving me being with people of less skill, would be that things have 
got really hard for them, probably upsetting ... needn't be that anything had gone 
wrong, or people had got hurt, just that ... it took a lot of energy for liS to get back 
I guess (Jane-Lee). 
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While some saw it as 'a very long and arduous physically and mentally challenging 
situation' (Jane). Eight agreed that it could also be a long hard trip in the sense of being 
physically strenuous. Charlie said: 
... an epic journey ... could mean a very long trip, hard trip, and it might be ... 
deep snow and long distances or conditions might be particularly difficult but 
you've actually got there and achieved it and that can often be referred to as an 
epic (Charlie). 
A long hard trip could mean different things for people, depending on their level of 
experience as illustrated by Juanita and Ezmerelda in FG5. 
J - For us it was an emotional epic ... for them it was an absolute physical epic 
because they had never been in those conditions ... 
E - It was still an epic for you ... ? 
J - Emotionally, yes. ... in the end physically also because you had to change your 
whole way of tramping. 
And Lou in FG3: 'I mean for these kids, going up the Lake was an epic ... Just with the 
hardship involved when it was ... -not something they're used to '. 
Seven respondents felt that an epic involved danger and high risk. While 12 expressed 
epics as events where they pushed their limits to the edge of their competence, others 
went further to say it was where 'you're extended, beyond your safe operating zone' 
(Eric, Spur). So, epics were out of control situations to eight respondents. The adventure 
experience paradigmS first proposed by Martin & Priest (1987) is useful in the analysis 
here. Figure 4.3 (below) shows an adaptation of this model. 
Those respondents who talked about epics as experiences where their limits were pushed, 
were talking about operating in C zone on the model. This was a zone where competence 
was slightly less than the difficulty of the taskls they needed to perform, so they were 
'pushing the limits'. A lot oflearning takes place in this zone where the situation is 
challenging. 
Several (five) said an epic was where they were 'on the edge' (Agatha) or 'on the line' 
(Frank). This figurative two edged sword may be the 'fine line' between pushing the limits 
and being out of control, illustrated by the black line between C and D zones. 
8 This model has been adapted several times (Davidson, 1992; Haddock, 1993; McConnell, 1989; Priest and Baillie, 1987). 
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Pushing Limits 
c 
Degree of difficulty of activity 
The edge 
- the line 
Out of Control 
High 
Figure 4.3 Operation Zones Model (adapted from Martin and Priest, 1986). 
The following operation zone descriptors are illustrated in Figure 4.3 above: 
A Boredom zone was where competence was far above the difficulty of the task. There was no 
stress and it could be boring. 
B Cruising zone was where competence was comfortably above the difficulty of the task. 
There was low stress as you were within your comfort zone. 
P Peak Experience zone was where competence matched the difficulty of the task. This well 
researched state of being was described as 'flow' by Csikszentmihalyi (1975). There was 
positive stress, and a sense of adventure. 
C Challenge zone was where competence was slightly less than the difficulty of the task. 
There was positive stress as you pushed your limits and learnt more. 
The edge - The 'fine line' between C and D zones, between pushing your limits and being out 
of control. There was high negative stress bordering on panic. 
D Distress or Danger zone where competence was far below the difficulty of the task. There 
was extreme negative stress, a feeling of being out of control and a serious accident or near 
miss was highly likely in this zone. 
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Some respondents described epics as unforeseen, full on, serious events which put them 
into a reactive mode where 'things ... have to keep on being done' (Miriam). A major 
feature of an epic was that people survived to tell the tale. Garth said this was ' ... because 
your reactions are so good that you're able to stop fa disaster} just in time', Others 
thought avoiding disaster was more to do with luck than good management. This sounded 
like D zone, where they neither had the skills nor the experience to cope with the situation, 
a potential danger zone. Negative stress and a feeling (or reality) of being out of control 
featured here. 
Perhaps an epic is born out of the perception of feeling out of control. Martin and Priest's 
(1985) original model of understanding the adventure experience, illustrated how 
astuteness contributed greatly to one's perception of an adventure experience. According 
to them, experienced adventurers were more astute in their perceptions of risk, so a period 
of being out of control (in D zon~) would be accurately perceived as a close call. Whereas 
novices had less astute perceptions (and events may be in the control of astute leaders) so 
although they perceive events as being out of control (D zone) it may actually be a 
challenging situation (C zone) or a peak experience. Juanita, Agatha and Jane concurred 
with this, stating the amount of control people felt they had in a situation largely depended 
on each person's perception . 
... in that situation they felt out of control, they felt this situation, they're not in 
control of it, but we didn 'tfeel it (Juanita), 
The essence of an epic would be .,. the perception of being out of control, whether 
it is real or not real... (Agatha). 
Five teachers stated that epics involved a good deal of stress. Spur and George identified 
two contrasting types of stress, harmful and exhilarating. Spur said: 
... they maybe stressed in some way positively or negatively ... Positive stress is 
having an epic adventure involving paddling from here to the head of the Lake, 
and buzzing as a result of having achieved that goal, and that's a form of stress, ,. 
and the negative side of that may well be if some sort of incident has occurred 
whereby there is some damage to body, mind or soul. 
Garth and Agatha claimed a link between testosterone and epics. Charlie linked epics with 
New Zealand culture, particularly male culture: 
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... part of the culture here (New Zealand) is coming back to the ... colonial 
heritage .. , thing ... there's been a bit of a tradition of the good keen man and 
roughing it out there and it goes back to the gold prospectors ... particularly ... 
amongst males ... in the past it was more a case of maintaining an image of a 
tough kiwi bloke or blokess as the case maybe ... 
Agatha, Garth, Charlie and Baz intimated that epics were reconstructions of events to 
show them in a different, more positive light. 
Charlie - The New Zealand framework here is that, sometimes ... it's a polite way 
of avoiding saying that we stuffed up, you know, covering yourself and then 
calling it an epic instead. Most people who have spent a bit of time in the 
outdoors have had epics, I don't really know of anyone, if they were honest about 
it, who hasn't, ... there has been some lack of judgement ... if you look back and 
analyse it all. 
Baz - I think one of my epics would come under that category quite well ... my epic 
title is probably covering up for the fact that... our weather forecast research 
wasn't brilliant, .. .I didn't have my crampon adjusted as well as I could have ... So 
those weaknesses in my planning probably led to what I'm now calling an epic. 
While Charlie and Baz saw epics as reconstructions or euphemisms, Agatha saw the re-
telling of an epic as an opportunity for exaggeration: 
But at the end of it it's sort of like the long fish, y'know catching the big fish? And 
it gets very distorted by drama and all sorts of other things ... So it ... has a certain 
amount of testosterone floating around in it (laughs) ... later on ... it has a 
glamorous sort of side to it ... it suddenly gets bigger and better and more close to 
the edge ... 
Hale (1989) concurred. He identified an important indicator of a close call was when "the 
individuals and the group ... express ... relief through exaggeration and humour. "(p. 11). 
This may be to give the story-teller kudos and admiration from their peers or as Garth put 
it 'later on it gets a bit of hero status. ' Risk is a socially valued behaviour according to 
some authors: 
Taking risks indicates courage andforcefulness, and is generally more highly 
valued than conservatism. Most people, particularly men, tend to respect and 
admire others who are willing to take risks. Being in a group reinforces the 
importance of the social desirability ... (Freedman et ai, 1970, p. 201 cited in 
Allen, 1980, p. 63). 
Given the above, it is not surprising that outdoor people indulge in storytelling about their 
epics, as it is an opportunity for folk to grandstand their risk-taking behaviour and gain 
social favour for it. The temptation to exaggerate and euphemise their experiences is also 
understandable. Given that the outdoors has traditionally been dominated by male imagery 
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and men in particular tend to admire risk takers (Freedman et ai, 1970 cited in Allen, 1980) 
it is not surprising that a connection between testosterone and epics was made. I hasten to 
add that testosterone is not a hormone restricted to males. 
Charlie noted he felt the culture of covering up mistakes in the outdoors was beginning to 
change. During FG2 he said: 
... 1 think it's only starting to change now that people actually analyse what they 
are actually doing themselves and actually looking and saying 'well hey, 1 could 
have done that better or, this is what 1 did that led to that '. 
Eric, Charlie and George noted that epics were learning points which could make a group 
'richer for the experience' (George). Garth, Charlie and Norm stated the obvious, that 
epics were memorable experiences and 'stuck in people's minds '. This latter point was an 
advantage in this research, as memorable experiences are much easier to recall after several 
months or years than everyday experiences; which rely much more on schemata and scripts 
(Philip chalk, 1995; Woike, 1995). 
4.4.1 Many meanings 
The data revealed an epic was a complex concept which had more than one meaning. '1 
think we use the word lots of ways ' (Jane). An epic could have different meanings for 
different people, depending on their level of experience. Three strands of meaning for an 
epic were juxtaposed by respondents. All began from the premise of a long arduous trip. 
On one strand, the epic would remain a long hard trip. On another strand, it could become 
an epic adventure involving long duration with the fun and exhilaration of achieving a goal. 
This would be a highly positive experience. On yet another strand, an epic could be a long 
hard trip which also involved a close call in a high risk situation, akin to Mortlock's (1983) 
misadventure, so is part of the subject matter for this thesis. This was a negative experience 
with folk 'realising how lucky the people have been to get away with it' (Norm). 
The three different types of epic described by respondents are illustrated on the revised epic 
spectrum below. While Figure 4.4 mostly matches the original epic spectrum (Figure 4.1), 
there are two exceptions. First, it shows how all epics emanate from a long and arduous 
outdoor experience as analysis of the current data revealed that these elements formed the 
o. ,","". 
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basis of all three types of epic. Second, the category on the left of the spectrum, originally 
entitled 'annoying experiences, changes of plans' , is re-named 'long hard trip' in the 
revised version and shifted one place to the right. 
The annoying change of plan had the effect of adding length and hardship to a trip, so the 
descriptor was changed to reflect this, as aptly described by Baz: 
... part of the definition of epic would be that something or some journey took 
longer than expected, that seems to be a common theme that there was a change of 
weather or the rivers were flooded and you couldn't do this and had to go around 
another way ... 
The 'epic adventure' and 'close call ' category names remain unchanged. Categories are 
arrayed from least risky on the left of the spectmm to most risky on the right, to display 
the relative seriousness of events. 
Seriousness of event 
Figure 4.4 The epic spectrum [revised]. 
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At first, the long hard day manifestation of an epic did not appear to be of concern in this 
study. However, respondents provided a clue to the long hard day's significance in a study 
of three plus incidents (on Albrighton's (1993) risk assessment matrix). Baz said: 
But for me an epic might be ... a really long day for instance ... a 14 hour tramp ... 
sure it was hard work but it wasn't an incident it wasn't an accident it wasn't 
dangerous, you just look back at it and say yeah, that was a real epic ... and 
perhaps you would be putting yourself at risk if you ... have pushed your limits but 
perhaps you aren't aware of putting yourself at risk. Like maybe you're really 
tired and in an outdoor situation that's a risky one. 
So a long hard trip does not constitute a three plus incident in the outdoors, but it may be a 
significant contributing factor to a HIPO incident. This proved to be so in two incidents 
included in this study (phoebe and FredlBill b). 
Finally the elements discussed, together provide a framework for the definition of the 
HIPO incident manifestation of an outdoor epic, which follows: 
EPIC A long, hard, strenuous outdoor trip, involving a chain of events which 
puts people in a reactive mode and pushes their limits to the extent of feeling out 
of control. It is a full on, major, unforeseen event involving perceptions of high 
risk and adventure which produces negative and positive stresses. Memorable 
learning experiences that people survive, they are often glamorised afterwards, 
creating the 'epic '. 
4.5 Relationships between the concepts - accidents, incidents ami epics 
To find out more about how respondents viewed accidents, incidents and epics, I asked 
some focus groups and interviewees if the three types of events were related in any way. I 
found that they were, but while related, they also differed. Respondents expressed 
relationships and differences in terms of: time; degrees of severity consequence wise, in 
importance, size I magnitude of event; main effect/s being negative, psychological, physical; 
frequency of occurrence; one leads to another; confusing lines between them; determining 
factors of context and prior knowledge. 
Ezmerelda saw time as a determining factor for event types, with 'the incident [being] the 
shortest of all ... and an epic long and drawn out. 'Many respondents alluded that 
incidents and epics had less severe consequences than accidents. Jane-Lee, Baz and Jane 
agreed that the reverse could sometimes be true, as described earlier. 
".j. 
64 
Jackie found 'incident and accident extremely confusing in terms of where you draw the 
line between ... them.' To Tommy and Sue they were similar types of events. While others 
(Norm, Jane-Lee) verbally placed events on a degree of severity continuum thus: 
'incidents, accidents, epics.' 
Charlie, Norm, Baz, and Spur agreed there were more incidents than accidents or epics . 
... like a pyramid with a whole lot of incidents out there, and if one of them goes a 
bit further, it becomes an accident. [Jackie agrees). .. and if it goes a bitfurther it 
becomes a serious accident and then if it goes further it's ... a death or disaster ... 
so basica/ly ... a/l accidents are incidents, but not a/l incidents... lead on to 
accidents, it's a degree of severity thing I guess. . .. I don't think epic fits in the 
continuum, an incident, accident and epic, I think ... if you 're going to use epic, it 
should come between incident and accident because, an epic doesn't necessarily 
involve an accident, but an accident is when ... harm did come (Charlie). 
This is a variation on Bird and Germain's (1992) Accident Ratio Study pyramid (Figure 
l.1). Ericand Frank added a useful category to the less severe end of the spectrum: 
E- Like I guess an incident is everything to my way of thinking ... from what you 
planned, and what you find acceptable and what's just part of the norm, 
through to the beginnings of an accident, so it's that area between. 
F- 0 'kay. So you've got normality, incidents, accidents. 
Incident/s Epic or . 
Normal -i---+Mi HIPO--+----+Senous 
. nor -r I 'd 
operatlOn Accident/s I Incident/ Acc! ent 
I I 
I 
Low Degree of severity High 
.. 
High Frequency of occurrence Low 
Figure 4.5 Pyramid of events 
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I have tried to capture most of the above discussion in Figure 4.5 above. The pyramid 
shape shows the frequency of occurrence, with most frequently occurring events at the 
base of the pyramid and least frequent at the apex. I have placed the pyramid on its side to 
emphasise the continuum idea. The linking arrows indicate that certain less serious events 
can lead to a more serious event. The relative degree of severity of events is represented by 
the continuous arrow beneath the pyramid and the decreasing area toward the apex of the 
pyramid, showing the least frequent events as most severe. 
On further discussion, an ambiguity of these relative positions emerged. Accidents, 
incidents and epics did not fit neatly on to a continuum of severity. This ambiguity led to 
the development of the original epic spectrum, where epics could be arrayed anywhere on 
the spectrum according to their relative degree of seriousness. 
4.5.1 The event tree 
FG2 found it hard to reconcile all of their ideas on a continuum, so they abandoned it, and 
George branched out with a new framework, the event tree (Figure 4.6). The following 
excerpts show the framework's development. In George's words: 
I think you've got a branch and fork coming out ... a tree shape with incidents at the 
base of the trunk and coming up to ... a trichotomy as the branches ... so that your 
incident could develop into an epic ... an accident, or ... a disaster . ... [The trunk 
represents} a series of incidents or accidents that collectively contribute to an epic ... 
[or other branch}. 
Each branch represented a possible outcome ifincidents or accidents went unchecked. Others 
added to the framework: 
• ... each of the roots of the tree are individual ... factors or incidents, .. , causes: ... 
environmental factors, lemons, just weather ... how bad the rock is up on the ridge 
and anything like that (Charlie). 
• No follow up ... on previous incidents as well ... (Ralph). 
• The people involved in the activity (Norm). 
• People, environment, equipment! (Charlie). 
• This ... here ... is the event horizon .. .[pointing to soil suiface} ... Thatis when all 
the causal factors, there's some instant in time, where they all intercept ... To make 
some sort of incident ... it might just be a probability [thing} ... rolling dice (Baz). 
The Event Tree below was drawn as their ideas emerged through discussion. I have added 
the arrow from the epic spectrum, to indicate the degree of severity of events to complete 
the framework. This framework provided the idea for and further refines the epic spectrum. 
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Event Horizon Instant in time when all 
causal factors intercept 
Figure 4.6 The Event Tree 
4.6 Meanings of a high potential incident 
This section examines the meanings of HIPO incidents for respondents. For most, HIPO 
incidents meant learning experiences. They provided a range of useful opportunities such as: 
a serious practice exercise, a test lfelt we passed (Miriam); sharpeningjudgement (Norm); 
learning your bounds and limitations (Frank); selflearning about your own needs and 
comfort levels (Renal, Janice); and learningfromyour mistakes (Frank, Juanita, Jane, 
Ezmerelda). Sue, Jane and Eric noted that it was better to learn from others' incidents, so you 
did not have to go through it yourself. 
Several contrasting meanings for a HIPO incident emerged from the data. Some interpreted 
it as a warning to alter something in order to avoid an accident later while others implied that 
certain events were unavoidable. Those subscribing to the former meaning said a HIPO 
incident to them was like a: tap on the shoulder (Jane); wake up call (Juanita, Bruce); 
warning bell (Spur); or reminder (Janice). This type of meaning prompted in many 
respondents questions like: 
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... what could I have done that might have avoided that incident happening? ... or 
what did I do that might have led to it, or what didn't I do that might have prevented 
it? (Charlie). 
Jane said: 'I'd feel quite disgusted in myself if I should of avoided it. ' Baz said 'there are 
freaks of nature ... avalanche {etc]' arguing that some events were unavoidabe. While Charlie 
argued the opposite: 
... even when it comes to situations where people say oh, it was just rock fall or it was 
just a wet snow slide that knocked us off our belay, or it was just a bit of frozen ice on 
the track Some people will look at all of those environmental things and say if you 
looked at it very closely ... that particular gully you were in was a trap for rockfall 
and ... that particular time of year was prone to wet snow slides .. , or if you walk 
down that track it would ... often be icy at that time of year and if you'd really done 
your complete risk assessment ... in that particular location, in those particular 
weather conditions ... then that may have avoided the incident. So, you know, some 
people say that there's no trne unavoidable accidents, other people say there is ... you 
can't control what happens out there. That perhaps is a debatable one. 
Others thought some may see IllPO incidents as inconsequential 'one offs' requiring no action 
at all. Norm said: 
I'd say most of the time it's just brushed off. .. {I doubt] whether they see the frequency 
and all that sort of thing, I think basically they probably don't. They see it as a one off 
thing rather than something that might be recurring, maybe leading to an accident in 
thefuture ... 
These thoughts are substantiated in the literature. Helms (1984) reported that the great 
majority of serious mountaineering injuries and fatalities examined in two studies, were 
preceded within one year by a near miss incident or an accident of a parallel nature in the 
same area. Kauffman (1989) identified crucial factors involved in one specific 
mountaineering accident involving multiple fatalities. Both reported that although the same 
factors (causes) had been present in previous years the group had done the trip, the leaders 
had failed to recognise them as important. 
Ben touched on an interesting, different meaning for why some might appear to brush off a 
HlPO incident: 
... maybe they just were afraid to admit it and glossed over it ... human nature being 
what it is .. , {maybe] they're insecure. 
There is support for Ben's thoughts in the literature. As discussed in Chapter Two, Baron and 
Byrne (1994) contended that people naturally wish to protect their self esteem, and prefer to be 
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seen in a good light. This phenomenon is the well researched self serving bias or attribution 
theory. A HIP 0 incident may be brushed offby attributing the causeto external factors, thereby 
hiding any personal responsibility for it. Alternatively, Hunt (1986) surmised that adventure was 
a sign of incompetence. So perhaps they reconstruct events to avoid appearing incompetent, 
turning it into a heroic epic adventure instead, as discussed earlier. 
To Bruce, Garth, Tommy, Fred and Agatha, their HIPO incidents meant a real affirmation 
of safety practices and systems in place, which enabled them to cope better with the 
serious situation. Bruce said: 
... it reiterated my thoughts or understanding that it's very important to have cover 
or shelter with you at all times when you're out in the hills with groups of 
students, because you never know when you're going to need them ... and ... the 
students .. , they had the right gear with them. 
Bruce was co-leader of a party of 16 sixth form students on a three day snow craft 
expedition on the Robert Ridge. On day thr~e of the trip, after spending the night in snow 
caves, the group headed out via a snowy summit then off-track down a spur through bush 
and out a river valley. Halfway down the spur, out of the snow and onto rock, tussock 
and scree, a student slipped and badly twisted her ankle. This effectively immobilised the 
group for the next three hours until a helicopter came. Bruce said: 
The worst situation at the time was that the weather was not very good, there was 
low cloud, low visibility, and a really strong ... southerly wind, which made things 
very cold. So the other students were getting cold very quickly ... luckily we had 
some tent flies. There had been some discussion, because we were going to get out 
that day, whether we would take those tent flies or not. . .. there were groups 
coming behind, who could've ... made use of the flies. And it would've made our 
travel a little lighter but I believed that we needed them for the safety and after a 
brief discussion, we decided to carry them ... so we managed to get ... several of 
the kids ... under one fly in beside the person who was injured, because she was a 
little bit cold ... then we got the others under another fly. We didn't actually pitch 
them, because ... we were on snow tussock and ... there was no real place to sling 
them ... just getting people inside them ... out of the wind ... I checked several 
times, and the temperature inside those ... shelters was actually amazingly warmer 
than on the outside. 
Another positive meaning of many respondents' HIPO incident experiences was the 
strengthening effect it had on their groups: 
... but what happened to the rest of the grOlp was a real strengthening of the group so 
immediately we rallied around and supported one another and it was amazing the 
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strength of the kids who ... were associated with the boy who hurt himself ... itwasjust 
something 1 didn't know that these boys had in them really (Janice). 
And themselves: 
1felt quite proud of what I'd done ... 1 thought I'd done a good job (Tommy). 
There was no doubt from the responses that most HIPO incidents were significant events 
for my teacher and instructor respondents. Tommy said his HIPO had a profound effect on 
him. Others reported exceptional feelings (see section 5.3) during and after their incidents, 
reinforcing the significant meaning of this type of event for them. This concurred with 
Woike (1995) who found that 'affective A11v1E 's [most memorable experiences] are likely 
to be considered salient and important' (p. 1089). They either shuddered at the thought of 
what could have happened, or felt relieved and glad to get away with it, or both. A HIPO 
incident was a negative experience for most, especially in the short term. For example, 
Spur imagined newspaper headlines. But respondents said it was also mixed with positive 
outcomes, not the least of which was the learning that came from the experience as 
discussed above. 
4.7 Risk acceptance 
Risk acceptance was an important aspect of the meaning of an incident. Many respondents had 
a certain amount of acceptance and expectation that incidents would happen during outdoor 
experiences (Jane, Gary, Frank, Spur, Garth). Lou said: 
Yeah, 1 mean in some wqys, it's a hard thing, but the only wqy you ever learn is 
through incidents. And you hope that they never tum into accidents. 
Ezmerelda, Jane and Frank said that with students, it was important to 'give them the freedom 
to ... stuff up , (Ezmerelda ). Jane felt there was value in them learning from their own mistakes: 
'1 mean it's just as simple as if you get burnt by a hot primus, you're not going to ever do that 
again are you? ' 
Risk to these folk was part of the attraction of the outdoors: 
1 think if you didn't have incidents, itwouldn't be worth doing things ... [but} 1 think 
there's an acceptable limit (Frank). 
But what was this limit? Some incidents were seen by respondents as unimportant (and 
therefore acceptable?), while others clearly were not, as this excerpt from FG5 shows: 
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Jane ... those incidents ... like ... on a ski field and a kid falls and breaks her 
arm I don't really care about that incident, in the sense that I've got her on a 
field, where they are beginners and its appropriate to her level of skiing and its 
just ... 'c 'est la vie' ... everyone knows the risk of going skiing ... 
Janice If you just slip the wrong way. 
Jane So I don't give that much energy at all ... 
Juanita Yes, some ... you just ignore ... But some of them ... just wakes you up! 
FG5 discussed the acceptance of certain incidents from their own perspectives as outdoor 
leaders, however as Priest (1990) pointed out, some incidents may not be acceptable to a child's 
mother. The earlier discussion of societal acceptance and tolerance of risk is useful in the 
analysis here. Societal risk tolerance was related to values not accident statistics (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Ewert, 1989b). The literature did not agree on an acceptable level of risk 
for students attending outdoor education activities. What was clear, was society expected a 
high standard of care when outdoor leaders and institutions had responsibility for students. 
So it is questionable whether the statements made by staff above, would hold up to 
society's scrutiny. 
4.8 Chapter summary 
Part of research objective 2b was to settle on definitions of key terms which were 
meaningful to New Zealand teachers and instructors in an outdoor education setting. 
Terms examined were accident, incident and epic. Commonly used and accepted 
definitions, based on the work of recognised overseas experts in industrial safety 
management and adventure education, were compared with respondents' definitions of the 
terms accident and incident. In both cases industrial, not outdoor definitions, most 
resembled ideas which emanated from the data. Thus, respondents' ideas were used to 
give a new accent to Bird and Germain's definition for incident, making it more relevant to 
the outdoor education setting. 
No definition for an outdoor epic was found in the literature, so the dictionary was 
examined along with respondents' definitions. Common features were extracted and three 
distinct meanings of an epic were distilled from the data. One was found to relate to the 
research topic of HIP 0 incidents and a framework of elements which contributed to it 
assisted in defining this concept. Relationships between accidents, incidents and epics were 
also examined. Incidents and near misses were placed among accidents, death and disaster 
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on the revised epic spectrum, graphically illustrating visible and invisible events side by 
side. High potential incidents took their place as serious events and the outdoor epic story 
was finally seen for what it was, a way for people to make significant near miss events 
visible, whilst maintaining face in a culture quick to judge stupidity whilst quick to revere 
heroic deeds. This revelation brought credence to Hunt's (1986) view that adventure was 
a sign of incompetence. Thus IllPO incidents in outdoor education were found to be 
meaningful to respondents, and synonymous with 'a tap on the shoulder' before a disaster. 
Finally, respondents agreed that part of the attraction of going into the outdoors was the 
risk involved. There was also value in students learning from incidents but there was an 
acceptable limit. This limit was not agreed on by respondents nor in the literature. 
However, society expected a high standard of care when outdoor leaders and institutions 
had responsibility for students, but the extent to which respondents were aware of this was 
unclear. 
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CHAPTER FIVE Effects of HIPO incidents on those involved 
5.1 Introduction 
To further determine the meaningls of HIP 0 incidents for leaders of outdoor education 
activities, effects on those involved were examined. After interviewees told me the story of 
a HIPO incident they had experienced, I asked what effect, if any, it had on them. They 
reported physical effects along with effects on their: feelings and emotions; respect for, 
trust and confidence in colleagues; leadership and involvement in outdoor education. I also 
asked how others were affected by the event, to their knowledge. They reported their 
observations of effects the incident had on students, the victim, assistants, colleagues on 
camp and people back at school (staff and students). 
5.2 Physical effects 
Interviewees reported feeling seven different physical effects during or after an event: stress or 
tension; raised eyebrows; adrenaline; sick! nauseous, butterflies, sweaty palms; pain; sinking 
feeling in stomach; dog tired. I will now discuss these in context. 
5.2.1 Stress or tension 
The physical effects respondents described above are symptoms of stress according to Ewert 
(1989c). Other authors identified similar stress symptoms (Bunting, 1995; Mabery, 1994; 
Mobley, 1981). 
Gintime, Tommy, Miriam and Phoebe felt stress or tension at the beginning and during their 
events. This is natural and although others did not mention it, I suspect they did also. Even 
though Spur was not present when a student had breathing difficulties during an unsupervised 
lake swim 50 metres from shore, he felt stress and raised his eyebrows on hearing about it 
afterwards. Phoebe's story was about her first leadership experience at the Lodge. She led a 
group of 14 students by herself, on a three hour tramp through bush to Lakehead Hut. She was 
nursing an injured leg (a tom sheath of muscle) on the trip, which happened several weeks 
earlier. Before she even left on the trip she said she felt: 
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Nervous, Iwasfeeling sick, nauseous, (laugh) I had butterflies, andwhenever I get 
overly nervous the palms of my hands just cold sweat and I kept wiping them ... 
Raffan (1984) showed how stress levels fluctuated during a typical crisis in Figure 5.1 below. A 
typical crisis (broken line) involved a slow increase in stress as the seriousness of the situation 
was realised, followed by fluctuations in stress levels as trial and error solutions to resolve the 
crisis were attempted, followed by a slow return to normal stress levels as it was resolved. 
Nonnal stress level 
Time 
Figure 5.1 Profile ofa typical crisis (Raffan, 1984, pp. 9-10). 
Gintime's story about losing a group of 14 students fitted this pattern. She said: 
Well it started off they were getting wood Then we realised, shit it's quiet! ... then we 
... started yelling out and there was no-one around and then I remembered the kids 
talking about the hut [an hour away] on the other side [of the river] ... so we shot 
across on the canoes ... to see if the kids were over there ... we probably had an hour of 
daylight left ... I was worrying whether those kids would try to cross the river ... they 
didn't really know the tracks, and did they have any torches or proper gear? ... We got 
over to the hut and found they weren't there ... Damn! They're over there on the track 
somewhere ... [so] we dispersed ... I was going to back-track, [the others] went around 
the other way ... and by the time we went back they were waiting [at the campsite] for 
us [just on dark] ... I could have rung their necks! 
Conversely, a managed crisis (solid line) involved a quicker increase in stress levels as the 
situation was evaluated more promptly, followed by a managed response to the situation, 
followed by a quicker return to normal stress levels. Garth's incident followed this pattern. A 
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qualified nurse and outdoor instructor, he discovered a very cold student at the end of an 
afternoon building snow caves with a sixth form group~ He explained his response: 
Let's go to the system that is requiredfor this situation ... well I wentinto the ... 
hypothermia drawer. Yeah, she's shivering and that's good ... how cold is she? .. is 
this situation gonna require help outside what we 've got here? .. , open that drawer, 
open the potential rescue drawer... open up the resources at the time drawer, and just 
see what you've got. And as you deal with the situation, try and ... tick 'em off and take 
what you need and sort it out. 
5.2.2 Adrenaline 
Tommy implied he was running on adrenaline when helping with a student who'd had an asthma 
attack and subsequent breathing problems during a caving trip. It took three hours to evacuate 
her from this difficult environment. He said: 
'" adrenaline's an incredible thing isn't it and I know afterwards I felt that great sort of 
.. . feeling of Gor Blimey what the consequences could be, and I know that night in here 
I sort of basically ... [was] wandering around in a daze ... 
Garth, had a different view on adrenaline . 
.. .I was in a crash team ... in Australia ... I've ... done enough of that sort of thing ... 
and years of rock climbing, and adrenaline's a no no ... you steer awtry from it. 
These two different physical responses to serious incidents could reflect the amount of 
experience they each had in emergency first aid situations in the outdoors. Tommy had spent 
years as a volunteer first aider, and had come on many school camps, but had not had a 
comparable amount of experience in the outdoors in his personal recreation, he was not an 
outdoor educator and certainly not an experienced caver. Whereas Garth was an experienced 
professional in both emergency medical care and outdoor recreation, and also felt comfortable in 
the alpine environment in snow, so it is not surprising that he did not run on adrenaline while 
responding to the crisis while Tommy reported he did. 
5.2.3 Pain 
Two respondents suffered physical pain during their incidents. Renal felt intense pain as he 
was trying to pass a kidney stone at camp. Phoebe, suffered pain tramping with a pre-
existing leg injury. She dealt with a boy who ate too many sweets during the tramp and 
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vomited all over himself and his sleeping bag that night. Phoebe spent considerable time cleaning 
up the mess, complicated by her leg injury and the bad weather: 
'" when I washed the sick off the mattress I put it into the tin and then I had to go 
way down ... off the track to empty it out somewhere ... and of course I had to be 
so careful ... of my leg, of where I put my feet and of climbing up the stairs and 
onto the porch.! was terrified each time because it was so slippery and while I 
was doing it of course there was torrential rain, thunder and blue lightening and 
all the rest of it ... it was quite a performance climbing up onto the top bunk to 
clean it because my leg hurt and on ... occasion, I was wincing, it really was very 
sore. 
Phoebe's leg injury was also a problem on the return trip: 
... [the students] were prepared to spot me over the shingle fans ... because I was 
feeling my leg badly at that stage, and I knew it was going to be a trip for me to 
get back ... (laughing) .,. and it ... rained all the way back and I was terrified I 
would slip on the mud and the slush but anyway I had boys in front of me and 
behind me and [they] kept turning around to check that I was alright ... it was 
hurting a lot and as I walked along I had to be very careful .. , when I stepped 
over a log, or ... a root ... because ... I couldn't take the risk to ... slip, ... we 
stopped every 20 minutes'or so, and the boys took my pack and it gave me a little 
bit of respite ... it was very cold and it was very wet and the conditions underfoot 
weren't particularly marvelous either, so it was a long ... painful trip ... it was an 
epic, but I made it. 
Phoebe saw the incident as the boy who was sick, but after listening to her story, I felt it 
was the whole trip, with significant factors being Phoebe's leg injury which lengthened the 
trip considerably, her inexperience as a leader and the bad weather, a combination which 
could have led to a number of scenarios. I'm not sure if Phoebe realised the gravity of the 
situation. I looked up the Lodge debrief notes taken at the time of this incident, and there 
was no mention of Phoebe' s pre-existing injury at all. The only recommendation made as a 
result of this incident was to have disinfectant available at the hut for cleaning up vomit in 
future. So the debriefing system had failed to capture the full extent of this event, due to 
Phoebe not having the experience to realise her injury and inexperience were complicating 
factors in the incident. 
5.2.4 Tired 
Finally, Jane-Lee said she felt dog tired during and after her incident. Her group had to 
abandon camp in the night and return to the Lodge due to a stomach bug going through 
approximately 50 students, some on out camp and others at the Lodge. She was the only 
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well staff member that night, so spent it looking after sick people. Others (phoebe, Tommy 
and Miriam) also indicated tiredness after their incidents, due to physical exhaustion and 
the aftermath of adrenaline I suspect. 
5.3 Effects on respondents' feelings and emotions 
Interviewees disclosed 29 different feelings and emotions resulting from their involvement in 
IllPO incidents. Feelings were negative, positive and neutral, ranging from mild to severe or 
extreme. Interviewees could experience a diverse range offeelings or emotions through the 
duration of an incident, depending on its nature, their role in resolving it, their outdoor 
experience and crisis management abilities. This array of feelings is structured to show the range 
from mild to moderate to more extreme indicating degrees of negativity or positivity. These are 
displayed in Table 5.1 below. 
5.3.1 Range of feelings 
Typically, interviewees reported feeling concern during an incident and relief after it was 
resolved. This complies with Raffan's (1984) profile ofa crisis (discussed in section 5.2.1). 
Hale (1989) also noted that an important indice of a close call was that those involved expressed 
relief afterwards. I will use two case studies to illustrate the range of feelings respondents felt 
during an incident. Feelings are highlighted to relate them more easily to Table 5. 1. Bruce said: 
I remember coming down the hill thinking 'this is it, we're nearly at the bush, 
home and hosed. Once we're down there, we're in amongst the trees and even 
though the weather packs out, we're safe. ' And then ... stopping, looking around, 
seeing somebody hadfallen over, seeing the person check, andI thought .,. 
somebody 's just twisted an ankle, they'll pop back up any minute, and then when 
Gerry ... flaggedme backup the hill, I had a sinking feeling in my stomach ... 
that person's experienced, they know about first aid, they wouldn't have called me 
back up here unless there's something that's going to stop us here ... Thinking ... 
what is the damage, is the leg broken or what? ... and when I ... did a physical 
examination myself and saw how sore it was, I was concerned. But, once I was 
through that initial ... feeling ... I just focused on dealing with it and ... things 
were fine then. A couple of times ... when it looked like the weather ... was sort of 
hovering between getting better or getting worse, I had ... some feeling of 
concern, but ... once ... the cloud was lifting and the helicopter had come ... back 
in, I felt ... pretty relaxed ... we were able to keep the situation in control. 
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Table 5.1 Respondents' feelings and emotions9 
Negative feelings / emotions 
Mild 
concerned 
divided 
felt on own 
not wanting to inconvenience 
mild pondering 
surprised 
Moderate 
not happy 
uncertain of ability ifRT injured 
worried 
powerlessness 
pissed off/annoyed 
oops, how did it occur? 
embarrassed professionally 
S(!)lere 
what if? 
felt terrible 
nightmare image 
cannot trust staff you're with 
anger / violence 
Neutral effect 
sixth sense 
profound affect 
9 All descriptors are respondents' own words. 
Positive feelings / emotions 
Mild 
did not panic / go to pieces 
railway track (see section 5.3.3) 
wasn't surprised 
wasn't concerned, just did it 
wasn't too worried 
Moderate 
home and hosed 
felt very responsible / people relying on 
me 
pretty relaxed 
really happy discovered her hypothermia 
felt good, good for self esteem 
Extremely positive 
relief, whew! . 
felt great afterwards 
close to group 
respect / admiration for students / staff 
proud of self / students 
trust and confidence in staff you're with 
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Tommy also experienced a range of feelings and emotions during his incident, some of 
which touched extremes, as illustrated by his and Miriam's recollections: 
T. Mrs Vodane [landowner} came up ... to report that ... a helicopter was on its way, 
and then ... I had the incident with the student ... I [told} all the kids ... look, the 
helicopter's coming ... we've got to move away from here because it may want to land, 
we're going to go down to the bus ... there's all sorts of gear, pick up gear, something, 
anything, and '" he was just by me and he bent down and picked up some grass, and I 
whacked him right around the back of the head, and I turned around and I poked him 
in the chest and 1, I really swore at him, I said, I've had an f'ing awful day and I don't 
remember the rest, 
M .... and you're pissing me off ... 
T .... and it just flowed out of me. I said I've just had 3 hours... and it was just this 
violent burst of energy and right at the end of it or something ... I said 'l'm sorry I hit 
you' and walked away and sat down. And I remember Miriam sayingwe know exactly 
what you mean, Mr .... 
M. It was completely in context because the kid... knew instantly that he had behaved 
completely inappropriately for the circumstances ... he was the last one ... that needed 
reinforcing that ... this had been a very serious day. And I think that's how it sort of 
came out. 
And once the helicopter had left: 
T. I remember the huge hug we had ... that sort of sense of relief that ... well that you 
in particular and me with a bit of help, had ... won the day as it were ... also ... I felt 
quite proud of what I'd done ... Ifelt privileged ... being able to watch you work, 
because I learned qUite a lot about the way in which you did some things ... your 
calmness ... having been afirst aider for years in the St. Johns, it's a thing I'd 
automatically do and yet I was really impressed with the way in which you did 
that ... also the stress ... adrenaline's an incredible thing ... I know that night in 
here I [was} basically in ... a bit of a daze, and ... I ... thought... 'what if it hadn't 
worked out happily?' And what effect that would've had on me. 
5.3.2 Neutral effects 
Two respondents reported effects which did not really fit into the broad categories of 
negative and positive feelings / emotions. Garth felt a sixth sense before an incident and 
Tommy felt a profound effect afterwards. Before Garth even realised there was an 
incident, his intuition was aroused: 
... after I'd been in the [snow} cave for about fifteen minutes ... the old sixth sense 
alarm went off ... [so} I made the decision to come out of the tunnel and check the 
group ... [that's} when I saw that girl was shivering, ... 
Tommy summed up the effect his IDPO had on him: 
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.. , So ... it had quite a profound affect, and I can '" still vividly remember ... other 
incidents that I've had with school trips 
These feelings may be related. Perhaps the profound affect after a HIPO triggers that sixth 
sense in the future, sharpening your judgement to pre-empt a disaster. Garth had noted 
several indicators that hypothermia was a possibility that day, added to long experience in 
the alpine environment, it is not surprising he decided to check the group. Such 
information may be stored in the sub-conscious mind enhancing judgement and decision-
making skills, and may be more prevalent with experienced instructors. Perhaps because 
they've had more incidents (?). This speculation would require further research. HIPO 
incidents may be an important training ground for judgement skills to develop. This theme 
is developed further in Chapter Seven. 
5.3.3 Railway track 
Garth had a unique perspective on how he felt when dealing with an incident. While others 
described various emotions and feelings, Garth would not be drawn on any. Instead he said: 
... when in a situation like that, I'm almost like on a railway track, but it's a very 
wide railway track, and you're like a railway train with a scanner ... controlling 
this ... wide sweep of events ... or trying to, and you're trying to ... keep the whole 
thing focused towards a reasonable sort of a goal ... assessing and looking and 
it's like standing there and having this really wide angle lens ... and walking 
forward with it. 
I think this indicates that the incident did not evoke emotions for Garth. Due to his experience 
and training, he looked at resolving the incident in a more mechanical way than most, 
immediately going into action mode. This is consistent with Raffan's (1984) profile of a 
managed crisis (see section 5.2.1). Others also went into action mode to resolve incidents: 
... get on and get things done (Fred) 
... hardnosed ... justdo it (Agatha) 
.. .I just focused on dealing with it ... things were fine then (Bruce) 
... when you're on the line .. , you gotta react, you gotta do something (Frank) 
5.3.4 Professional embarrassment 
Jane-Lee was the only interviewee who mentioned feeling embarrassed professionally about her 
HIPO incident. This was understandable given what happened. Briefly, she was teacher in 
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charge of a camp which was struck by a vomiting and diarrhoea bug. Some students (14 year 
olds) were already sick by the day they left for out camp, so she and a colleague took their 
group to a campsite which was close to the Lodge and had vehicle access for the car they took 
for back up. Late in the evening, her colleague and two students came down with the bug. She 
sent them, along with two well students, back to the Lodge in the car. An hour later, the two 
well students arrived back in the car. They told Jane-Lee that only one parent was still standing 
back at the Lodge as all staff and many more students were sick. She spent the next two hours 
ferrying students back to camp in the car, whilst the remaining students walked along the 4WD 
road in the dark until they could be picked up. 
Well professionally 1 was a bit embarrassed about the whole thing, because of those 
three ... bits to it ... one parent in charge of the camp up at the Lodge, students 
driving a car, and me having to leave students walking on their own in the middle 
of the night ... [1 was] a bit embarrassed about kids driving cars (laughing) in 
particular, that one 1 felt a bit sheepish about. 
I expected other respondents to experience ,some embarrassment if involved in an incident, 
however, none mentioned it. Looking at the circumstances of Jane-Lee's incident, they 
were unique in the sense that 'if there had been a car crash with the kids driving, our 
names are all mud' (Jane-Lee). But Jane-Lee had not created this situation. She 
explained: 
... one of the well students 1 had sent back was a farm boy and was used to 
driving, and somehow between him and the parent that was still able bodied 
decided that he should drive the resident teacher's car back to tell me ... 
This particular event, is a classic example of a wild card factor (Haddock, 1996a). 
Wild cardfactors can strike anyone at any time, regardless of how much planning 
... goes on. Wild cards are a subset of Raffan's [1984] lemons and their main 
features are their unpredictable and serendipitous nature ... [They usually inhere] 
in the teachers or students (p. 6). 
Taking attribution theory (Baron and Byrne, 1994) into account, perhaps it is easier to 
admit embarrassment if a wild card factor is responsible (exonerating you). Or, perhaps 
Charlie was right about the culture changing so that people talk more comfortably about 
incidents these days, therefore feeling less embarrassment. The setting may also have 
influenced people's comfort levels about sharing incidents, as Rotoiti Lodge had 
established procedures for discussing incidents for some years and people were used to it. 
Bruce said: 
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I think familiarity with the whole debriefing process is a big difference, because 
I've noticed a change in even my feelings about it, talking about incidents where I 
feel that there could be some implication or blame attached to me ... I feel it much 
less now, when I'm in a debriefing situation, I just accept that process now as 
being normal, and that's just something that's taken time of being involved with 
the process and seeing the value of it. 
5.4 Trust and confidence in colleagues 
Interviewees made strong remarks about the importance of trust and confidence issues 
among colleagues working together in the outdoors, especially when resolving a HIPO 
incident. When re-telling their stories, some expressed confidence and trust in their 
colleagues, while others said this crucial component was lacking. Some had confidence 
and trust in some colleagues yet not in others during their incidents. Confidence and trust 
was asymmetrical between distinct groups of colleagues. This was also alluded to by 
Austin (1992). I will use examples to illustrate these contrasting situations. 
Confidence in the team was important for Fred as teacher in charge of his camp: 
[the incident} reinforced ... the knowledge of the supportive people I had .. . And it 's 
very reassuring to know that you've got other people who you can rely on to do the 
things when they need to be done ... I mean that's the w£ry we work, we've got to work 
thatw£ry there, we're like a sort of six or eight legged monster, and we just work all 
together ... to me it's a very efficient and very effective w£ry of dealing with things. 
Whereas trust in colleagues could not be taken for granted for Agatha: 
[teachers j, they're good people, but [the incident] just makes me realise, that you 
can't trust them. And Barry's wasn't because I couldn't trust him, it was just because 
in some w£rys he didn't know any better? But with some ... other staff ... I said to one 
of them about her cotton skivvy, and I'm bloody sure she wore it up the Lake, and I 
know she was up the mountain in it today, and it's ... like we're telling the kids one 
thing and they're doing the opposite ... but it's like they're a law unto themselves and 
... hypothermia won 't get them, it will only get the kids. So, it's [a] real ... double 
standard and it's quite infuriating and it makes me really aware when I get the staff to 
get the kids packed to go up on the mountain, that I need to check them [too]. And in 
fact, this week, I checked the kids before we left ... for their hat, their raincoat, their 
gloves, and I actually physically checked under their clothing, each van load that I 
took up the hill because I knew that I didn't want to get up there and find that they had 
screeds of cotton on ... it's easy to let that slip eh. Like, the week before ... I let it slip 
and I got up there and jucken every kid had a t-shirt with them ... and I just sort of 
realised that ... I can't afford to let it slip. 
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On his snow craft trip, Garth found colleagues that he could trust and rely on and those he 
could not, due to their lack of knowledge and experience. There were two other specialist 
outdoor educators (Jack and Meg) working with him on his trip, plus a teacher (Angus) and 
student teacher assistant (Rebecca). Of his fellow instructors he said: 
... one of the most positive things about that whole trip ... [was} we worked so well 
together and we were thinking of the other people's groups. For that reason, I'd say 
it's the only trip I've ever been on with other leaders where I've felt completely 
confident um, ... I felt very confident, comfortable with Meg's and Jack's experience 
and it seemed to go the other way as well. And it made the whole thing very ea.sy. 
Of the other two he said: 
'" [Angus and Rebecca} weren't really aware of what was happening [the student 
getting cold}. That is one event that did disturb me ... But they were useful in 
terms of some practical things if they were given really clear guidance as to what 
to do, but they weren't really capable of making a judgement call. When we [the 
instructors} were underground, it was left up to them to do that roving eye, and 
they basically didn't have that experience and shouldn't have been expected to do 
it. 
... with the teachers, it's this whole thing of when are they a liability? ... I 
remember being concerned right from the start, at the numbers ... that may sound 
conceited but I don't ever count teachers [re ratios} in an alpine environment. 
Um, I mean, the first thing I do is, I ... start assessing them to find out if they're 
going to be any help at all, or whether they're going to be ... like an increase in 
numbers. 
The adventure experience paradigm originally proposed by Martin and Priest (1986) is 
useful in the analysis here. It (Figure 5.2) illustrates the group's experience. Let us 
consider Garth's snow craft course as a level two in a possible difficulty range of one 
(low) to five (high). The 23 students on the trip had some tramping experience, but were 
novices in a snow environment, so were operating at a level of one to two say. The teacher 
was experienced at managing groups of students but at a similar level to the students 
regarding snow skills so was operating at level two; the assistant was similar to the 
students in most respects apart from being a little older with some teacher training, and 
was also operating at level one to two; the three instructors were competent alpine 
instructors operating at a level of three to four. 
Figure 5.2 shows why Garth, understandably, did not count the teacher or the assistant in 
terms oflowering ratios on this trip. Although helpful for some tasks, given clear guidance 
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from the instructors, they were additional 'students' for the instructors to look after. So 
the real ratio of (experienced) staff to novices (staff and students) on this trip was 1: 8 
(approximately), not 1:5 as would be the case if Angus and Rebecca were counted as 
experienced. 
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Figure 5.2 
Degree of difficulty of activity 
Operation zones model for snow craft course (adapted from Martin and 
Priest, 1986). 
Miriam and Ripena had limited confidence in senior students and parent helpers on camp, 
due to gaining limited support from them on camps in the past. Miriam said: 
.. ; like going up on the Mount Robert Ridge, in pretty cold conditions and the kids 
were just dying to do a bit of snow stuff ... there was ... a constant pressure to get up 
to it ... and my seventh former .... was ... unforgivable because he was the worst for 
that sort of pressure ... kids really wanting to have fun, and you hate being a hard 
task master all the time, and that 's where ... all the intermediate sort of people that 
help become a [problem. It's} very much easier ... if you're with other staff 
members that have the same [attitude} ... and being able to work in that sort of 
structure. 
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5.4.1 Asymmetrical trust and respect 
In summary, the respect for, trust and confidence held by colleagues for one another was a 
crucial element in safety to respondents. However, respect and trust was not always 
mutual or symmetrical. Experienced outdoor educators trusted one another but not their 
less experienced teacher colleagues in situations involving commitment and risk. Less 
experienced staff trusted their more experienced colleagues and each other but not always 
their senior student or parent assistants. Experienced outdoor educators and instructors, 
although respecting their less experienced colleagues, did not always trust their judgement 
when it came to decision-making critical to safety. 
So on a scale of experience, like trusted like, less experienced trusted more experienced 
but the reverse of this was not always true. Reasons given for this were a lack of 
knowledge, skill and experience in that environment and activity on the part of the teacher 
or assistant (Garth, Agatha, Miriam, Ripena), or because some teachers and assistants 
chose to be a law unto themselves (Agatha, Miriam, Ripena). 
A problem existed at the Lodge, where at times, a shortage of experienced outdoor 
educators or instructors meant that less experienced teachers or assistants were sometimes 
relied on to carry out duties beyond their competence. They did not have the skill or 
judgement capability for some tasks. Additionally, the environment itself was also 
challenging for them, so simple tasks critical to safety were sometimes not carried out due 
to the person operating out of their comfort zone. When operating in Cor D zones (see 
Fig 5.2 or 4.3) there is no margin for safety to cope if difficulties arise as the person is 
understandably focusing on themselves. This problematic situation was a contributing 
factor to several of the HIPO incidents in this study, and is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter Eight. 
5.5 Effects on leadership 
I asked interviewees what effect the incident had on their outdoor leadership since the 
event. All identified general and specific things they had become more aware of or had 
reaffirmed as a result of their HIPO incident. General effects included sharpened 
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judgement as a result of awareness gained (most); learned a great deal (Jane-Lee, Garth, 
Phoebe, Bill); increased confidence and trust in themselves (phoebe, Jane-Lee); and safety 
practices were reinforced (Tommy, Bruce, Fred, Bill, Garth). 
While general effects overlapped, specific effects on leadership were more unique. 
Each incident in the study highlighted different aspects of leadership for 
respondents. For example: 
I'm much less tolerant of kids challenging the basics as I know what the 
consequences are (Miriam). 
It made me realise that it's not uncommon that the teachers are the 
weakest link ( Agatha). 
It would take much time and experience for a leader to gain all the insights 
disclosed in the research. But sharing others' incidents gave outdoor leaders 
opportunities to learn from others and a much better idea of the frequency of 
events as alluded to in earlier sections and summed up by Jane and Charlie. 
... that's the nicest way to use it, when you hear somebody else's [incidents] (all 
laugh) ... You can ... take that learning on. But you didn't have to do it yourself 
(Jane) . 
... within our own individual experience, we may ever only have one of a 
particular type of incident ever occurring ... but we don't get the bigger 
picture. And that's where a ... broader research [is necessary] .. , to show that 
bigger picture (Charlie). 
Alan Hale (1989) echoed this in his article 'Close Calls - Ignore them at your peril.' As 
already discussed, he encouraged outdoor leaders to discuss, record and analyse their 
close calls as well as their accidents, so more people could learn from them and 
appropriate changes could be made regarding programme safety. 
Many insights gained appeared in the literature. Gintime said lit made me realise it 
could happen to anyone, including me '. Two studies revealed that in spite of an 
accident or near miss in a similar area in the past, group leaders failed to perceive that 
the hazards could affect them or their group (Helms, 1984). So realising 'it can happen 
to me' was a valuable lesson learned by Gintime after her incident. 
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5.6 Effects on involvement in outdoor education 
Six respondents said their HIPO incident had little effect on their involvement in 
outdoor education. Bruce's reply was typical, 'probably have very little affect I 
imagine, I'm committed to that. 'Four respondents reiterated the HIPO had been a 
learning experience and they'd 'carry on and learn more' (Bill). Two raised the 
issue of staff trustworthiness on camp. Miriam said: 
I'm very careful about who I'll come away on camp with ... [it] becomes a 
concern ... with ... squeezes on resources ... the whole ... issue of getting 
staff to come up here that are safe (Miriam). 
5.7 Effects of event on others 
I asked respondents what affects, to their knowledge, the events had on others 
involved. They identified affects on the students, victim, parent help, colleague/s 
(on camp), and people back at school (students, staff). 
Respondents reported 24 different effects on students, mostly feelings and 
emotions they observed in their groups. In order to structure this array of feelings 
and for consistency, I used the framework used for interviewees' own feelings in 
Table 5.1. 
5.7.1 Range of feelings 
Like respondents, students exhibited a range of feelings, emotions and actions over the duration 
of a HIPO incident. I will use two examples to illustrate this, highlighting feelings and emotions 
to relate them more easily to Table 5.1. Tommy described students' reactions when one student 
had an asthma attack and prolonged breathing problems in the caves . 
... it was reasonably tense in there but calmish I suppose, and then when the 
kids started to see just how much trouble Rosie was having ... I think some of 
them started to get a bit anxious ... and it was round about that time we told 
the students who had already gone through the 'Birth Canal' [a tight squeeze 1 
to stay put ... and then we had that marvellous moment when the kids on the 
other side started singing 'it's a lovely day today' and we all burst out 
laughing. 
Some effects on the students were extreme. Phoebe said: 
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Table 5.2 Students' feelings and emotions 10 
Negative feelings / emotions 
Mild 
concerned (for injured student) 
thought seriously about lead up 
Moderate 
felt guilty 
very concerned (for injured student) 
sick & tired of waiting 
most concerned about selves 
Severe 
tense 
anxious 
angry 
OTHER 
did not see seriousness 
did not realise what was happening 
staff did not let them see seriousness 
10 As expressed by respondents 
Positive feelings / emotions 
Mild 
not concerned (about situation) 
accepted staff needed space 
realised reality of deaf people can't hear 
interested in helicopter 
Moderate 
adventure 
hilarity 
positive 
learnt something 
calm 
Extremely positive 
maturity 
pride 
tried hard / helpful 
really supportive 
trouble-makers prepared to work in 
marvellous moment - singing 
tension release 
OTHER 
took incident seriously 
realised seriousness 
staff shared seriousness with them 
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... it made a profound effect on the actual group because the trouble makers were 
prepared to work in with me, and do as they were asked, they were prepared to 
spot me over the shingle ... because I was feeling my leg badly at that stage, ... I 
think it made [the boy who was sickfrom eating all the sweets] ... think very 
seriously about the circumstances leading up to it, of course ... his fellow 
classmates were very angry with him, and I know that he felt extremely guilty. 
For the rest of the week, he couldn't be nicer ... 1'm sure he learnt something 
from it 
Interestingly, respondents reported contrasting levels of awareness among students, regarding 
the seriousness of the HIPO incident. Some staff did not disclose the seriousness of the situation 
to students, or else made efforts to conceal it. Consequently, some students did not realise the 
seriousness of the situation while others did, according to respondents . 
... we didn't let them see, I guess that I thought Thursday night was pretty dodgy 
... it all got solved and four came back and out-camp had a good old adventure, 
clamping around in the puddles in the middle of the night, they 
thought it was hilarious ... For them it was positive (Jane-Lee). 
This was consistent with earlier findings (Haddock, 1995/6a) where students thought the 
incident was an adventure, while staff realised it was a near miss. Tommy tried to hide the 
seriousness of the situation from students, but they realised anyway. He said: 
... a couple of the kids were ... saying 'is she gonna be alright? ' ... and I said 'oh yes 
yes, Meg's here [the instructor] and everything will be fine, no problem' ... but I didn't 
feel that, I felt really tense ... the kids were really good ... people realised it was a 
serious incident ... and there was a lot of concern for the student involved 
Others made no effort to try to hide the seriousness of the situation from students. In Agatha's 
group, some students realised the gravity of the situation, while others did not. Her teacher 
assistant suffered mild hypothennia on his second caving trip for the day. 
A . ... you couldfeel this ... team sort of thing coming in and ... there were a number 
[of students] that I cmtld've relied on and they ... started stepping up and being a 
little bit more older, because he was up with me ... [instead of tail ending] ... 
suddenly he was in trouble, not that he made a big deal about it, but he ... wasn't 
scared to say that he was cold and ... there was .,. this feeling of support .. .1 think a 
lot of it was because he was up front and wasn't trying to hide stuff ... they could 
see that and it made them that bit more mature. 
L Do you think the students were aware of the gravity of the situation? 
A. I think a couple of them might have been. Some of them wouldn't have been and 
the middle ones would have been aware that he was pretty cold 
Students' sensitivity to the seriousness of the situation appears interesting, but requires further 
investigation to check out the accuracy of teachers' perceptions. 
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5.7.2 "icti~s 
Nine of the twelve interviewees identified effects of the incident on victim/so Physical, social 
and psychological effects were identified. Physical effects included: cold (four incidents); pain 
(three); breathing difficulties (two); sick / vomiting (two). It is interesting that the physical 
effects of the 11 incidents concentrated into just four areas. Cold was a significant causal factor 
in a previous study of accidents and incidents at the Lodge (Haddock, 1993b). Further 
investigation would need to determine the significance of the other physical effects. 
Respondents reported social and psychological effects of incidents on victims also. These 
included: extreme guilt (student); couldn't be nicer after (student); thought seriously about lead 
up (student); suppressed pain to organise own evacuation (teacher); open about being cold 
(teacher); enjoyed camp anyway (sick students). These responses reflect social norms and 
personality traits in my view, but further investigation would need to verifY this. 
5.7.3 Colleagues 
HIPO incidents had the effect of getting colleagues to work together professionally to 
resolve them. They generally assisted and supported one another whilst remaining calm 
and in control. Garth commented that less experienced staff required clear guidance on 
how to assist, while fellow instructors did not. Others commented that the incidents were 
usually talked about casually afterwards in the kitchen. Eyebrows were sometimes raised, 
but staff were not put off camps as a result of incidents. This latter point was made a 
number of times during interviews and focus groups. 
5.7.4 Assistants 
A parent helper at Jane-Lee's camp who found himself in charge when all stafffell ill, 
experienced contrasting feelings during the incident. These related directly to the amount of 
responsibility and hence stress he felt at different stages. Jane-Lee said he wasn't happy with 
being in charge initially as he lacked the skills to be responsible. Later when Jane-Lee returned, 
he was thrilled, relieved and helped out willingly. This highlighted the importance of adequately 
staffing school camps, and not relying too heavily on untrained voluntary assistants. This school 
reviewed its staffing policy after the incident, increasing the number of teachers attending 
camps from three to four, in line with all other constituent schools. 
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5.7.5 People back at school 
Three respondents mentioned effects the incidents had on people back at school. Miriam and 
Tommy stressed how important it was that they received back up and support from school, for 
any decisions they made at camp. The support they received included senior staff back at 
school dealing with parents, rescue services and media during and after the event and the 
principal commending their efforts at a staff meeting on their return to school. Of paramount 
importance was that they felt their judgement was trusted. Jane-Lee reported that the incident 
of 50 students and staff getting sick at camp was viewed with humour by others on their return 
to school. It gave them 'a big laugh' she said. 
5.8 Learned from the experience 
I asked interviewees what they learned from the experience of their IllPO incident in order to 
further investigate the meaningls of the event to them. They reported approximately thirty 
different things that they learned or had reinforced as a result ofthe IllPO incident, which are 
displayed in Table 5.3 below. 
As indicated, learning specific to each incident did not overlap, but fell into four categories: 
learning about themselves, the students, their colleagues and other areas. Some items spanned 
two categories. Many specific learning points were reiterations of points made earlier in this 
analysis. 
Poignant for many respondents was what they learned about themselves. Their comments 
reflected a deeper understanding of the role and responsibilities of an outdoor leader. The 
'self learning' and 'other learning' lists bore particular resemblance to Priest's (1987) list 
of skills and attributes of effective outdoor leaders (see Table 3.1). There was no doubt 
that IllPO incidents were valuable learning experiences for respondents, and I would go 
further to state that they are a valuable training ground in the development of an effective 
outdoor leader. This theme is developed further in Chapter Seven. 
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Table 5.3 What respondents learned from incidents 
• about my limits 
• not to let guard down until end of camp 
• not to transfer responsibility to students, they are not 
equals 
• I could push myself 
• I had to give confidence to kids, therefore I had to 
instil confidence in myself 
• have to communicate better with other instructors, to 
cover group 
• reinforced importance of being prepared 
• have to look after myself, manage my stress 
• know when to step back, let others manage 
• never put myself at risk (if leader) 
• studentls limits 
• even when sick, they can still have fun 
• they are not equals, so cannot always transfer 
responsibility to them 
• respect 
• drew closer to them 
• they were responsible to one another 
• the value of their prior fitness and good gear 
• check their gear before activity (eg. inhaler) 
5.9 Chapter summary 
• respect 
• groupwork 
• drew closer to them 
• to communicate better with other instructors re - group 
coverage 
• adult helpers cannot necessarily cover quite simple 
events independently 
• you cannot take anything for granted 
• ego gear check systems 
• the quality of the people you're with 
• check in with colleague's preparedness (physical, 
psychological) 
• respect for how quickly lemons (causal factors) can 
stack up 
• about hygiene 
• planning, what and how 
• need for communication (radio) 
• be aware of what deaf people cannot hear outdoors 
• value of prior fitness & good gear 
• to carry emergency rations (high energy snacks) 
• think of worst case scenario 
• need for adequate medical information 
HIPO incidents inevitably had an effect on those involved, ranging from physical effects to 
effects on their feelings and emotions. Interviewees reported a range of effects during and 
after events. Stress levels experienced during an event matched Raffan's (1984) profile of 
a typical crisis, with a high initial stress level then a tapering off of stress as the incident 
was resolved. 
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Respondents reported effects on their respect for, trust and confidence in colleagues, 
their leadership and involvement in outdoor education. Interestingly, trust and confidence 
in colleagues, remarked on by many respondents, was not mutual or symmetrical. 
Experienced outdoor educators and instructors trusted and had confidence in one another 
but not their less experienced teacher colleagues. Teachers trusted and had confidence in 
each other and their more experienced colleagues, but not in parent or student assistants. 
So like trusted like and less experienced trusted more experienced but the reverse of this 
was not true. This led instructors like Garth, to count teacher assistants as extra novices, 
rather than extra staffwhen it came to calculating ratios for activities. 
Interviewees reported various effects on others involved in an event. These included 
victims, students, colleagues on camp, assistants and people back at school. Students 
involved in the event, like interviewees, experienced a range of feelings and emotions 
during and after an event. Additionally, students did not always realise the gravity of the 
situation. Some were more likely to think it was an adventure than a HIPO incident 
according to respondents. Further research is required to verify this however. 
Examining effects further assisted in unravelling meanings of HIP 0 incidents for those 
involved. Incidents had little effect on respondents' involvement in outdoor education as 
most were committed to this. But their involvement in a HIPO incident was undoubtedly a 
learning experience, which often sharpened interviewees' judgement, improving their 
leadership after an event. This is an important point, since HIPOs may help teach the very 
lessons that prevent future accidents. Thus respondents reported positive and negative 
effects of events, indicating that like risk, the outcomes of incidents ( and accidents) are not 
only losses. This theme is examined further in Chapter Seven. 
It was apparent through effects incidents had on respondents and others involved, that 
these events were significant to them. Several tools have been developed by researchers to 
assist in determining the significance of an event for preventive purposes. Chapter Six 
describes how one such tool was used in this study to determine the significance of HIP 0 
incidents to respondents. 
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CHAPTER SIX Determining the significance of an event 
6.1 Introduction 
In this thesis I have reviewed the literature relating to incidents, their significance, 
investigation and analysis. Part of research objective b was to determine the significance of 
HIPO incidents for the respondents involved. This chapter presents findings related to this 
objective. 
The literature revealed that several tools were used to determine the significance of 
industrial accidents and incidents. One such tool was Albrighton's (1993) Risk Assessment 
Model (see Figure 1.2). He recommended that incidents with a risk factor of three or more 
should generate further investigation, analysis and corrective action. So incidents with a 
risk factor of three or more were the focus of this study. My use of Albrighton's tool was 
twofold. To ascertain the scores for inclusion of events in the study and to determine the 
significance of events for respondents. 
6.2 Interviews 
I asked interview respondents to rate their incident using Albrighton's model at the end of 
each interview. I explained how the model worked, taking care to go over each descriptor, 
as these had caused some confusion in the pilot study. I explained there were no right or 
wrong answers and where more than one respondent was interviewed, got them to assess 
the incident separately so they did not influence each other. During the discussion I 
explained that it didn't matter if they did not agree. 
To control for the limitations of self reporting, an external consultant was engaged to rate 
all incidents independently. If an incident was rated three or more by the respondent, 
consultant or both, it was included in the study. Table 6.1 below shows the results of 
ratings by the respondents (resp) and consultant (cons). Respondent name and incident 
number identify them. 
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All incidents were rated three and above by the consultant, whereas two incidents were 
rated a two by respondents. Spur rated his incident two while the consultant rated it five. 
Fred rated incident 5b a two while Bill (his co-interviewee) rated it three and the 
consultant rated it four. So under the criteria of one or both rating an incident a three or 
more, both incidents were included in the study. One interview was excluded from the 
study as the incident was rated a one by the respondent. I agreed with the rating so did not 
send this incident to the consultant. 
Table 6.1 Risk assessment scores (interviews) 
1 4 
2 Tommy & Miriam 5 
3 Renal 3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
10 Jane-Lee 
Figure 6.1 below illustrates the risk assessment scores given by the respondent/s and 
consultant (events are identified by incident description and number). Respondent/s and 
consultant scores agreed for three incidents (2,4,6). The two respondents' scores agreed 
for incident 5a. In cases where scores did not agree, the consultant rated the incident 
higher for four incidents (1, 5b, 9, 10), while the respondent rated it higher for four 
incidents (3, 5a, 7, 8). In all cases the difference between scores was one point, except 
incident 9 where the difference was three points (respondent rating two and consultant 
rating five). For incident 5b there was a one point difference between each of the three 
ratings as already discussed. In summary, there was general agreement in the risk 
assessment scores between consultant and respondent/s as they were within one rating 
point in all but one of the eleven incidents. 
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Incident Risk Assessment Scores 
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Figure 6.1 Incident Risk Assessment Scores (interviews) 
6.3 Focus groups 
To ascertain focus group respondents ' views on the significance of events, I gave them a 
case-study to discuss and rate using the Albrighton (1993) risk assessment model. They 
were all given the same case-study, based on an incident from one of the interviews (5a). 
Focus group one was involved in this incident the week of their discussion. I read the 
case-study (see Appendix I), then gave them an opportunity to ask questions. I gave them 
the Albrighton model (see Appendix II) explained how it worked, and answered any 
questions. Respondents were asked to rate the incident separately so they did not 
influence each other. Finally, they were asked to share how they rated the incident and 
why. They did this in turn, then I told them the outcome of the incident (see Appendix I). 
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Respondents discussed the incident further in some cases. Scores are displayed in Table 
6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 Risk assessment scores - Focus group case study 
4 
1 1 2 
2 3 2 5 
3 2 5 
3 2 5 
2 4 
2 2-3 
1 2 3 
4 2.;.3 2 4-5 
5 
5 1 2 3 
Figure 6.2 below shows a wide range of scores given for the probability of this event 
occurring. Scores covered the whole range possible, from zero to three. Similar numbers 
rated the probability as a one (6), two (7), and three (8). Such variation in the scores puts 
into question its usefulness for determining the probability of an event occurring. 
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Probability Scores (n=22) 
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Figure 6.2 Probability scores 
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An examination of why the variance may have occurred could assist refinement of the 
tool and interpretation of the results. First, I noticed that respondents found the probability 
rating the most problematic, indicated by most questions being asked about this variable 
during the exercise. Confusion arose where respondents tried to assess how often this type 
of event would occur. I emphasised that they needed to base their assessment on how 
likely it was that the event would occur, given the same set of circumstances. Second, 
further research would need to test whether better descriptors would improve agreement 
between scores. 
Seriousness scores were more consistent as shown in Figure 6.3 below. Twenty 
respondents (including the consultant) gave the incident a seriousness rating of two (quite 
serious), one gave a one (marginal) and one gave a three (catastrophic). The consistency 
of rating clearly indicated agreement that the incident was quite serious. 
Seriousness Scores (n=22) 
nrp I I 
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Figure 6.3 Seriousness scores 
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By adding the probability and seriousness ratings together, a risk factor score was 
obtained. Figure 6.4 below, shows the risk factor scores of respondents and the consultant. 
Risk Factor Scores (n=22) 
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Figure 6.4 Risk factor scores 
4 5 6 
Risk factor scores ranged from two to five (two = 2; three = 5; four = 6; five = 8). The 
variance in scores reflected the variance in probability rating scores discussed earlier. 
6.4 Chapter summary 
Albrighton (1993) recommended that an incident with a risk factor of three or more 
should generate further investigation, analysis and corrective action. Incidents with a risk 
factor of three or more were the focus of this study. All interviewees rated their HIPO 
incidents using the tool as did the consultant. Most interviewees rated their incidents a 
three or more (12 of 14 ratings). The consultant rated all incidents a three or more. This 
indicated (and thus reaffirmed previous chapter findings) that the majority of respondents 
and the consultant thought the incidents were significant. 
To test for reliability of the tool, all focus group respondents were given a case study to 
rate. A comparison of the probability scores showed a range of scores from zero to three, 
shedding doubt on the trustworthiness of the tool to accurately measure the probability of 
an event's occurrence. This variable may need some more work on the descriptors or 
respondent briefing. A comparison of the seriousness scores showed that most (20 of22) 
gave a seriousness score of two, indicating the tool was more trustworthy in measuring 
the seriousness of an event. In combining scores, a clear majority of respondents gave the 
case study incident an overall risk factor of three or more (20 of 22) as did the consultant. 
This indicated respondents and consultant alike thought the event had significance. It also 
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indicated that the instrument was useful in estimating three plus incidents and thus 
determining the significance of an event. 
It is therefore useful in delineating HIPO incidents from other minor events with no 
relationship to major accidents and thus may be useful for preventive and safety purposes. 
I therefore recommend that schools consider using such a tool to determine HIPO 
incidents which require reporting, analysis and remedial action, as part of its overall risk 
management plan. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN How incidents were processed 
7.1 Introduction 
Processing is an activity that is used to encourage individuals to reflect, describe, 
analyze, and communicate what they have recently experienced (Quinsland & 
Van Ginkel, 1984) ... The primary reason for processing is that adventure-based 
learning experiences are rich in symbols, metaphors, feelings and typical 
behaviour patterns ... Transfer and generalisation occur when the learning in one 
situation carries over to another (Nadler and Luckner, 1992, pp 1 & 3). 
The processing of experiences occurred on different levels and in different ways according 
several authors (Nadler and Luckner, 1992; Schoel, Prouty and Radcliffe, 1989). It could 
assist individuals to find out what happened at a cognitive, affective (feelings and 
emotions) and behavioural level. Respondents identified similar benefits when reflecting on 
incidents, including finding out why it happened and what they could have done to avoid 
it, and coping with the feelings side of it. 
Research objective d was to investigate how (or if) HIPO incidents were processed 
afterwards. Objective e was to elucidate procedures for incident reporting and analysis 
which would be beneficial to a school's risk management plan. Respondents were asked 
how, in their experience, incidents were processed both formally and informally. I asked 
interviewees how they processed a specific HIPO incident and I asked focus groups to tell 
me, in general, how they usually processed such events. I asked all respondents which 
methods (formal and informal) they found beneficial. 
7.2 Formal ways 
Interviewees reported the following formal ways they processed their HIPO incident: a 
verbal debrief at the end of camp at the Lodge; notes written up at debrief and kept on file 
at the Lodge and a copy sent to the liaison teacher at school; incident reported to principal 
or deputy principal by telephone during the week or on return to school; liaison teacher 
told on return to school; verbal debrief at school; discussed with students at camp or at 
school; reported to outside agencies (for example: Health Department, health nurse, deaf 
tutors); incident used as example to educate future groups preparing for camp; separate 
incident report completed. 
,-~- - .. ---. . 
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Of the eleven incidents reported in the ten interviews, all were debriefed at the Lodge and 
notes taken except for one. Renal's incident (kidney stone pain and evacuation to doctor) 
occurred after the debrief, so a separate report was written up the next day. This was a 
departure from a previous study (Haddock, 1995/6a) where some respondents were 
excluded from any processing of an event back at school as they were outdoor instructors 
employed by the school for the specific camp only. Due to their experience, they would 
most likely have had a valuable input to make to a debrief. Additionally, there was no 
formal or informal debrief after the event at some schools. 
How incidents were processed formally 
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Figure 7.1 Formal ways used to process HIPO incidents 
Focus group respondents identified an almost identical list of formal ways they used to 
process HIPO incidents, which differed in two categories only. They mentioned that 
parents were informed of the incident and they made no mention of outside agencies 
being informed. Figure 7.1 illustrates the formal ways interviewees (n=ll) and focus 
group respondents (n=41I) used to process HIPO incidents. 
II Of the five focus groups, one could not be drawn on ways they used to process events. 
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7.2.1 Debriefs 
Respondents reported that incidents were always formally debriefed at the Lodge and 
sometimes back at school also. I asked respondents to describe how these debriefs 
functioned and what their purpose was. Formal Lodge debriefs took place: 
... at the end of the week, either Thursday evening or Friday morning (Bruce). All 
staff and helpers usually attend (Agatha). Incidents and accidents are logged 
(Janice) and we have lots of cups of tea (Ezmerelda). We look at incidents that 
could lead to ... a more serious effect, what was done about it and suggestions to 
try and ensure it doesn't happen again (Agatha) for example, didwe have 
everything we should have hadwith us (Janice). 
Notes taken at the Lodge debrief were also routinely sent to the Liaison Teacher after the 
camp. Additionally, three forms of post-camp school debriefs took place according to 
respondents: informal, semi-formal and formal. 
Informal chatting was very common, where staff on camp who had an incident would 
communicate this informally to the Lodge Liaison Teacher on return to school. Incidents 
were also chatted about to other staff over a cup of tea in the staff room in subsequent 
weeks after the camp. In some schools, this was the extent of post camp debriefing at 
school. In the busy school environment, anything further may not have been seen as 
necessary due to the full debrief already held at the Lodge. 
Semi-formal meetings after camps were also routine in some schools. These were usually 
co-ordinated by the Liaison Teacher, who tried to get all staff who attended camp together 
to discuss it on their return. These could be arranged as a get together in the staff room on 
the Friday everyone returned, or a few days later at lunch time, although time constraints 
sometimes meant all staff could not attend or the meeting was missed for some camps. 
Where staff were unable to meet for any reason, the Jane (FG5, Liaison Teacher) would 
see staff individually after camp to see if there was anything they wanted to add to the 
Lodge debrief notes. Jane felt it was valuable to hold these meetings some time after the 
camp rather than immediately, to allow time for reflection and distance from events. The 
meetings also provided another forum for staff to express any concerns, if they felt they 
were unable to do this at the Lodge debrief Jane sent any further feedback to the Lodge 
afterwards. 
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Formal meetings were held on occasions, usually after a serious event. Tommy described 
such a meeting after his incident. He said it was a thorough debrief to look at procedures, 
with staff involved, the Liaison Teacher, Deputy Principal and school nurse. Tommy said 
it was 'certainly the longest debrief I 've ever been involved with '. 
In addition to the above, respondents mentioned two more formal ways incidents were 
processed on return to school. First, the Lodge debrief notes were gone through by the 
Liaison Teacher, and appropriate action taken on any recommendations. Sometimes, more 
serious incidents were transcribed onto a school accident report form and filed in the 
school for future reference, for example OSH or ACC purposes. Second, some incidents 
were used as examples to brief future groups in their preparation for camp. 
7.3 Informal ways 
Figure 7.2 shows the informal ways that interviewees (n= ll) and focus group respondents 
(n=4) used to process HIPO incidents. Interviewees and focus groups identified similar 
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Figure 7.2 Informal ways used to process HIPO incidents 
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ways they had informally processed HIPO incidents. These were: chatting to friends or 
colleagues over a cup of tea; personal reflection through going over it in their minds or 
diary writing; talking to family, particularly their partner; talking to an experienced 
outdoor colleague; talking to other staff involved; talking to students involved; and joking 
about it. In addition, the focus groups identified a further three ways o~ informally 
processing an event: story telling and reminiscing about it; talking to close friendls; and 
warning other instructors who lead the same activity in the same area about the hazards. 
7.4 Helpful processes and conducive settings 
In order to determine procedures for incident reporting and analysis which would benefit a 
school's risk management plan (research objective e), I asked respondents which methods 
they found helpful to process events; what kinds of settings were most conducive to 
reflecting on an event; and which were not? 
7.4.1 Helpful ways of processing 
It was important to respondents that the people they talked to about an event were able to 
relate to the situation. Respondents found the following ways most helpful in processing 
events: talking to friends and colleagues who work in the outdoors or go on camps; 
talking 
Most helpful ways of processing an event 
recording it 
joking about it 
self reflection 
~--------------~ 
taking to farrily 1------------....1 
formal debrief at the 
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informal talking 
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Figure 7.3 Most helpful ways of processing an event 
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to others involved in the incident including staff and students; talking to family for 
emotional support; formal debrief at the Lodge; self reflection; joking about it and making 
light of it afterwards; and recording it well. Respondents noted a range of reasons why 
they found the formal Lodge debriefs helpful in processing incidents. The following were 
typical. 
• experienced resident teachers to make recommendations (phoebe) 
• immediately is better as fresher (Phoebe, Garth, Bill) 
• more structured (Gintime) 
• all people involved are there (Garth) 
• goal of learning and changing procedures within an institution (Bruce, 
Gintime, Sue) 
• you get support if something happens to you (Sue) 
Respondents also found the debriefs valuable as remarked on by Fred: 
.. .[they 're J valuable because often people don't come and talk to you about things 
that are going wrong, they'd rather try and handle it themselves. So with a forum 
like that you've got the chance to state it as a fact rather than a gripe or a grizzle. 
Three respondents said that joking about an incident afterwards was a helpful way of 
processing it. Hale (1989) stated this was an important indicator of a close call . 
... when especially frightening experiences end without harm, laughter and light 
hearted joking usually occur. This seems a natural emotional outlet and reaction 
to the potentially disastrous results that were apparent, yet too unpleasant to 
dwell upon (p. 12). 
Hale (1989) warned that 'amid the laughter, stories and goodfeelings it is quite easy to 
ignore or forget the writing of a close call report' (p.12). Awareness spread instead by 
word of mouth. He believed that this in turn led to a lack of analysis followed by a 
tendency for incidents to recur and occasionally led to injuries and even fatalities. 
Eric indicated that passing information on by word of mouth, beginning with a joke, was· 
fairly common in the school environment. 
... it's not until some time down the road, maybe at a function ... that it's let slip that 
'oh, you know, such and such occurred' and everyone has a good chuckle about it. 
But at the same time you can see ... half a dozen light bulbs going on around that 
conversation as people suddenly think, 'hell, I almost went over there the other day ... 
the same thing could've happened to me ' 
Hale (1989) believed the important part of processing an incident was the formal reporting 
and subsequent analysis, followed by intervention to stop or alter the close call 
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circumstance. These final steps were most important in reducing accident potential yet 
least often practised after a close call according to Hale in 1989. Some would like 
reporting and analysis to be the norm in New Zealand schools as illustrated by Eric: 
... if it'd been a formal, or an informal ... meeting of some sort, where people could 
Sl{Y 'hey, this happened' ... these are the things that led up to it, these were the factors 
involved in it, let's file that, or put that aside and ml{Ybe look again at it later if 
necessary. But then, it's been voiced, others have heard it, it's become public 
information. And you learn from it, and ... it's a slowly changing thing ... I guess we 
see things like aSH trying to change them but, like even trying to encourage people to 
plan for worse case scenarios and come backwards from there, it can be quite 
difficult, because they're still stuck in a mindset that well, I don 'twant any of those 
things to happen, so I know that I'm going to avoid them. You're not sl{Ying you want 
them to happen, you're sl{Ying they're potentials. Just come backwards. 
At Rotoiti Lodge, many close call incidents are captured by the formal debriefing 
procedure at the end of each week. Interviewees attest to this with most (ten) saying their 
incidents were recorded (see Figure 7.2). This is commendable but some escape the net. 
As mentioned earlier, Phoebe left crucial information out of her formal report of her 
incident. She said: 
[In the debrief] I didn't mention myself, just the incident ... [the sick boy j, and 
how I dealt with it, and we talked about having .,. disinfectant actually there for 
use in the hut '. 
There was no mention of Phoebe' s injured leg in the debrief notes kept by the Lodge. As 
discussed, Phoebe saw the incident as being the sick boy, but after listening to her story, I 
felt the HIPO incident was the whole trip, significant factors being Phoebe's leg injury 
which lengthened the trip considerably, her inexperience as a leader (her first leadership 
experience) and the bad weather. This combination could have led to a number of 
scenarios. I'm not sure if Phoebe realised the gravity of the situation. Her inexperience 
may have inhibited her ability to realise these factors were significant in her incident. Or, 
due to attributional bias, she may have chosen not to disclose these factors in the Lodge 
debrief I believe the former is more likely, as Phoebe had no hesitation in including these 
details in setting the scene and re-telling the story of her incident to me. 
Inexperience being a significant factor, I asked Phoebe how one came to be leader of a tramp at 
her school. Phoebe explained it thus: 
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... they obviously thought I could handle it ... I only had one trip to Rotoiti ... two years 
prior ... I was quite surprised ... frankly ... I'm not young ... I'm not strong in sport ... I 
really have to push myself to participate in things like abseiling ... I think my Head of 
Department accepts the fact that I relate well, especially with problem kids ... I had the 
qualities that he was looking for ... and ... fulfilled the criteria that he considers 
necessary for leadership ... it was a compliment, I just cOllldn 't believe it when he 
asked me. 
Phoebe did not mention any outdoor training or experience she had for the job, indicating that 
these skills were not considered vital for leading students on a tramp by her school. This 
contrasts markedly from opinions of outdoor leadership experts reviewed in Chapter Three and 
raises a substantive issue underlying the obvious points emanating from the data. It is clear 
that, like Phoebe, some teachers who lead outdoor education activities are not experienced 
or qualified for the job and therefore not fully aware of the risks. While they may learn 
substantially from their epics, improving their leadership as a result, the question begged is 
should they be learning whilst leading students in such a demanding environment as the 
outdoors? Also, what soci~l andprofession~l climate exists in the outdoor education 
setting, where perceptions of preparedness for the task of outdoor leadership fall so far 
short of the requirements? These important questions are not the primary concern of this 
research, but signal areas for further research. 
7.4.2 Conducive and non-conducive settings 
Hale (1989) argued that reporting and analysis were critical steps following a close call to 
prevent a recurrence. Nadler and Luckner (1992) agreed reflection was an important 
stage in the experiential learning cycle, as was application of what was learnt in new 
situations. I contend the setting in which this occurs is also crucial. To elucidate 
procedures which may be useful for schools to facilitate this important process, I asked 
respondents what kinds of settings were conducive to constructive reflection on an 
incident and which were not. Bruce summarised many respondents' views: 
... it depends on the context ... when I'm just informally talking with people, that's 
fine, but if somebody were to corner me and trying to be blaming me for 
something (laughs) then I would feel very uncomfortable ... and that's why I think 
it's really important to set up systems where people can do it. I think familiarity 
with the whole debriefing process is a big difference, because I've noticed a 
change in even my feelings about it ... that's taken time of being involved with the 
process and seeing the value of it ... When I'm in a group of people where it's the 
norm, then it's very easy, but when you've got a number who are not happy with it 
themselves, then ... it becomes difficult again. 
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Respondents identified conducive and non-conducive settings for talking about incidents. 
These fell into five categories: places, forums, people, times and elements (see Table 7.1 
below). Not surprisingly, most items on the conducive list had an opposite on the non-
conducive list, particularly in the 'elements' category. I have arranged items in opposite 
pairs to emphasise this. For example informal, non-judgemental, non-blaming settings were 
thought to be conducive to talking about incidents while formal, judgmental and blame-
based settings were not. If a school or outdoor education institution wanted to create a 
conducive environment for talking about incidents, the following would need to be 
present. An informal atmosphere, although a formal process would be fine if the 
programme was busy. The people involved would need to be familiar with the debriefing 
process within a culture that promotes reporting and discussion of incidents with a 
minimum of paperwork and a goal of acting on any recommendations. It would need to be 
a round table forum that was non-blaming, non-hierarchical, which happens soon after the 
event and away from students. 
7.5 Knowledge transferred - to prevent similar events infuture 
I asked interviewees what was said and done about an event (if anything) afterwards 
(research objective d). They were also asked what knowledge, learned from the event, was 
transferred to prevent similar events in the future. Focus groups were asked what usually 
happened to information gained from an event. 
Nadler and Luckner (1992) explained that 
The last part of the experiential learning cycle is an essential stage. In essence, it 
is the primary reason that we spend time reflecting and processing. At this point, 
we focus on the central question 'Now what? ' Individuals apply what they have 
learned during this experience to actual situations they are involved in ... (p.2). 
Interviewees identified particular knowledge they gained from their incident, how and to 
where this knowledge was transferred. Respondents said their primary goal was to apply 
the knowledge in new situations to reduce the chances of a repeat incident. 
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Table 7.1 Settings - conducive and non-conducive to talking about incidents 
tI.) 
~ 
U 
-< ~ 
~ 
informal comforlable, socially at ease 
• non-judgemental (2) 
• non-blaming (2) 
• non-hierarchical (2) 
• familiar with debriefing process, it's the norm 
• ego not threatened (2) 
• straight up (2) 
• open (2) trust (2) professional (2) sympathetic, 
sensitive receptive atmosphere, good working 
relationship with those involved 
• seems relevant, no retribution 
• accessible reporling system, min paper work 
• culture that promotes reporling, discussion 
and shan'ng of incidents, goal of learning 
• forn/al- ifbusy programme 
• formal process - self and peer feedback model 
• confidence in people in forum 
• fresh in your mind 
• students cannot overhear 
• quiet space [time] from incident 
• things are acted upon (2) 
Talking to adults 
• staff room at school (5) 
• away from students at camp (3) 
• comforlable 
• bars 
Talking to students 
• the playground 
• in the corridor 
• in hut 
• Lodge debriefs (4) 
• Meetings back at school (2) 
• safeforum 
• round tableforum 
• friend/ instructor/peer involved in outdoors (5) 
• interestedfriends! others (4) 
• non threatening people 
• meal or tea-break times (4) 
• while tramping with a group (2) 
• period after camp (2) 
on arrival back at school 
• formal 
• fear of judgement 
• blame-based atmosphere 
• male dominated hierarchy 
• people not happy with the debriefing process 
• threatening 
• lots of posture 
• staunch, concrete sequentialist, traditionalist 
debriefing situation (sequential - rigid, 
militaristic, of the old school) 
• huntingfor a scapegoat 
• reporl time consuming 
• fear of misinterpretation of report 
• time pressured 
• supervisors taken away from responsibilities 
• officey settings 
• a conference 
• pub 
• hospital 
• debriefwith authoritarian DP or Principal (2) 
• rigid 
• militaristic 
• person who wouldn't relate to situation (3) 
• authoritarian figure eg principal (3) 
• someone seeking to lay blame (2) 
• people not happy wilh debriefing process 
• somebody I don't know 
• debriefs held when students unsupervised 
eg, in kitchen (2) 
• when pressures and constraints on time (2) 
12 Number indicates number of times mentioned, no numbers means mentioned once 
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Each incident and the knowledge gained from it was unique, with little overlap between 
incidents. This was expected given the small sample (11) and diversity of incidents. A 
recurring theme however, was incidents were used as an example to prepare future 
students for camp in six cases. The types of knowledge transferred to new situations, 
ranged from technical matters to deep learning in the leadership area. I will use an example 
to illustrate this. Bruce's incident involved a student injuring her ankle on a snow craft 
course, whilst descending a spur from a snowy ridge to the bush. The group of 
approximately sixteen students and two instructors were delayed for three hours on an 
exposed spur in bad weather until a helicopter evacuated the injured student. Bruce 
applied the following knowledge to a similar situation in the future. 
• ... the map had some missing information as it was [parts on four [differentJ 
maps laminated together, so after the incident, I added the grid line numbers, 
map name and number to the Lodge maps 
• [IJ made students go a lot more quietly down until they reached the bush the 
folloWing year 
• [IJ took a different, safer route down to by-pass a steep section 
• [IJ used the incident to illustrate why you need to take flies etc 
It appears that far from thinking HIPO incidents were insignificant events without the 
possibility of serious harm, my respondents recognised them as critical incidents which 
provided sharp lessons in honing judgement and decision-making skills. Without 
exception, interviewees used the opportunity to reconsider their actions and act more 
conservatively in future now they realised what the consequences could be. They also used 
it to illustrate what could happen. It may also be useful for Lodge or school staff to 
integrate what was learned from incidents into a specific training package. For example, all 
staffwho lead the trip in which Bruce's incident occurred, could get together to highlight 
the above points and discuss strategies and routes for getting students safely down that 
section of terrain in the future. This would take about an hour and would be easy to 
arrange as the programme involves only one school. 
7. 6 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe what people said about an event and what 
they did about it (if anything) afterwards. Also, to elucidate procedures for incident 
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reporting and analysis (formal and informal) and determine which would be beneficial to a 
school's risk management plan (research objectives d and e). 
HIPO incidents were talked about extensively by respondents, and more informally than 
formally. Formal methods of processing events included debriefs at the Lodge and/or 
school, recording it in an incident report and/or debrief notes, verbal report to principal, 
deputy principal, parents and/or outside agencies. In addition the incident was often used 
as an example to prepare future groups for camp. Informal methods included talking to 
colleagues or friends (especially those experienced in the outdoors), family (especially 
partners), others involved (staff and/or students), story telling, joking about it and personal 
reflection. Processes that respondents found most helpful to constructive reflection on an 
event included informal talking, formal debriefs at the Lodge, talking to family, self 
reflection, joking about it and recording it. 
Settings which respondents found most conducive to talking about incidents spanned five 
categories: places, forums, people, times, elements. Respondents found places free of 
students such as the staff-room at school and the classroom at the Lodge ideal for talking 
about incidents. Safe, round table forums such as the Lodge debriefs and meetings back at 
school were also conducive. People they talked to needed to be non-threatening, involved 
in the outdoors or at least interested. Times most conducive to talking about incidents 
were down times such as meals or breaks. The following elements needed to be present in 
order for respondents to feel comfortable talking about their HIPO incidents: relaxed/ 
informal, non-judgemental, non blaming, non hierarchical, non-threatening, honest, where 
a sense of trust and confidence in others existed, open, formal receptive process, goal of 
learning, culture which promoted reporting and discussion of incidents, and a minimum of 
paperwork. 
Settings which respondents found non-conducive to discussing their HIPO incidents 
included places such as an office where a rigid traditionalist debrief took place with an 
authoritarian principal or deputy principal, people who could not relate to the situation or 
those seeking to lay blame. Time constraints and leaving students unsupervised when 
debriefing were also seen as impediments to constructive reflection. In addition, the 
following elements needed to be absent in order for respondents to feel comfortable 
~..::-::;:~:.::::~:~;:.;;:~):.~ 
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discussing their HIPO incidents :threatening atmosphere, male dominated, people unhappy 
with debriefing process, where there was fear of judgement or misinterpretation of a report 
and a time consuming report procedure. 
Respondent preferences for the types of settings where they could talk freely about their 
incidents bore out Joing's (1993) conclusions about changes to incident reporting 
procedures in the French rail industry. By building up a state of mind and a climate of trust 
in which employees would have no hesitation in reporting incidents, a better knowledge of 
what was not functioning correctly was achieved. This involved adopting flexible, error 
embracing management policies so the organisation could correct its behaviour by learning 
from its mistakes (Clark, 1980). Schools would do well to develop such a climate and 
procedures for the reporting of accidents and incidents in their outdoor education 
programmes. 
All respondents reported that knowledge gained from their event was applied to new 
situations to reduce the chances of a similar event recurring. So learning as a result of a 
HIPO incident did not remain with the learner, but was applied to new situations to benefit 
personal and programme safety. This was the final and most important stage of the 
experiential learning cycle and the primary reason for reflecting and processing according 
to Nadler and Luckner (1992). This study highlighted effective means of processing 
incidents at Rotoiti Lodge, which was an important step in accident prevention according 
to Hale (1989). Hence it can provide a model for other, similar programmes, to follow. A 
refinement could be that in appropriate cases, specific training sessions be designed to pass 
on information learned from an event to other teachers and instructors that would benefit. 
Finally, one by-product of processing HIPO incidents, was discovering some of the 
contributing factors to the events, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT Contributing factors to the HI PO incidents 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One I discussed the point that researchers had shown HIPO incidents and 
serious accidents to be similar, " ... the difference between a near hit and a fatality is often 
only afew millimetres or afraction of a second" (Mitchell, 1998, p. 40; also supported by 
Bird and Germain, 1992; Hale, 1989; Johnson, 1980). They stressed the importance of 
investigating contributing factors to HIPO incidents as they had similar causes to serious 
accidents. Consequently, objective c was to identify possible causes, ascertain patterns 
common to several incidents and structure them into recognised models of analysis. In 
doing this, I hoped to provide information to improve safety in Lodge and similar 
programmes and provide a future basis for comparison. 
8.2 Contributing factors to the HIPO incidents 
To identify contributing factors to the eleven HIPO incidents, I listed factors identified by 
respondents, added factors from the story, then checked Lodge incident reports. 
Consistent with the literature reviewed, HIPO incidents in this study were the result of a 
multitude of factors. Figure 8.1 shows a range of six to twenty five factors. 
Number of Contributing Factors Identified 
Jane-Lee 
Spur 
Ftloebe 
Gintirre 
~ Garth c 
ell 
"0 Fred & Bill (2) c 
0 
Co Fred & Bill (1) 
Xl a: Bruce 
Renal 
To~&Mriam 
Agatha 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Number 
Figure 8.1 Number of contributing factors to incidents identified 
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The types of factors leading to incidents in the study included significant and common 
causes of outdoor accidents from the literature along with those derived from the data. 
These are displayed in Figure 8.2 below and explained in the rest of the chapter. 
Contributing Factors to the HIPO Incidents (n=10) 
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unsafe act - studentls 
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Unsafe condition 
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overw eightlunftt student 
poor hygiene 
t 
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I 
t 
+ 
t 
t 
t 
t 
.7' .. I 
t 
o 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of incidents where factor was present 
Figure 8.2 Contributing factors to HIPO incidents by themes 
8.2.1 Significant causes from the literature 
8 9 
The following summary of factors, significant in the literature, featured in the stories. 
More information on the factors can be found in section 1.4. Factors are highlighted to 
relate them more easily to Figure 8.2 above. 
Like Helms (1984), this study found accepting increased levels of risk contributed to 
many incidents. Helms concluded that risk shift, get-home-itis and familiarisation with the 
situation were the three largest contributing factors to accidents. Garth, Agatha, Gintime, 
Fred and Bill described risk shift (where groups make riskier decisions than individuals) 
occurring in their groups. For example Garth thought they pushed the boundaries more 
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with an extra instructor and two extra adult assistants. The day before, with only two 
instructors, they took more conservative decisions. Get home-itis (forgetting everything 
once the end was in sight) was a feature in Bruce and Jane-Lee's stories. In their haste to 
get everyone back to the Lodge, a number of risks were overlooked. Too familiar with 
the situation (where experienced people who knew the territory well, had a reduced 
perception of the risks) manifested itself in Fred, Agatha and Bruce's incidents. The leader 
was feeling ok in the conditions, while students or teachers were stretched. Bruce's 
comments illustrate several of these factors as well as dropping your guard: 
I think we had probably let our guard down a bit, because we were heading home 
... we thought we were over the worst ... I was quite happy cruising along at the 
front of the group, thinking it was plain sailing, and maybe if I'd been stopping 
kids and cautioning them, it wouldn't have happened ... I'm really happy on that 
sort of country and I should have probably stopped and thought right, there might 
be some people here, although they're travelling alright ... they're not as aware of 
the dangers as I am. 
Meyer (1979) found that the majority of accidents in adventure programmes were the 
result of a combination of any of the following: an unobserved or underestimated unsafe 
condition, an unsafe act on the part ofa student or an error of judgement on the part of 
staff. These factors contributed to many ofthe HIPO incidents in this study as illustrated in 
Table 8.1 below. 
Table S.l 
Swift water 
Loose rock 
Inadequate 
area securi 
Unexpected 
water/ 
improper 
cloth 
Unexpected 
Snow13 
Principal causes of major accidents in adventure programmes (Meyer, 
1979), showing incidents where factor present (by respondent name). 
Gintime Poor position Bruce Unexpected or Gintime 
TomIMiriam new situation 
Unauthorised Gintime Desire to Renal 
procedure Phoebe, Spur please others Phoebe 
FredIBiIl a 
Tom! 
Miriam 
Unsafe speed Misperception Bruce 
Agatha 
Agatha Inadequate Garth Fatigue/ Phoebe 
water/ distraction Garth 
nutrient FredIBiIlb 
Garth 
intake 
FredIBill b 
Garth 
13 This category added to original table. 
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Haddock (1996a) identified wild card factors in a previous study. These factors involved 
unpredictable behaviour that took the leader by surprise and put them in a reactive mode, 
often without all the information. Seven incidents had wild card factors, three of which 
had two, as illustrated in Figure 8.3 below. Jane-Lee' s classic wild card factor is described 
in section 5.3.4. 
.rg 
c:: 
CD 
" c:: o 
Q. 
X! 
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Wild Card Factors 
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o 0.5 1.5 2 
Number 
Figure 8.3 Number of wild card factors pres(!nt in incidents 
8.2.2 Significant causes derived from data 
Further common significant factors were derived from the data as follows. Environmental 
conditions, particularly bad weather and cold contributed to ten of the eleven HIPO incidents. 
These factors are detailed in Figure 8.4 below: 
- -- ------ ---------
Environmental I Weather Factors 
cold 
poor visibility 
snow 
short day (w inter) .. bad weather 0 -U 1\1 dark II.. 
difficult terrain for evac 
cloudy 1--____ .... 1 . 
strong wind 
Lightning/torrential rain 
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Number of Incidents where factor was present 
Figure 8.4 Environmental factors present in incidents 
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Activities involving cold conditions, particularly snow, were significant in a previous 
analysis of accidents and incidents at Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre (Haddock, 
1993b). It is important to emphasise the setting here. Rotoiti Lodge is situated at the 
northern end of the Southern Alps at an altitude of 620 metres above sea level, so it is not 
unusual to get cold and wet weather or snow at any time of year. Such conditions are 
challenging for novices to cope with so appropriate gear and experienced leaders are 
essential for safety. If an incident occurs, cold and wet conditions serve to exacerbate the 
circumstances, as does the remoteness of the area, as illustrated by Fred and Bill's story. 
They, with a teacher aid, took a group offifteen learning development students, including 
an overweight student who was extremely slow, unfit and unmotivated, on a tramp around 
Lake Rotoiti in August. 
Fred ... on the way up he was dragging the chain, it was a nice fine day ... we got 
him up there after ... a fair amount of cajoling and grizzling ... The following day, 
it had snowed over night ... I made a decision to go ahead [and complete the 
Lakehead circuit} ... As we moved, it was starting to snow, it was only snow 
showers, flurries coming through .. : we kept in tow most of the way until we got to 
about Whiskey Falls ... after Whiskey Falls the snow was starting to settle quite a 
lot. I decided, well there's no point in going back, because it's a lot longer to go 
back than to push forward, thinking that the mini-bus was going to be there [at 
the road end}. Eddie was really dragging the chain ... So we ended up with Sue 
[the teacher aid] ... walking with Eddie and Bill as well. 
Bill ... That put me in an awkward position, I ... didn't know whether to keep up 
with Fred and his group, or stay back with Sue. Sue kept saying 'you go on' but I 
kept worrying that, when the snow started, whether I should have stayed with her. 
In the end I kept going, I was quite a way behind you guys. You've walked that 
track many times, that's the first time for me, and when the snow come down, in 
that clearing, it's quite hard to follow ... I was walking back on my own, I had to 
really concentrate on where I was going ... 
Fred ... with the snow ... all the kanuka and stuffwasjustfolded over ... we 
pushed right through [but} the mini-bus wasn't there, which complicated things as 
well ... they dumped their packs there ... on the road, and somehow, we hoped the 
van would've turned up ... and I turned around and walked back to pick up Eddie 
and Sue. His major problem was his mind ... he just winged and moaned and 
carried on '" 
Bill ... With the other group ... a couple of them weren't togged out properly ... 
it kept snowing and snowing ... and I was pretty tired by this time and I had that 
sore foot. And a couple of them wanted to lie down on the side of the road and 
they were quite serious about just having a rest ... had they been on their own, 
they wouldn't have got off their arses and they would've stayed there ... our group 
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fractured, walking down the road Damn hard to keep them together ... and I was 
getting knackered and grumpy. 
Many of the factors discussed so far are illustrated in the above story. The decision, at the 
beginning of the day to go ahead and complete the Lakehead circuit14, in my view, pushed 
the group's limits. The more conservative option to return the same way would not have 
pushed the group's resources to the same extent as they would have been back at the 
Lodge by the time the snow really set in. The snow compounded their problems, 
particularly that of keeping the whole group warm. This could only be achieved by keeping 
them on the move, which meant splitting the party. Once split, the smaller party was 
weakened considerably and communication was affected. Another complication was that 
staffback at the Lodge assumed they would return by the quickest, easiest route, due to 
the weather and the nature of the group. So the van was sent to a different road-end, 
meaning that it was not awaiting the group at the end oftheir arduous tramp. The 
disappointment of not seeing the van and the further four kilometre walk in heavy snow 
meant students' morale and physical resources hit a low point at this stage. 
On the positive side, this group had three staff members due to the nature of the group. 
Usually one staff member would be on their own or with an assistant. Fred and Bill 
contemplated this: 'We'd all be sitting there with Eddie, or leaving him behind ... 'to hell 
withyal' What would you do? Safety of the fourteen as opposed to one (Bill). 
The extreme weather conditions had not been experienced by Fred on this trip before, 
although Fred and Bill had experienced a strikingly similar incident on a previous trip to 
Bushline Hut which, being higher, is more prone to snow conditions. Again Bill remained 
behind the main group with two slow students on the way up. It was snowing and one 
student sat down and refused to go any further. After reaching the hut with the main 
group, Fred returned to assist the stragglers. They did not have far to go, and did make it. 
Fred said he did not expect such conditions on the Lakehead trip and was surprised to hear 
the resident teacher say it was not unusual. 
14 Completing the circuit to the road-end would take a minimum offour hours tramping with an average party. A slow party in snow 
conditions could take an extra two hours. The road end back to the Lodge is an extra hour, a total of seven hours. The alternative was to 
return the same way, a three hour tramp with an average group. The Lodge was a further 15 minutes walk from the road end. A slow party 
in snow conditions could take four to four and a half hours to complete the trip. 
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This reiterates a theme already developed in this thesis. As Charlie pointed out, a particular 
kind of incident may only happen once in a person's experience, so they don't always see 
the bigger picture. Helms (1984) substantiated this in identifying that the majority of 
serious mountaineering injuries and fatalities examined in two studies, were preceded 
within one year by a near miss incident or an accident of a parallel nature in the same area. 
Although the same factors had been present in previous years the group had undertaken 
the activity, the leaders or institutions had failed to recognise them as important. Other 
authors also identified this (Brett, 1994; Kauffman, 1989). 
This highlights the problem of having teachers who come to the Lodge once a year, 
leading trips in an environment where extreme conditions are possible at any time and for 
which they have little experience and are ill prepared. Resident teachers at the Lodge 
experience many seasons and environmental conditions over time so are more prepared for 
extreme conditions and used to adapting their decisions more conservatively to suit. But 
resident teachers cannot cover all groups in this programme, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
Haddock (1994) examined this problem. She found that of the 69 teachers currently 
leading the Lakehead tramp, 54 reported they had experience equivalent to the National 
Standard required of a voluntary Bush 1 Instructor (leading below the bushline). Therefore 
15 were leading the trip without this baseline of experience. Of the 55 teachers currently 
leading the Bushline tramp, four reported they had the skills and experience necessary to 
lead trips above the bushline in winter conditions. A further 45 reported experience similar 
to that required below the bushline and for six, their experience was well below this level. 
These staff would be operating in B or C zones (on the operation zones model, Figure 4.3) 
in good weather, however they would be operating in C or D zones in poor conditions 
(rain, snow, cold). Yet all staff could end up leading in such conditions, as happened in 
two incidents included in this study (phoebe and Fred/BiII). Thus the situation could result 
in staff exceeding their competence, compromising their judgement abilities and putting 
themselves and their students at risk. 
Fred and Bill's story worked out happily, but things could have gone wrong. Of concern in 
the Lodge programme, is how often teachers end up leading students on trips where 
conditions exceed their abilities. In other words, a tramping trip which started out in good 
t>.', 
120 
weather as a level two trip on the operation zones model, is changed to a level three when 
it snows, but the teachers' and students' abilities remain at levels one or two. As already 
discussed, this was an inherent risk in the Rotoiti Lodge programme, and may be the case 
in school outdoor education programmes elsewhere in the country. I believe this is a 
management problem not a teacher problem. Teachers volunteer to assist on school camps 
while Boards of Trustees and Principals, as managers, are responsible for programme 
standards and resourcing, including staffing. This issue is addressed in more depth in 
section 8.3.2. 
Five respondents talked of mis-placed responsibility with staff or studentls when a staff 
member or student was too inexperienced and failed to carry out a responsibility given to 
them or proved to be irresponsible. When responsibility for managing certain risks is 
placed with someone other than the leader of the outdoor activity, this is called risk 
transfer (Ewert, 1984). It is a risk management option when considering how to manage 
certain risks. This is an acceptable strategy when the party that responsibility is transferred 
to is competent to manage the risk, but problematic when they are not. Mis-placed 
responsibility was a factor in six cases in this study, as illustrated in Figure 8.5 below. In 
three cases the responsibility was transferred to staff (by Tommy, Garth, Agatha) and in a 
further three to students (by Spur, Tommy, Fred & Bill). 
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Incidents where responsibility was mis-placed with student or staff (by 
respondent name). 
An example where responsibility was transferred inappropriately was in Tommy and 
Miriam's incident, where two cases of risk transfer proved to be mis-placed. One instance 
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involved a student while the other involved a staff member. Tommy, Miriam (teachers) and 
a seventh former assisted the Lodge resident teacher (Meg) on a day of caving. 
Approximately 25 students were divided into three groups. Meg took eight or nine 
students and one teacher or assistant into the caves at a time for one and a half hours. 
Meanwhile, the other two groups did an activity or got prepared for their caving trip with 
the other staff member, who had been briefed by Meg beforehand. 
The incident occurred on the third trip into the caves. During the trip, a student slipped 
part way down a deep hole but was caught by Tommy just in time. Contributing factors to 
this were the student's Lodge hired torch went out as she approached the hole and the 
student assigned to guard the hole, did not do his job. Another student (Rosie) had an 
asthma attack as a result of being frightened by the first incident. She did not have her 
inhaler with her, but Meg had a spare in her first aid kit, although on its expiry date. 
Subsequently, Rosiehad prolonged breathing problems, preventing her from getting out of 
the caves unassisted. Her difficult evacuation from the caves took three hours. Tommy 
reflected on possible contributing factors to the incident. First, where responsibility was 
mis-placed with a student: 
T. ... as we were going around the cave, Meg had at certain points asked people to 
volunteer to go in behind her or to do a particular activity. Andwithin the group 
there was one boy that continually offered and nobody else did ... and I said to one 
of the other boys, as we were going along, why don't you offer to be the next one. 
And ... leading up to the incident ... when Meg asked, this guy didn't respond at all. 
And no one did, it was all very quiet, and then, finally ... this other boy ... said 'oh 
I'll give it a go' ... I've felt bad about the pressure I'd put on that kid for a start ... 
I was unhappy with myself, what I'd done. 
l Was he the one guarding the hole? 
T. Yeah, now, infact, [he has] not turned out to be ... a particularly ... reliable person, 
and subsequently ... his career is quite interesting ... Right so, that's something that 
sort of gnawed at me a bit for quite some time, and I still think of that, did I do 
something, at that beginning, which contributed to this whole thing? And so ... he 
went in, and was there to guard the hole and to direct the people to go up into the 
'Birth Canal' [a tight squeeze] part of the cave. 
Second, where Meg had transferred responsibility to Tommy to ensure the students had all 
the right gear before coming into the caves. Tommy said: 
And then, this quiet little voice just further along said ... 'Rosie is having an asthma 
attack'. And I remember my reaction was Oh God! 'Is she an asthmatic?' 'Yes. ' 'Has 
she got her inhaler? ' And then 'No'. And I thought, did I ask? And you know, I didn't 
ask I didn't check before we came in, didn't think about it. 
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This situation reiterates a theme which has come up already in this thesis, that of teachers 
who have limited outdoor experience, or who are not working in the outdoors regularly, 
failing to carry out responsibilities which are critical to safety. Furthermore, a 'trap' 
situation is prevalent because specialist outdoor staff rely on these teachers to carry out 
some responsible roles such as checking students have the right gear: clothing, torch and 
medication with them. At the time of the research, two specialists were usually shared 
among four groups over the week. On the caving day, one specialist was shared among 
three groups. So it is not surprising that responsibilities were not always carried out 
effectively, when staff did not have the training, skill or experience for the job. 
Additionally, staff often found activities like caving challenging themselves, so may not be 
in a position to cope with much responsibility outside of looking after their own needs. 
This is best illustrated by Martin and Priest's (1986) operation zones model, which shows 
that if you are challenged, you needto concentrate on yourself as your competence barely 
matches the activity demands. In order to take responsibility for others during an activity, 
you need to be operating in a state of 'unconscious competence' (Raiola, 1990) or in A or 
B zones on the model. 
Five respondents' noted a pre-existing health condition contributed to their HIPO 
incidents. These were blood in urine (Renal), students infected with vomiting bug (Jane-
Lee), flu (Agatha), torn muscle (phoebe) and hyperventilation/asthma (Tommy). Some 
conditions were known to staff in advance while others were not. Tommy's school 
changed their medical consent form as a result of the incident he had to deal with. Staff felt 
there was not enough room for care-givers to write adequate information about health 
conditions on the form, leading to inadequate information about the student being available 
during the incident. 
Four respondents identified that a shortage of skilled staff contributed to their HIPO 
incidents (Jane-Lee, Agatha, Tommy, Garth). It was also apparent in several other stories 
that this was the case. 
Missing or failed gear contributed to three incidents (TommyiMiriam, Fred/Bill, Garth). 
Missing gear included an inhaler, polypropylene and other warm clothing, paper and pencil 
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to write emergency information down and the non-availability ofthe mini bus. Failed gear 
included a torch and the inhaler on its expiry date. 
Overweight and unfit students were central contributing factors in two of the HIPO 
incidents. Bruce said the student who injured her ankle was 'not as fit as some of the 
others ... [and being] overweight made it difficult to shift her '. Her injury effectively 
immobilised the group for three hours on an exposed spur in bad weather until help 
arrived. Fred described Eddie as a slow, unmotivated student who was overweight but not 
the biggest kid in the group but he was physically unfit and a blob. Eddie's slow progress 
on a tramp led to staff splitting the party once snow began falling heavily, as it was difficult 
to keep everyone warm. 
Poor hygiene led to the rapid spread of a vomiting bug on Jane-Lee's camp where 
approximately fifty students and staff fell ill, some on tramps away from the Lodge. 
In summary, I have discussed just over half the factors identified as contributing to the HIPO 
incidents in the study. These were those found to be significant causes of accidents in the 
literature and others which were common to several events andlor seemed significant. Having 
done this, I will examine some models for incident analysis. 
8.3 Tools for incident analysis 
A number of accident and loss causation models have been developed over recent years to 
analyse events, to determine causes and possible areas for remedial and preventive action. 
Such tools are useful for examining catastrophic events where losses have been high like the 
Challenger Space Shuttle accident or HIPO incidents where losses have been minimal. 
Research shows that serious accidents and HIPO incidents are complex events resulting from a 
multitude of causes over several different stages. 
Current work indicates that accident causation is more web or tree-like than sequential. As a 
result, Fault Tree Analysis (Johnson, 1980) has been designed to identify all possible hazards 
with new technology as a pre-emptive loss control tool. Or it can be used after an event to 
determine all possible contributing causes. 
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Authors (Bird and Gennain, 1992; Kates et ai, 1985) have attempted to simplify these 
models, retaining key points to enable the analyst to identify critical factors which led to the 
accident or incident. In doing this, they imposed a sequential framework by dividing causes 
into different categories or stages which take account of temporal and systemic influences. 
Bird and Gennain' s research identified that the causes of most accidents can be traced back to 
a lack of management control. The following is an examination of these tools. 
8.3.1 Fault tree analysis 
Fault Tree models begin with the incident. Causal factors are linked to the incident by 'or' or 
'and' gates. An 'or' gate means that only one of the causes were present (either x or y or z). 
An 'and' gate means that all causes were present (x and y and z). Agatha's incident, where a 
teacher suffered mild hypothermia on his second caving trip, has been analysed using a Fault 
Tree model. Barry filled in for a teacher who had the flu' and was unable to go into the caves 
at the last minute. Students would have missed out if he did not do this. 
The Fault Tree showed a multitude of factors, many involving social and professional 
pressures (shaded in diagrams), which led to a teacher getting mild hypothennia. The first tree 
has three areas (A, B, C) which require trees of their own. This is a simplistic analysis, more 
investigation may reveal many more factors (the Challenger Space Shuttle accident fault tree 
was over 300 pages). Social and professional pressures on staff to lead activities, highlighted 
in this simple analysis, signal an area for future research. 
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8.3.2 Causal pathways / pathways to change 
Bird and Germain's loss causation model (figure 8.7 below) incorporated five stages of an 
accident! incident, originating from a lack of management control. 
THE ILCI LOSS CAUSATION MODEL 
LACK OF BASIC IMMEDIATE INCIDENT 
CONTROL CAUSES CAUSES 
1. Inadequate 
program Personal Substandard Contact 
2. Inadequate factors Acts with 
program & energy 
standards Job Conditions or 
3. Inadequate factors substance 
compliance 
to standards 
Figure 8.7 Loss causation model (Bird and Germain, 1992, p. 22) 
LOSS 
People 
Property 
Process 
Kates et aI, identified six stages of an accident/incident and notably, identified pathways 
between each stage where action could be taken to block or mitigate events from culminating 
in a serious loss. Haddock (1993a, p. 71) amalgamated these models to produce the Pathways 
to Change model (see Figure 8.8). These authors sought to simplify the web-like structure of 
an accident or HIPO incident into a linear model. In doing this, they recognised an accident or 
HIPO incident was not purely a sequence of events but acknowledged the multi-linear links 
between causes. Figure 8.8 below is an analysis of Agatha's incident using the Pathways to 
Change model. 
The analysis clearly showed that there were opportunities (pathways) between different stages 
of the event where strategies could have been used to block the progress of the incident and 
mitigate losses. Additionally, a lack of control at institution or management level was a 
systemic or root cause of the HIPO incident. Although staff did their best to lead students at 
Rotoiti, there was no guarantee that school staff were suitably experienced for the job, yet the 
programme relied on them leading some activities. So while standards and policies were in 
place for the activities, inadequate specialist outdoor staff to carry these out adequately was a 
weakness in the structure. This was a management rather than a staff problem, as management 
have responsibility for ensuring national industry standards are met and resourcing the 
programme accordingly, which includes staffing. This has been a recurring theme in this thesis. 
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Causal pathway analyses of all incidents in this study can similarly be traced back to the 
management level of responsibility. This is consistent with industrial research, where the 
majority of serious events can be traced back to a lack of management control (Bird and 
Germain, 1992). 
CAUSAL SEQUENCE C> 
Systems Conditions Events Outcome Consequence 
LACK OF BASIC IMMEDIATE INCIDENT LOSS 
CONTROL CAUSES CAUSES 
- Inadequate Persollal-Not - Immersion in - Teacher gets - Teacher: loss 
instructors psychologically freezing cold cold of body heat & -, -Reliance on ~ prepared -~ water .. f-,~ psychological 
untrained staff -cold and wet trauma 
-No contingency Job -pressure to 
- No effort to Stlldellts: 
keep Barry curtailed caving if staff sick lead when other 
teacher sick 
warm & dry trip 
Change ModifY Block Block Block 
Systems Conditions Events Outcome Consequence 
-Employ Persollal- check -Use wet exit for -Hot drink -Method 
adequate staff ifphysically & last exit only to -Adequate warm unknown so only 
(or programme: f-+ psychologically f-+ keep staff dry -. & dry clothes --. option: 
4RT's prepared -Staffhave time -keep moving -Stop party 
-No caving if Job- no reliance (or hot drink & -More clothes 
inadequate staff untrained staff change clothes -Exit caves early 
Figure 8.8 Pathways to Change - Incident 1, Teacher - Mild Hypothermia (Adapted from 
Bird and Germain, 1992; Kates et aI, 1985 by Haddock, 1993a) 
8.4 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe possible contributing factors to the HIPO 
incidents to ascertain patterns common to several incidents and to structure these using 
recognised models of analysis (research objective c). Consistent with the literature, HIPO 
incidents in the study were not the result of a single cause. Interviewees identified from six to 
twenty five contributing factors to their incidents. Some factors identified were common and 
significant causes of outdoor accidents in the literature, for example: risk shift, familiarisation 
with the situation, get-home-itis, unsafe condition, judgement error (leader) unsafe act 
(student), and wild card factors. 
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Other factors were derived from the data. Not surprisingly given the setting, environmental 
conditions, particularly bad weather and cold featured in ten of the eleven HIPO incidents. 
Responsibility was misplaced with a student or staff member in five incidents. This was a 
feature of concern, as the way Rotoiti Lodge was staffed at the time of the research, 
necessitated that inexperienced staff or students were routinely relied upon to carry out tasks 
which were critical to safety. This situation was typical of many school outdoor education 
programmes at the time of writing. Other factors featuring in the data included pre-existing 
health condition, shortage of skilled staff, missing or failed gear, overweight and unfit student 
and poor hygiene. 
I structured incidents using two recognised models of analysis, Fault Tree Analysis (Johnson, 
1980) and a Causal Pathway (adapted from Bird and Germain, 1992 and Kates et ai, 1985 in 
Haddock, 1993a). Fault tree analysis showed HIPO incidents to be complex events involving 
numerous variables interacting in different ways, reinforcing that serious incidents were more 
web or tree-like than linear and therefore complex events which were difficult to manage and 
predict. The fault tree analysis reinforced the hindsight bias (Philipchalk, 1995), that we tend 
in looking back, to overestimate our ability to foresee actual consequences. The causal 
pathway analysis showed that incidents had multiple causes that were spread throughout 
several different stages of an incident. Between stages were pathways where intervention 
could mitigate losses. Notably, incidents were often the result offactors which only 
management had control over, for example, employing enough trained staff. This was 
identified as an underlying cause of several incidents in this study. 
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CHAPTER NINE Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined several dimensions of incidents in outdoor education. I aimed to 
investigate high potential incidents and the actions that resulted through a case study of 
Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre. Additionally, I aimed to ascertain meanings of the 
events for those involved and elucidate suitable mechanisms for their analysis for preventive 
purposes. The study affirms that lllPO incidents are indeed meaningful events for those that 
experience them and that they have significance for safety and preventive purposes. It also 
indicates that suitable mechanisms for incident analysis depend on conducive settings being 
established. 
The thesis consists offour centdtl topics embodied in the research objectives; the meanings of 
lllPO incidents for teachers and instructors including definitions, effects and significance; the 
possible causes of incidents and patterns common to several events; how incidents were 
processed; and procedures for incident reporting and analysis which would benefit a school's 
risk management plan. These provided the framework for the literature reviewed and the 
results chapters which followed. I reappraise the objectives next, summarising the most telling 
of the outcomes and drawing them together in a final analysis and evaluation. I then discuss 
implications of the findings. Lastly I consider future research needs before concluding the 
chapter and thesis. 
9.2 Final evaluation of research objectives - Summary of main findings 
9.2.1 Meanings of HIPO incidents 
Meanings oflllPO incidents to respondents and others involved were explored in a three 
pronged approach encompassing in-depth examinations of definitions of related terms, effects 
the events had on those involved and attempting to determine the significance of events using 
a tool from industrial research. 
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9.2.1.1 Definitions 
Respondents' definitions of accident and incident most resembled industrial rather than 
outdoor definitions in the literature, indicating outdoor definitions need revision, at least for 
the New Zealand context. Bird and Germain's definitions were endorsed as suitable with 
minor adjustments (highlighted) to reflect respondents' emphases: 
ACCIDENT 
• An undesired event that results in ... harm to people, damage to property and loss to 
process. 
There are three parts to the definition: 
1 Does not limit human results to injury. Harm to people includes injury, illness and 
death as well as adverse psychological amI/or emotional effects. 
2 Does not confuse 'injury' with 'accident '. They are not the same. Injuries, illnesses 
and death result from accidents. But not all accidents result in injuries, illness or 
deatlt. This distinction is critical . ... The severity of an injury that results from an 
accident is often a matter of chance. It depends on many factors, such as reactions 
based on skills, dexterity and judgement. 
3 If the event results in property damage ami process loss, and no injury, it is still an 
accident. Process loss alone does not constitute an accident Often, of course, 
accidents result in harm to people, property and process. (Based on Bird & Germain, 
1992, p. 18). 
Respondents were aware that some incidents were very serious, more so than some accidents, 
so understood the concept ofaHIPO incident and referred to these as 'near misses' or 'close 
calls' . 
INCIDENT 
• An undesired event which, under slightly different circumstances, could have resulted 
in harm to people, damage to property and loss to process. 
The incident is usually referred to as the "near accident" or "near miss." ... the 
incident is similar to an accident, but without injury or damage ... incidents are 
enormously important to safety. An incident with high potential for harm (HIPO) 
should be investigated as thoroughly as an accident. (Bird and Germain, 1992, pp. 19-
20). 
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No definition for an outdoor epic was found in the outdoor literature, but approximately half 
the respondents understood the concept in the outdoor context, indicating the term was 
exclusive to the outdoors culture. Epics had several meanings according to the teachers and 
instructors, one of which was synonymous to a HIPO incident. The elements which 
contributed to this particular meaning were used to develop a framework for defining the 
term: 
EPIC 
A long, hard, strenuous outdoor trip, involving a chain of events that puts people in a 
reactive mode, pushing their limits so they feel out of control. It is a mqjor, 
unforeseen event involving perceptions of high risk and adventure which creates 
stress. Memorable learning experiences that people survive, they are often glamorised 
afterwards, creating the 'epic '. 
The HIPO incident took its plac~ as a serious event and one manifestation of the outdoor epic 
story was finally seen for what it was, the reconstruction of a near miss, making the event 
, visible whilst maintaining face in a culture quick to judge in hindsight whilst quick to revere 
heroic deeds. From this we can learn to listen carefully to epic stories told in outdoor 
education, for they may contain important learning points. We should also continue to create a 
culture in outdoor education where HIPO incidents are talked about openly and honestly and 
not judged but learned from. 
9.2.1.2 Effects 
Effects of HIP 0 incidents on those involved were profound, ranging from physical effects to 
effects on their feelings and emotions. The affective nature of HIP 0 incidents made them most 
memorable experiences for respondents indicating they were important events in their lives. 
HIPO incidents had effects on the respect for, trust and confidence felt between colleagues, 
which was not always mutual or symmetrical. Experienced outdoor educators and instructors 
trusted and had confidence in each other but not their less experienced teacher colleagues. 
Teachers trusted and had confidence in each other and their more experienced colleagues, but 
not in parent or student assistants. So like trusted like and less experienced trusted more 
experienced, but the reverse of this was not always true. Instructors knowingly had to rely on 
inexperienced people for tasks and decisions critical to safety at times in the programme, due 
; .::'. ~ -""" : .. ' ~'. 
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to a lack of experienced staff. One instructor treated teachers and assistants as novices rather 
than extra staff when it came to calculating ratios. Mention ofthis issue was not found in the 
mostly American outdoor leadership literature examined, although it was found in pilot work 
for this research. An explanation could be that most outdoor leadership is carried out by 
professionals in the U.S. and consequently ignores the issues surrounding classroom teachers 
as outdoor leaders. This signals an area for future research and policy development. 
The study revealed that although students involved in a HIPO incident were affected by it 
physically or emotionally, some did not realise the gravity of the situation. Whereas staff 
realised it was a serious near miss, they reported that students were more likely to think it was 
an adventure. Although identified in pilot work for this research, no mention of this difference 
between staff and student perception was found in the literature examined. Indeed no research 
examined, focused on students' perspectives of HIP 0 incidents or accidents. An unsafe act on 
the part of the student did feature in the literature and contributed to incidents in this study. 
Investigating student perspectives in future research may determine whether more astute 
student perceptions of risk lead to safer behaviour and therefore involvement in outdoor trips. 
For example, education campaigns targeting youth, on the dangers of drink and speed when 
driving are having a positive effect on reducing road deaths in that age category. 
9.2.1.3 Significance 
According to the results of this study, it is possible to measure the significance of an event 
using the Albrighton (1993) risk assessment model. Incidents scoring three or more on the 
matrix, like the eleven incidents in this study, should be investigated as thoroughly as an 
accident involving serious loss according to the literature. While the tool proved more reliable 
in determining seriousness than probability of events, it proved a reliable indicator of three 
plus events, so was useful in determining significant events for preventive purposes. Schools 
therefore, ought to consider using the tool to determine incidents which require reporting, 
analysis and remedial action. 
9.2.2 Possible causes, patterns, structured analysis 
Consistent with the literature, HIPO incidents in the study were the result of a multitude of 
factors. Some factors identified were common and significant causes in the literature such as 
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risk shift, familiarisation with the situation, get-home-itis, unsafe condition, judgement error 
(leader), unsafe act (student) and wild card factors. Other factors, derived from the data, 
included bad weather, particularly cold, responsibility misplaced with a student or staff 
member, pre-existing health condition, shortage of skilled staff, missing or failed gear, 
overweight and unfit student and poor hygiene. Considering the small sample, there was a 
surprising amount of overlap of causal factors, indicating many incidents have similar 
underlying causes which makes some areas for remedial action more identifiable. 
Two models for structured incident analysis were examined. Fault tree analysis illustrated the 
complexity of a single event, suggesting incidents may be more difficult to manage and predict 
than initially thought and reinforcing the hindsight bias. The pathways to change model 
illustrated that, at least in hindsight, it appeared there were opportunities to intervene and 
block the incident's progression and hence mitigate losses. Additionally, it showed how 
incidents progressed through a number of stages and most could be traced back to factors 
which only management had control over. This reinforced a theme repeated often in the 
research, that a shortage of skilled and experienced outdoor staff at Rotoiti Lodge contributed 
to many incidents in the study. This was seen as the Trust's responsibility, as they had control 
over resourcing the Lodge, to ensure that appropriate national standards, including staffing, 
were met. 
9.2.3 How HIPO incidents were processed 
This study found that respondents processed events formally and informally. The most helpful 
methods of constructive reflection on an event were informal talking, formal debriefs at the 
Lodge, talking to family, self reflection, joking about it and recording it. The most conducive 
settings to processing events were described by respondents as an informal atmosphere 
although a formal process would be fine ifthe programme was busy. The people involved 
needed to be familiar with the debriefing process, within a culture that promoted reporting, 
discussion and sharing of incidents with a goal of acting on any recommendations and a 
minimum of paperwork. It would need to be a round table forum that was non-blaming, non 
hierarchical and non threatening which happened soon after the event and away from students. 
Respondent preferences for the types of settings where they could talk freely about incidents 
bore out successful reporting procedures in the literature. Where a climate of trust was 
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created, incidents were reported more readily, a better knowledge of what was not functioning 
correctly was achieved and they could learn from and act on their mistakes. 
All those involved in incidents in the study were also involved in Lodge debriefs of the event. 
This was routine practice at the Lodge. This was a departure from a previous study where 
some respondents were excluded from any processing of an event back at school or there was 
simply no formal or informal debrief after the event. Those who missed out were usually 
outdoor instructors employed by the school for the specific camp only. These people, due to 
their experience would most likely have had a valuable input to make after a serious event. 
This signals an important area for policy development. 
Incidents were used as examples to prepare students for subsequent Rotoiti camps. 
Respondents also modified their own behaviour and programme policy as a result of what they 
learned from incidents. This was salient evidence of the most important stage of the 
experiential learning cycle, where reflection was followed by application of the knowledge in 
new situations. This final stage afforded the programme and people the benefit of the 
considerable knowledge gained from incidents, identified as a crucial accident prevention 
measure in the literature. 
9.2.4 Procedures for incideqt reporting and analysis beneficial to schools 
The research results suggest that setting up incident reporting procedures would be beneficial 
to a school's risk management plan. Analysis procedures discussed may also be beneficial, 
particularly the pathways to change model, as it specifically identified intervention points and 
strategies to block incident progress as well as management control issues which the 
programme or school may need to address. Albrighton's (1993) risk assessment model was 
also thought to be useful for determining significant events which required further analysis and 
remedial action. In order to enjoy these benefits however, a conducive environment for 
constructive reflection on events first needed to be established in the school. 
9.3 Implications oftTtefindings 
The research findings outlined above highlight some problems and solutions regarding 
incidents in outdoor education, elements of which have important implications for the 
management paradox regarding safety and risk. The implications concern Rotoiti Lodge 
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Outdoor Education Centre; school outdoor education in general; and future outdoor education 
research. There is some overlap between the first two categories. 
9.3.1 Implications for Rotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre 
A recurring theme in the thesis was a lack of appropriately skilled and experienced staff to lead 
all groups in residence at the Lodge for the week. This situation contributed to many of the 
incidents in this study as it required outdoor educators and instructors to routinely rely on 
their less experienced colleagues and in some cases students for tasks critical to safety and led 
to teachers with limited skills and experience leading activities. If a HIPO incident occurred, 
teachers were pushed to their limits and sometimes beyond in an effort to resolve the incident, 
suffering high stress levels in the process. The implications of problems associated with 
staffing Rotoiti camps relate to the management challenge of balancing safety and risk. These 
are set out below. 
1. The management committee ofRotoiti Lodge Outdoor Education Centre need to re-
evaluate the experience, skills and training required of an outdoor leader of activities at 
Rotoiti Lodge. Specifically, constituent schools need to develop a structured leadership 
development programme, based on accepted national standards. These are outlined in the 
current Lodge Safety Manual (Haddock, 1996b). To ensure programme safety, teachers 
need to be 'locked' into levels of res ponsibilitiesl activities which are tied to their current 
logged training and experience. 
2. Furthermore, each school needs to examine the culture surrounding outdoor education 
camp involvement, for social and professional pressures on staff to accept leadership roles 
where appropriate experience and skills are absent. The balance needs to shift from teachers 
with a lack of experience being encouraged and expected to lead trips, to staff being 
encouraged and supported towards attaining appropriate experience, skills and training for 
the job which needs to be compliant with current outdoor industry standards (outlined in 
Watts, 1996 and Haddock, 1996a). 
3. Before a group arrives at camp, staffwho can adequately meet the leadership requirements 
of programmed activities need to be allocated. If this is not possible within the current staff 
of the school, outside specialists could be contracted to work on the camp or programme 
activities curtailed to match staff experience and skills. Resident teachers should not be put I .• _.' ••.• ' ... 
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in the position of arguing for these baseline standards each week with a group, rather there 
need to be agreed policies between constituent schools which all are bound to adhere to. 
4. Given the current emphasis on adventure activities in Lodge programmes, the Trust should 
seriously consider employing four resident outdoor educators to lead activities so all 
schools can be confident of appropriately skilled and experienced leaders for their four 
groups each week. This will enable staff to build up important local knowledge of the 
programme activities, activity sites and seasonal weather conditions which all impact on the 
balance between safety and risk. It will also eradicate the need for reliance on inexperienced 
staff to carry out responsibilities which are critical to safety but beyond their level of 
competence. 
5. A vote of confidence in the incident reporting culture and systems established at Rotoiti 
Lodge is due. Schools would do well to emulate and build on these in other outdoor 
programmes they run if they haven't already. Refinements to the Lodge and school incident 
reporting procedures would be to introduce the use of Albrighton's (1993) risk assessment 
model to determine significant events requiring further analysis and remedial action. The 
pathways to change model is also recommended for its usefulness in identifying intervention 
points and strategies to block incident progress as well as management control issues the 
Trust or constituent school may need to address. 
9.3.2 Implications for school outdoor education 
Those responsible for the management and administration of outdoor education programmes 
are increasingly under financial pressure to make school programmes cost effective. This is at 
a time when professionalism in outdoor leadership and standards of accountability for outdoor 
safety have never been higher. Ameliorating these pressures is a necessary but huge challenge, 
if outdoor programmes are to be maintained at current levels. Programme curtailment in line 
with teachers' outdoor competence is another choice. Or, schools could wait for the inevitable 
outdoor education disaster to necessitate acting on these issues. A proactive approach is 
recommended in favour of the reactive. 
1. Managers of school outdoor education programmes need to evaluate the experience, skills 
and training required of a leader for their programmed outdoor activities. Specifically, 
schools need to develop a structured leadership development programme, based on 
accepted national standards (as outlined in Watts, 1996, or other appropriate publications), 
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with teachers 'locked' into levels of responsibilities I activities which are tied to their current 
logged training and experience. 
2. Furthermore, schools need to examine the culture surrounding outdoor education 
programme involvement, for social and professional pressures on staff to accept leadership 
roles where appropriate experience and skills are absent. The balance needs to shift from 
teachers with a lack of experience being encouraged and expected to lead trips, to staff 
being encouraged and supported towards attaining appropriate experience, skills and 
training for the job which meets current outdoor industry standards. 
3. Current Ministry of Education policy in outdoor education may need to be scrutinised for 
the extent to which it addresses issues surrounding teachers as outdoor leaders. 
Specifically, have support systems been put in place and appropriate funding made available 
which enable schools to provide effective outdoor leadership that meets current outdoor 
industry standards? Legislators and educational policy makers may need to revise resource 
allocation and design suitable processes within the education system which facilitate the 
above. 
4. At the planning stage of outdoor education activities, staff need to be selected who 
adequately meet leadership requirements. If this is not possible within the current staff of 
the school, the programme should be curtailed to match staff experience and skills or 
outdoor specialists contracted to support the programme. 
S. Schools need to recognise the significance of incidents, particularly HIPO incidents in their 
outdoor programmes. 
6. Given the benefits to safety of having incident and accident reporting and analysis 
procedures in place and the fact that they are a statutory requirement, school outdoor 
education programmes would do well to set these up. But as the success of such 
procedures depends heavily on a conducive environment, this needs to be established in the 
school as well. A culture needs to be created where it is okay to talk about these events 
openly and honestly with all involved. Components would need to include those discussed 
in section 9.2.3. 
7. Ifa school contracts outdoor instructors to work on programmes, these people need to be 
involved in the programme planning and incident reporting procedures also. 
8. School outdoor education programmes ought to consider using Albrighton's (1993) risk 
assessment model to determine incidents which require reporting, analysis and remedial 
action. Additionally, they should consider using the pathways for change model to assist in 
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identifying intervention strategies to block event progress and identify management issues 
they may need to address. 
9.3.3 Implications for outdoor education research 
Very few studies have focused on incidents, especially in outdoor education. Such studies are 
needed on the basis that it is very difficult to manage problems when local issues have not been 
identified. Whereas New Zealand classroom teachers have traditionally worked in outdoor 
education programmes, in the United States the job is mainly done by professionals. The New 
Zealand situation creates safety issues in outdoor programmes which are absent from the 
mainly American literature. So New Zealand researchers cannot assume that issues raised in 
the literature apply to New Zealand or that all important issues concerning a topic in outdoor 
education are contained in the existing literature. 
Although outdoor education research is scant in this country and a vast amount on many 
topics is required to build up a picture of the local situation, I have identified several topics for 
further research as a result of the present work. 
1. An increased understanding of teachers as outdoor leaders. It is clear that some teachers 
who lead outdoor education activities, have a skill level which is inadequate for the 
programme and environment. They are therefore not fully aware of the risks they are 
taking. While they may learn substantially from their epics, the question begged is should 
they be learning whilst in charge of students in a demanding environment such as the 
outdoors? How did become outdoor leaders? On what basis - training / experience? A 
comparative study of the experience, training, skills and qualifications teachers have, 
compared to professional outdoor instructors with similar responsibilities, may supply 
answers to the above questions. This may be achieved by surveying a random sample of 
teachers and instructors from a variety of areas throughout New Zealand, supplemented by 
some interviews and focus groups. 
2. A related and intriguing area to that in number 1 would be a qualitative investigation and 
analysis of the social and professional pressures on teachers to lead outdoor education trips 
and activities. Also, what socio-professional climate exists in the outdoor education setting, 
where perceptions of preparedness for the task of leadership fall so far short of the 
requirements? These may include: 
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• guilt feelings if students are to miss out if they do not lead 
• fear of being thought incompetent if admit feeling uncomfortable about leading 
• obligation to school to lead since they already pay you and hiring a professional will 
cost extra money which the school either does not have or has higher priorities for 
• pressure of tradition - teachers have led outdoor activities in the past 
• fear that outdoor education will die in schools if all who lead need specified 
experience and training 
• reluctance to stay home when sick or disclose sickness on camp as this may mean 
students miss out 
• ethic (and expectation) of involvement in extra curricular activities eg drama 
production, camp, sport 
3. An area, related to the above two, would be a qualitative study comparing experts' and 
novices' abilities to resolve lllPO incidents or serious accidents in the outdoors. 
4. An investigation ofmeaningsoflllPO incidents for students who have experienced them in 
order to compare these with meanings for staff. Test if students are more likely to 
conceptualise a lllPO incident as an adventure. Also examine student perspectives of risk 
taking and if these bear on their propensity to perform unsafe acts in the outdoors (a 
significant cause of accidents in the literature). 
5. An investigation of the effects oflllPO incidents on victims, their families and community. 
6. An in-depth examination of the outdoor epic to answer the question 'is the epic 
synonymous with a lllPO incident experience or is it the reconstruction of the event into an 
embellished adventure story, heroic in nature?'. In other words, is an epic the experience or 
the story? or both? 
7. An in-depth investigation of the positive outcomes oflllPO incidents and serious accidents. 
Specifically try to increase understanding of the extent to which lllPO incidents or epics 
are a training ground for outdoor instructors and leaders, and the appropriateness of this. 
8. An investigation of the ideas of teachers and instructors regarding an acceptable level of 
risk in outdoor education. Examine these in terms of society's standards. 
9. A survey of the number of outdoor education camps and activities held in New Zealand 
annually and the number of staff and students involved. This would provide an excellent 
baseline and background for all outdoor education research. 
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9.4 Conclusion 
The nature of outdoor education means that safety and risk are intertwined in the experience. 
In the quest for positive outcomes of risk such as adventure and challenge, outdoor education 
experiences will inevitably brush with the negative consequences of risk, accidents and 
incidents. The outdoor leader plays a vital role in balancing safety and risk, with leader 
competence inextricably linked to safety. 
Incidents with high potential for harm afford an opportunity to analyse these dynamics without 
the emotionally charged situation of a death to tiptoe around. Against a background of having 
got away with it, the meanings of these events have been examined along with how the 
incident was processed. Contributing factors were analysed on a micro and macro scale and 
the significance of events estimated. Focusing on these topics in a specific case study 
organisation has gone some way to address the broader issue of risk management in outdoor 
education in New Zealand schools.· 
The study has indicated that the provision of sound risk management is difficult as schools live 
through a period of change involving economic pressures and an analogous increase in 
professionalism and safety standards in the wider outdoor industry. It appears that schools 
have been unable to keep up with these developments, specifically, failing to ensure that 
outdoor education programmes are staffed at a level which meets current outdoor industry 
standards. Traditional management approaches to outdoor education have been shown to 
contribute to IllPO incidents in this study. In a climate of increased accountability for safety 
across industry sectors, these approaches are outdated and I am not the first to signal this to 
schools. These issues pose a most significant challenge to managers of school outdoor 
education programmes and education policy makers alike. 
A new era in the evolution of outdoor education in schools has been unfolding with the use of 
specialist outdoor educators and instructors on school camps. While it is acknowledged that 
employing specialists to support programmes is unlikely to lead to the eradication ofIllPO 
incidents, as these are very common occurrences, trained and experienced outdoor instructors 
are in a better position to resolve incidents. Due to unconscious competence in their activity 
and crisis management skills, the outcomes of events which do occur are likely to be reduced. 
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In addition, programme safety is not compromised by inexperienced staff being routinely relied 
upon to carry out tasks that are critical to safety. 
Principals and Boards of Trustees must be careful to assess the competence of their staff 
against responsibilities in outdoor education. It is vitally important that staff are encouraged 
and supported in the development of their skills and experience for leading outdoor activities 
as in other curriculum areas, rather than expected or pressured to lead activities beyond their 
abilities. Or, options can be investigated for hiring specialist outdoor staff to support 
programmes where necessary. Such alternatives to traditional approaches may be possible by 
reassessing and re-allocating current school resources and priorities. But informed government 
intervention and support would ensure more streamlined and sustainable changes which meet 
current industry standards. These measures will go a long way to strengthening existing 
outdoor education programmes and indeed ensuring their survival. The prime beneficiaries 
would be students, their parents, teachers, school outdoor education programmes and their 
staff and New Zealand society at large. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I Case study 
This is based on an actual incident which occurred. On the first night of camp, the staff 
decided to take the students outside to play spotlight. They all went outside at about 
9.30pm, the students were counted as they passed out the door. 42 students went out to 
play. There was a deaf student amongst the group, and he went out as well. All students 
were buddied up, including the deaf student. After an hour of playing the game, the van 
hom was tooted which was the arranged signal that the game was over and it was time for 
everyone to come back inside. There was a count of the kids coming back in the door and 
only 41 returned. At 10.30 at night, they realised that the deaf student had not come back. 
So, the students were all paired up to go out and look for the deaf student. Several students 
were questioned about his last known whereabouts etc. The last place that the student was 
seen was the first place that was searched. All the students went out in pairs, 4 or 5 staff 
and parents went out also and a staff member looked after the whole show back at base 
(the Lodge). After another hour of the students and staff searching with torches and 
shouting the boy's name, the hom went again to get everybody back in. There was still no 
show of the deaf student, and four more students did not return from the search. Staff 
searched for these students for another 20 minutes, found them, and brought them back to 
the Lodge. It was the middle of winter, with snow around on the ground, but a fine clear 
night. At midnight, the Resident Teachers were phoned to come up and assist. 
Outcome 
The resident teachers arrived at the Lodge at 12.1 Opm to find that the student had walked out 
of the bush and into the Lodge by himself. He had thought that the game was still going 
during the search, so continued to hide. Once the lights went out in the Lodge hall, he figured 
the game was over, so came back in. 
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APPENDIX II Risk assessment model 
Albrighton's (1993) risk assessment model ranks the probability and seriousness of events in 
order to produce a risk factor. Thus the significance of individual events may be estimated. 
Seriousness 
II) 
u 
~ o 1 2 3 u 
0 u 
0 0 1 2 3 
<+--
0 
.~ 1 1 2 3 4 -:g 
2 .0 2 3 4 5 
8 
Po. 
3 3 4 5 6 
Risk Factors 
Figure 1.1 Risk Assessment Model. (Albrighton, 1993: 18). 
DESCRIPTORS FOR MODEL 
Probability Ranking Points: Seriousness: 
o 
1 
2 
3 
Very unlikely 
Slight possibility 
Medium possibility 
Highly possible 
o 
1 
2 
3 
D/no consequence 
Marginal 
Quite serious 
Catastrophic 
Probability Points + Seriousness Points = Risk Factor 
Albrighton (1993) recommended that an incident with a risk factor of three or more should 
generate further investigation, analysis and corrective action. Incidents with a risk factor of 
three or more were the focus of this study. 
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APPENDIX III Research procedures 
The following is an outline of information gathering procedures used for the study, including 
interview questions and topics discussed. 
In-depth interviews: 
Flow of interview. 
Briefing. Thanks for agreeing to be a respondent for my study. The information gained from 
this interview will assist me to investigate how safety and risk management procedures in 
outdoor education can be improved. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
I am interested in understanding more about incidents which happen here at Rotoiti, in 
order to prevent similar recurrences. I am not interested in attributing blame. I have 
incidents myself, they are a common phenomenon. 
This is an informed consent document, to let you know what will happen to the 
information gained from the interview, and that you can withdraw from the study if you 
wish. Can you read it now, and then we can both sign it. This is your copy to keep. 
I am interested in an incident you have experienced in the last two and a half years, 
which had high potential for serious harm. 
Do you mind ifI audio-tape the interview? 
The interview will then be conducted. 
Interview Schedule. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
How would you define an accident, incident, epic? 
Would you tell me the story of a high potential incident you have experienced whilst 
leading or co-leading an activity at the Lodge? What happened, including events leading 
up the incident which may have occurred well before the actual incident itself? When did 
it occur? 
What was the meaning of that incident for you? 
Can you describe your feelings, physical state, emotional state whilst dealing with the 
incident? 
How did it affect your leadership? 
How has/will it affect your involvement in outdoor education? 
What did others say? What did others do during the incident? 
What did you learn from the experience? 
What do you believe were the possible contributing factors to the incident? 
What did you say after the incident? What did you do after the incident? How was the 
incident 'processed' (formally, informally)? 
How are these sorts of events debriefed officially, at the Lodge, at school? 
How have you processed this event personally, professionally so far? 
What processes were helpful in your view? Who helped? 
Can you describe how comfortable you felt talking about the event afterwards? 
What sorts of settings did you feel were conducive to discussing the incident and which 
were not? 
.... " ... ' .', .... 
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What knowledge, if any, that was gained from the event, was or will be transferred to 
prevent future similar events? 
Rate the incident using the Albrighton risk assessment model. 
Debriefing. During the debriefing stage of the interview, I allowed time for 'even keeling' 
(sharing an experience of an incident I had experienced). This was intended to finish the 
interview on more of an 'even keel' than if the respondent only had made her/himself 
vulnerable. Then a topic of mutual interest was discussed before terminating the interview. 
Focus Groups: 
Each focus group involved three to six staff from the school in residence at the Lodge. 
Discussions were audio-taped and transcribed. 
Briefing. Similar to that for in-depth interviews. 
Topics for Focus Groups 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Define an accident, incident, epic. 
What meanings are associated with incidents? 
How, in your experience, are these events processed (analysed / debriefed) afterwards? 
Formal ways, informal ways. 
What happens to the information surrounding these events? 
What sorts of settings, are conducive to constructive reflection on an event? Which are 
not? 
Case study to discuss and rate using the Albrighton risk assessment model (to be 
developed from themes which emerge from earlier interviews). 
Debriefing Thank everyone for their participation. Have a cup of tea and informal chat 
together. 
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APPENDIX IV Informed consent form 
I am currently undertaking research work for my Master of Applied Science Degree in the 
Department of Human & Leisure Sciences at Lincoln University. 
You are invited to participate in a study which investigates incidents with high potential for 
harm in outdoor education and the actions that result from them. The research attempts to 
determine incident analysis procedures that could enhance safety in the programme, and 
assist schools to comply with the Health and Safety in Employment Act, 1992. 
Your participation could include being interviewed or being involved in afocus group 
discussion. I also wish to let you know that you may withdraw your consent to participate in 
this research or your consent to have any of the information obtained from you used in any 
written reports in this research, up until August 31, 1997 when I begin the data analysis. 
I undertake to ensure your confidentiality in the following ways. I wi II not let any person 
listen to tapes or see transcripts of observations and interviews, other than a research 
assistant, myself and my supervisors, unless I have your written permission. These transcripts 
and tapes will not identify you or your school. I will not publish any information gained from 
observations and interviews whether as research paper/thesis or in other academic media 
except in the form of extracts, pseudonym'ously identified, or in the form of numerical data. 
Thank you very much for your help in my study. If you have any concerns or queries, please 
discuss with me or contact my supervisors. 
Cathye Haddock 
Postgraduate student 
Supervisors: Dr Pat Devlin 
Pip Lynch 
Department of Human & Leisure Sciences 
P.G. Box 84 
Lincoln University, Canterbury. 
Tel: (03) 325 2811 
I have read and understood the above and on this basis I agree to participate as a respondent 
in the project. I consent to publication of the results with the understanding that my identity 
will remain confidential. I understand that I may withdraw from the project up until August 
31, 1997 (including withdrawal of any information I have provided). 
Signed: 
Date: 
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